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General introduction
A brief history of interventions
Interventions on foreign exchange markets have been widely used by several countries as an important
stabilization tool in the last decades. As discussed by Dominguez and Frankel (1993), the perception of
interventions as an efficient way to manage exchange rates has substantially evolved over time. As we
will see in the following paragraphs, this view has especially been influenced by the exchange rate system
in place in industrialized countries.
During the 1950s and the 1960s, the international financial system was organized by the Bretton
Woods agreements. Main international currencies were then pegged to the US dollar (i.e. the reserve
currency). That is, the dollar had taken over the role that gold had played under the gold standard
system prevailing in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The sustainability of the system was ensured by
occasional interventions aimed at impeding currencies to deviate of more than plus or minus one percent
from their parity with the dollar. Clearly, in this framework, the decision to intervene was automatically
taken depending on exchange rate developments. As a consequence, at that time, interventions were less
seen as an independent and discretionary policy tool than a necessary adjustment mechanism.
The Bretton Woods system collapsed in the early 1970s. The excess demand for dollars due to the US
macroeconomic expansion of the end of the 1960s and the inability of US authorities to credibly manage
their balance of trade deficit contributed to the failure of the system. Indeed, international reserves, and
especially those of the Federal Reserve system, were not sufficient to defend the fixed parities over the long
run. By 1973, a managed floating exchange rate system supplanted the Bretton Woods fixed one. The
dollar kept playing the role of reference currency. In this new system, interestingly, interventions were
used episodically to influence the level of exchange rates and to counter excessive currency fluctuations.
An example of the latter may be found in the interventions conducted, from the end of 1974 to early
1975, by the United States, Germany and Switzerland to fight the depreciation of the dollar against the
Deutsche mark and the Swiss franc.
At the end of the 1970s, US authorities organized the depreciation of the dollar as a response to their
increasing trade deficit. However, the decline of the dollar got rapidly out of control, especially against
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the mark. Then, in November 1978, the United States was joined by Japan, Germany and Switzerland
to “rescue” the dollar. By the end of the month, the dollar had risen and the operation appeared totally
successful. This success was however temporary since the dollar fell again until the end of the year. It
is only at the beginning of the 1980s that the decline actually stopped and that the dollar began its
appreciation. From that period until the late 1985, US authorities became rather reluctant to intervene.
Indeed, the United States only stepped into the market occasionally with small amounts. Interestingly,
several of these operations remained undetected by the market at the time they occurred (Dominguez
and Frankel, 1993). The “laissez-faire” strategy of the Reagan’s administration (related to the belief
that markets were globally efficient and that dollar fluctuations need not any particular official response)
contrasted with that of other countries. In particular, in Europe, interventions continued to be used
in the framework of the European Monetary system (the successor of the European currency snake) in
which currencies were linked to avoid excessive fluctuations and to keep them within a narrow range. In
Japan, authorities also intervened on several occasions to sustain the yen against the recovering dollar.
The appreciation of the dollar against major currencies continued until the Plaza agreements were
negotiated in September 1985. The G-5 countries (i.e. the United States, Japan, France, Germany and
Great Britain) joined into several concerted interventions to depreciate the dollar that had been the
object of an irrational “speculative bubble” (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993). The strategy appeared to
be effective since the dollar actually stopped rising. It should be noted, however, that the Plaza episode
occurred as the dollar had already begun its landing after the conduct of several interventions at the
beginning of 1985. In particular, Germany intervened several times in February and March but only a few
of these interventions were reported (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993). Nevertheless, the Plaza agreement
is generally considered as the turning point in the intervention strategy that occurred at that time. In
February 1987, the G-7 countries (i.e. the G-5 countries plus Italy and Canada) agreed at the Louvre
to act in concert to maintain the dollar at the level it had reached after the Plaza episode. Indeed, this
level was seen to be consistent with the evolution of macroeconomic fundamentals. Several interventions
were then conducted by the United States, Germany, Switzerland and Japan to sustain the value of the
dollar. Interestingly, interventions of this period were, for the first time since 1985, aimed at appreciating
the dollar.
The strategy of stabilizing interventions adopted at the Louvre was maintained until the mid 1990s.
In 1995, a clear shift toward fewer interventions was observed in most countries. Beine et al. (2004a)
and Fratzscher (2004) noticed that official talks (i.e. oral interventions) largely supplanted traditional
currency transactions for the management of exchange rates. Indeed, after 1995, the United States only
intervened once, in December 2000, to support the euro. The United States acted in coordination with
the European Central Bank (ECB), Great Britain, Japan and Canada. Before being replaced by the
ECB (that has intervened only on four occasions since the introduction of the euro, in 1999), Germany’s
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last intervention also occurred in 1995. Overall, most industrialized countries have abandoned progres-
sively the use of interventions in the last years and have rather focused on communication strategies
for the implementation of their foreign exchange policy. However, Japan is a notable exception. It has
maintained a frequent-intervention policy over the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s. It is only in
March 2004 that Japanese authorities changed their strategy.
The Japanese case
While theoretical elements discussed in this work are general, the empirical analysis is exclusively based
on the Japanese experience. Two main arguments make of Japan an interesting case of study. The first
one is the variety of intervention strategies adopted by this country’s authorities in the last years. Ito
(2003, 2006) divides Japanese interventions between 1991 and 2004 into three sub-periods according to
the presence of E. Sakakibara (Mr. Yen) at the head of the International Finance Bureau that is in
charge of the exchange rate policy at the Japanese Ministry of Finance.1 E. Sakakibara is known to have
adopted a policy of sporadic and massive interventions.
The pre-Sakakibara period (1991-1995) corresponds to a period in which interventions were frequent
and the amounts invested were small. During the Sakakibara period (1995-2002), only a few interven-
tions were conducted and the amounts engaged were large.2 Interestingly, while oral interventions have
been used during all the period of interest, an important peak was reached during the Sakakibara pe-
riod. Finally, interventions were very frequent during the post-Sakakibara period (2002-2004). Indeed,
Japanese authorities acted in the market on about 40% of trading days between 2003 and 2004, with
average amounts. This sub-period is also striking since about 80% of interventions were secret (i.e. not
contemporaneously detected by market participants), especially, during the first quarter of 2004 (Beine
and Lecourt, 2004). The intensive use of secret interventions is peculiar to the Japanese case. This con-
trasts with other countries’ experiences, in which a clear trend toward much more transparent policies
is generally observed. The pattern of Japanese interventions is summarized in table 1.
The overall macroeconomic situation of Japan in the last years is the second argument pleading for
the study of the Japanese case. In particular, as can be seen on table 2, Japan entered a period of
deflation at the end of the 1990s. At the same time, it engaged in a liquidity trap as the official discount
rate decreased from 5.5% in July 1991 to 0.1% in September 2001. The discount rate stayed at that level
until July 2006 where it began its slow increase. These elements are essential to understand the objective
of the exchange rate policy conducted by Japanese authorities at that time. The strategy was clearly
aimed at depreciating the yen while it was already undervalued with respect to the dollar. This may be
1Japan provides official data on its interventions only from 1991 onwards.
2The so-called Sakakibara period goes from June 1995 to January 2003 despite E. Sakakibara was present at the Ministry
only until July 1999. This is explained by the fact that H. Kuroda (E. Sakakibara’s successors) claimed that he would
follow the same strategy. H. Kuroda left the Ministry in January 2003.
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Table 1: Japanese interventions over the 1991-2004 period
Interventions Amount Secret (%) Oral
pre-Sakakibara (1991-1995) 166 46.8 16.9 147
Sakakibara (1995-2002) 49 519.5 0 437
post-Sakakibara (2003-2004) 128 273.4 80.5 93
Whole period (1991-2004) 343 65.1 38.2 677
Note: “Interventions” indicates the number of interventions conducted by Japan since 1991. The
average amount (in billions of yen) of interventions per period is in “Amount”. The percentage of
secret interventions is in “Secret” and “Oral” reports the number of oral interventions.
seen as an attempt to “import” inflation at a time in which pure monetary measures were inoperative
(as proposed by Svensson, forth.). To illustrate this, consider the situation in the last quarter of 2003
and in the first quarter of 2004. The dollar was on average at a rate of 108.1 yen, however, according
to Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2006), the misalignment with respect to an exchange rate consistent with an
external equilibrium between Japan and the United States exceeded 8%. That is, there still was room for
an appreciation of the yen against the dollar of more than 8%. Nevertheless, all interventions conducted
during that period were yen selling operations with a cumulated amount of 20,622.6 billions of yen.
Table 2: Evolution of prices in Japan (1991-2004)
Period Average inflation rate (%) Period Average inflation rate (%)
1991 3.3 1998 0.7
1992 1.7 1999 -0.3
1993 1.3 2000 -0.7
1994 0.7 2001 -0.7
1995 -0.1 2002 -0.9
1996 0.1 2003 -0.3
1997 1.7 2004 0.0
Note: Data on monthly inflation (measured by the consumer price index) in Japan is available on
the Japanese Ministry of International Affairs and Communications’ website (http://www.stat.
go.jp/english/data/cpi/).
More generally, the specific situation of Japan makes of it an interesting ground of research for the
examination of the relation between the exchange rate and monetary policies (Fatum and Hutchinson,
2004). In particular, it is crucial to see how the objectives of both policies can be reconciled and whether
or not this has consequences for the general foreign exchange strategy . Indeed, the discordance between
both policies may have huge implications for the determination of the characteristics of interventions
(Dominguez and Frankel, 1993).
12
Defining interventions precisely
We have seen that interventions have been used over time by several countries to influence exchange
rates. While the concept of intervention is quite common, it is worth defining it precisely. Interventions
are traditionally defined in the literature as “any transaction or announcement by an official agent
of a government that is intended to influence the value of an exchange rate or the country’s stock of
foreign exchange reserves” (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993). From this general definition, several types
of interventions can be distinguished according to whether they involve currency transactions or not.
Oral or verbal interventions are pure announcements or speeches, made by official agents, that do not
involve any currency transaction. These announcements allow authorities to signal to market participants
their vision on foreign exchange market developments, without having to endorse any financial cost.
They are principally used to indicate a discomfort concerning the exchange rate level or volatility and
eventually to “warn” the market that authorities are ready to “back their words with concrete acts”. In
a sense, oral interventions may be seen as a first line of defense when exchange rates are behaving in an
inappropriate way.
The study of oral interventions is not an easy task for researchers. Indeed, authorities do not provide
data on their official speeches in a structured way (i.e. there are no official datasets indicating the days
in which an official speech occurred). Other sources than official ones must then be used to gather the
data. Oberlechner and Hocking (2004) have shown that newswire services efficiently report important
information flowing through financial markets. The information provided by newswire sources is also
useful because it often reflects traders’ own analysis and interpretations on market developments. That
is, this information permits having a precise overview of the actual perception of market participants.
Therefore, the method that has been used in most recent works (see Beine et al., 2004a and Fratzscher,
2004 among others) to determine whether an oral intervention was conducted on a specific trading day
consists in examining news reports issued by newswire services on that day. This method is actually
similar to that used in earlier works in which the research of relevant news reports was based on the
examination of the financial press (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993 and Dominguez, 1998). The use of
newswire services is, however, more precise since it provides information that is not necessarily reported
by the press (i.e. the raw information directly available to market participants).
In this work we used the Dow Jones and Reuters’ Factiva online database to obtain news reports.
Factiva is a search engine that dramatically simplifies the research of relevant reports. It proposes
several research tools like the possibility to search for key words in specific locations of the news reports
(e.g. title, heading or whole text). A sample of news reports obtained with this technique and used to
determine days in which oral interventions were conducted by Japanese authorities is provided in table
3.
As a policy tool to manage exchange rates, oral interventions suffer from an important limitation.
13
Table 3: Example of oral interventions obtained using newswire sources
Date Source Relevant text of the news report
2nd April 1993 Agence France-Presse “It is not desirable for the yen to fluctuate
wildly in a short period of time,” Ozaki
[Japanese Vice-Finance Minister] added.
“Currently, the yen is swinging too much”.
11th December 1997 New York Times E. Sakakibara, Japan’s Vice Finance Min-
ister for International Affairs, said the ex-
cessive yen weakness was undesirable. Mr.
Sakakibara added that Japan would take
the appropriate steps in the currency mar-
kets.
9th December 2003 Dow Jones Int. News “The yen’s latest surge against the dollar
is out of step with economic fundamen-
tals” , Japanese Finance Minister S. Tani-
gaki said Tuesday, a clear signal to traders
that Tokyo remains poised to curb the
yen’s rise through market intervention.
Note: This sample of oral interventions were obtained through the Factiva (http://www.factiva.
com) online database using keywords such as “Bank of Japan/BoJ”, “Ministry of Finance/MoF”
and “intervention”.
Simple talks may not be able to convince the market that authorities are determined to actually correct
things. That is, oral interventions may be considered as “cheap” policy measures by market participants.
Actual interventions may then be viewed as more credible than oral ones since they are currency oper-
ations in which authorities invest their own financial assets (i.e. they take a higher risk). Interestingly,
by carefully choosing the characteristics of the intervention (e.g. the amount invested, the market in
which the operation is implemented or whether it is conducted unilaterally or in coordination with other
countries), authorities can “fine tune” the message sent to the market. Naturally, oral interventions
could transmit an explicit objective or strategy in a more efficient way. However, in practice, this is not
the case. Authorities tend to communicate only general orientations and not precise targets (see the
analysis of Stein, 1989 concerning cheap-talk strategies). Therefore, actual interventions clearly have an
important role to play in the implementation of foreign exchange measures.
By contrast to oral ones, data on actual interventions is publicly available in several countries. It is
in particular the case for the United States and Japan. These countries provide the precise date, the
amount and the currencies involved for each of their interventions on a quarterly basis (we talk then
about official interventions series). Note that most countries only publish daily aggregated data on
their interventions (i.e. the precise amount and timing of operations conducted within a day are not
available).3 Table 4 reports a sample of actual interventions conducted by Japan.
3Canada, Denmark and Switzerland are exceptions. However, the data is not available to external researchers.
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Table 4: Example of actual interventions
Date Market Intervention
5th May 1991 JPY/USD 13.9 billions yen bought.
10th April 1998 JPY/USD 2620.1 billions yen sold.
5th March 2004 JPY/USD 1244.6 billions yen sold.
Note: “Intervention” reports the amount transacted by Japan on a sample of intervention days.
Data on Japanese actual interventions is publicly available on the Japanese Ministry of Finance’s
website (http://www.mof.go.jp/english/e1c021.htm).
The determinants of interventions
The reasons why authorities intervene have been largely examined in the literature for several countries
and periods. These researches have focused mainly on understanding the occurrence of actual interven-
tions by using so-called reaction functions.4 Reaction functions are helpful in describing the decision of
authorities to intervene or not. Several studies have considered ad hoc reaction functions (Baillie and
Osterberg, 1997 and Ito, 2003). Other works have adopted a more formal approach by considering that
authorities solve a loss minimization program when intervening (Almekinders and Eijffinger, 1996; Ito
and Yabu, 2007 and Kearns and Rigobon, 2005). In this framework, losses arise as a consequence of the
exchange rate behaving in an inappropriate way. Optimal interventions are then seen as an efficient way
to correct unwanted exchange rate dynamics and to reduce losses.
An important aspect of the intervention activity is that they are not conducted on a continuous
basis. In other words, relatively to all trading days, the proportion of days in which interventions
are conducted is small. The reluctance of authorities to intervene might come from the existence of
substantial costs related to the intervention activity such as bureaucratic ones (for a detailed discussion,
see Almekinders, 1995). Given this particular feature, reaction functions have been generally estimated
with non linear econometric methods like friction or ordered probit models (Almekinders and Eijffinger,
1996 and Ito and Yabu, 2007). These specifications allow the estimation of “no interventions bands”
reflecting the infrequency of interventions. The main empirical results indicate that interventions occur
to counter deviations of the exchange rate level from authorities’ exchange rate target or to fight large
misalignments. Interestingly, the role of exchange rate volatility as a determinant to interventions is
not clear. That is, most empirical researches have failed in finding evidence that authorities intervene
for volatility purposes (see among others Baillie and Osterberg, 1997 and Beine et al., 2002). This
contrasts with official declarations indicating that volatility is a primary concern.5 Nevertheless, recent
improvements in the way volatility is evaluated (i.e. by the use of the realized volatility) may improve
4It is usual in the literature not to mention explicitly whether an intervention is an oral or actual one. Generally, the
context is sufficiently clear for the reader to understand of what type of intervention it is question. We adopt the same
convention here.
5As we will see, interventions tend to trigger volatility. Therefore, authorities may be reluctant to intervene in periods
of excessive volatility.
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the situation (Andersen et al., 2005 and Beine et al., 2006). Another important finding concerns the
observation that interventions deeply depend on the occurrence of other interventions in the preceding
days. Ito and Yabu (2007) suggests that this may be due to the fact that, once the decision to intervene
has been taken by authorities, the cost of intervening in the subsequent days, if the situation has not
changed drastically, is lower.
Given the focus of the literature on actual interventions, the determinants to oral ones have not been
studied much. A notable exception is the work of Fratzscher (2005). He analyzes two reaction functions
explaining respectively the occurrence of oral and actual interventions. His main results indicate that,
in practice, oral and actual interventions tend to be “coordinated domestically”. This suggests that they
are used on the same periods. A possible interpretation of this is that authorities have the ability to
switch from one type of measure to another depending on market conditions. In other words, if a simple
talk is not sufficient, authorities can rapidly decide to implement currency operations.
So far, no work has considered oral and actual interventions in a single framework that would allow
examining their relations in detail. Indeed, determining the circumstances causing authorities to use one
type of intervention rather than another is crucial to fully understand the intervention strategy adopted
by major countries and for policy evaluation. In the first chapter of this thesis, we propose a new ap-
proach to reaction functions that includes oral interventions alongside actual ones. The analysis is based
upon the signaling framework (see below) and a theoretical discussion of costs related to interventions.
Our approach allows classifying the different types of interventions according to the “strength” of the
signal they convey. An ordered probit model is then estimated using data on Japanese actual and oral in-
terventions over the period 1991-2004. The data on oral interventions is obtained using newswire sources
as described above, and official series were used for actual interventions. This specification is useful
to explain the occurrence of each type of intervention. Furthermore, the model allows evaluating the
extent to which oral and actual interventions are substitutes or complements. The results indicate that
authorities tend to adopt progressively stronger measures as the exchange rate behaves in an increasingly
unfavorable way. This suggests that words (i.e. oral interventions) and acts (i.e. actual interventions) are
used as complements only in extreme cases. More generally, the use of the different types of interventions
deeply depends upon the state of the market.
Interventions and the monetary base
An important characteristic of actual interventions that contrasts with oral ones is that they can influence
the monetary base. This feature will determine if the intervention is independent from monetary policy
measures or is per se an additional policy tool. Non sterilized interventions are not independent from
monetary policy as they affect the monetary base just as a stand alone open-market operation would. On
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the other hand, sterilized interventions do not influence the monetary base and constitute a policy tool
well suited to manage exchange rates without interfering with monetary policy. Since most industrialized
countries claim to sterilize their interventions, researchers concerned with foreign exchange policy have
generally focused on sterilized operations.6 In the case of Japan, it is important to note that recent
researches have put into evidence that, between 2003 and 2004, about 40% of the funds injected in the
market by official yen selling operations were not sterilized (Watanabe and Yabu, 2007). This contrasts
with the previous period in which interventions used to be fully sterilized.
To understand the sterilization process, we can consider a situation in which the Japanese authorities
intervene on the JPY/USD market to depreciate the yen. Accordingly, they will sell yen and buy dollars
and the Japanese monetary base will increase. If the process ended there, the intervention would be
a non sterilized one. However, the change in the monetary base induced by the intervention may be
incompatible with the general stance of the monetary policy. To avoid this, Japanese authorities could
conduct an open-market operation (i.e. sell yen-denominated treasury bonds for an amount equivalent
of that of the intervention) additionally to the intervention itself. As a consequence, the monetary
base would remain at its initial level. Importantly, while the monetary base remains unchanged due to
the sterilization operation, it is not the case of the relative supplies of domestic and foreign currency
denominated assets. Indeed, the open-market operation causes the proportion of yen-denominated assets
to increase. As we will see, this will have important implications.
Sterilization operations generally consist in conducting an open-market operation of the same amount
as the intervention in order to offset the effect on the monetary base. More formally, as described by
Dominguez and Frankel (1993), for an intervention to be fully sterilized and to leave the monetary base
unchanged, any variation of net foreign currency denominated assets (∆NFA) needs to be canceled out
by a variation of net domestic currency denominated assets (∆NDA). This is illustrated by equation
(1).
∆NFA+∆NDA = ∆MB = 0 (1)
We have already indicated that major industrialized countries claim to sterilize their actual interven-
tions. While this is an excellent reason to analyze the sterilization process, it is not the principal one.
One of the most important reasons behind most countries sterilizing their interventions is to prevent
them from interfering with monetary policy. Indeed, monetary and foreign exchange policies may not be
controlled by the same agencies. Therefore, knowing who exactly is in charge matters. In other words, it
is essential to examine carefully the actual institutional organization underlying the intervention activity.
6In the rest of this work, if it is not explicitly mentioned, the term “intervention” actually holds for “sterilized interven-
tion”.
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The institutional organization underlying interventions
The literature on interventions generally refers to “central bank interventions”. However, for many
countries, this assertion is only “superficially correct” (Ito, 2006). Indeed, in Japan and in the United
States it is respectively the Japanese Ministry of Finance and the US Treasury (i.e. political authorities)
that are in charge of the foreign exchange policy. The Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve only play
the role of agent by implementing intervention orders.7 Note that in the Euro Zone it is the ECB that
controls the foreign exchange policy and which decides interventions consistently with its price stability
objective.
The actual institutional structure in which interventions are decided on, and its potential implications
for the intervention activity, have not been considered explicitly in the literature. Doing so requires
formalizing a framework involving two agents (i.e. a political authority and the central bank) that do
not necessarily pursue the same exchange rate objectives. Furthermore, they will both face losses if the
exchange rate follows an inappropriate dynamics. Therefore, the sensitivity of the political authority to
the central bank’s losses (i.e. the extent to which it may internalize them) can potentially have huge
implications for our understanding of the decision and designing process of interventions. Indeed, since
it is the political authority that has the ultimate power of intervening, it will face a complex trade-off
between the achievement of its own objectives and the central bank’s. That is, knowing who is actually
in charge may be crucial for the study of reaction functions (Ito, 2006).
In the second chapter of this thesis we build up an interaction model for an economy in which a
political authority controls the foreign exchange policy and the central bank only implements transac-
tions orders. This framework is used to extend traditional reaction functions by allowing the optimal
intervention to be the result of the trade-off faced by the political authority between the achievement of
its own objectives and the central bank’s. The empirical relevance of the theoretical model is assessed by
estimating a friction model on the Japanese experience between 1993 and 2000. This corresponds to a
period in which Japanese operations were sterilized and in which foreign exchange and monetary policies
could be seen as being separated (Watanabe and Yabu, 2007). Our results reveal that the magnitude of
Japanese actual interventions was actually the outcome of the interactions between the Japanese Min-
istry of Finance and the Bank of Japan. More precisely, interventions tended to be of a larger scale if the
Ministry of Finance had the possibility to reduce both its and the BoJ’s losses by intervening. On the
other hand, when the Ministry of Finance could not act without hurting the BoJ’s interests, it intervened
more reluctantly.
7It is generally convenient to simplify the analysis by referring to the “central bank” or “monetary authorities” as being
the authority responsible of interventions. In this work, we adopt the same approach. However, when it is relevant to know
who is actually in charge we will mention it explicitly.
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Transmission channels of sterilized interventions
In countries in which the institutional organization is similar to that described in the previous section,
the sterilization process may be thought to be required to ensure the independence of the central bank
for the conduct of monetary policy or, at least, to avoid interferences with monetary policy measures.
Sterilization has also implications for the way interventions operate. Indeed, by definition, sterilized
interventions will not work through the traditional monetary channel.8 This is also the case for oral
interventions. Two main theories have been proposed to explain how sterilized interventions and oral ones
can influence exchange rates. The so-called portfolio balance channel only concerns actual interventions
while the signaling channel concerns both actual and oral interventions.9
The portfolio balance channel is based on the assumption that agents only hold two types of assets:
foreign and domestic currency denominated assets. Importantly, these assets are not perfectly substi-
tutable. As the proportion of these assets changes because of the sterilization process, the exchange rate
has to adapt to incite agents to hold the assets whose proportion has increased. This mechanism is well
described in Edison (1993) and is represented by equation (2).
Bt = bN,t + stbF,t (2)
At the equilibrium, the supply of domestic currency denominated bonds (Bt) should equal the demand
of domestic currency denominated bonds emanating from nationals (bN,t) and foreigners (stbF,t) when
expressed in domestic currency units (st is the domestic price of the foreign currency). bN,t and bF,t
depend principally upon the interest rate differential and the national income. Then, assuming the
income to be constant and given that an intervention does not have any effect on the interest rate if it is
sterilized (i.e. the monetary policy remains unaffected), at the equilibrium, a change in Bt (due to the
sterilization process) supposes a domestic currency depreciation. Considering again the example in which
the Japanese yen selling intervention brought about an increase of the proportion of yen-denominated
bonds, according to the portfolio balance channel, st must increase for the equilibrium to hold. That
is, the yen has to depreciate which, in our example, is exactly the objective Japanese authorities were
pursuing.
Three main drawbacks affect the portfolio balance channel and make it not completely satisfactory to
explain how interventions work. First, the “other things being equal” assumption may be too restrictive.
Indeed, expectations on exchange rate movements may alter the demands without necessarily affecting
the exchange rate. Second, for these portfolio effects to be significant, the amount of interventions should
be sufficiently large with respect to the size of the market. However, given the market turnover, this
8The monetary channel supposes that changes in the money supply have direct effects on exchange rates through supply
and demand mechanisms.
9Other theories have been proposed like the noise trading channel (Hung, 1997) or the coordination channel (Reitz and
Taylor, 2006). However, the portfolio balance and the signaling approaches still remain the most popular.
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might not be realistic.10 Third, the portfolio balance channel cannot explain how oral interventions work.
In order to avoid these limitations, another approach has then been developed.
The signaling channel has been proposed by Mussa (1981) and supposes that interventions (whether
they involve financial trades or not) may influence exchange rates as long as they convey private infor-
mation from authorities to market participants. If this piece of information is relevant and is observed
by agents, they will adapt their expectations and their transactions decisions in accordance. Equation
(3) describes the situation well. It represents the exchange rate dynamics as an efficient forward-looking
process (Dominguez, 1998). Again, st is the domestic price of the foreign currency, δ is the discount
factor, zt+k is a vector of exogenous variables and Ωt is the information set available at time t. If au-
thorities intervene to depreciate the domestic currency and the information provided by the intervention
is credible and non ambiguous (Ωt + It > Ωt), the exchange rate will indeed depreciate.
st = (1− δ)
∞∑
k=0
δkEt(zt+k | Ωt) >(1− δ)
∞∑
k=0
δkEt(zt+k | Ωt + It) (3)
It should be noted that stricto sensu, the signaling channel supposes that the information conveyed
by interventions signals future changes of monetary policy. However, most authors consider that inter-
ventions provide general information on fundamentals (including changes of monetary policy).11 The
signaling channel has received a strong support in the literature. Most empirical studies have stressed
that interventions mainly operate through the signaling channel (for surveys see Dominguez and Frankel,
1993 and Sarno and Taylor, 2001 among many others) rather than through the portfolio balance one.12
These studies are important for policy purpose as they allow assessing the impact of interventions on the
exchange rate dynamics. Several works of this type have tried to estimate the impact on the first two
moments of the exchange rate distribution using ARCH-type models (Bonser-Neal and Tanner, 1996;
Dominguez, 1998 and Beine et al., 2002). More recently, the release of high frequency data permitted
to examine more precisely the effects of interventions using microstructure or event-studies methods
(Dominguez, 2003, 2006 and Beine et al., 2006). On the whole, these works have shown that the signifi-
cant effects of interventions are only observed on the short run. Also, while interventions can influence
the exchange rate level in the desired direction, generally, they increase volatility.13
Interestingly, while several researches have investigated whether actual interventions were efficient to
influence exchange rates, the interest on the effects of oral interventions is rather recent. In particular,
10The “Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity” released by the Bank of
International Settlement (BIS) on March 2005 showed that, in 2004, the average daily turnover on traditional foreign
exchange markets was of about 1.8 trillions dollars and about one third of this amount concerned spot transactions. These
figures should, however, be considered with caution, since this huge transaction volume may just be the consequence of
dealers inventory operations (Lyons, 2001).
11This is consistent with the fact that interventions are not decided on by central banks in several countries.
12Recent studies having considered the microstructure approach to interventions, however, have found that interventions
may generate portfolio effects (Lyons, 2001 and Evans and Lyons, 2001).
13Despite results on volatility appear to be incredibly robust across periods and countries, they should be nuanced. For
instance, interventions can impact the volatility very differently depending on the state of the market and on whether they
are coordinated or not (Beine et al., 2003a).
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these studies have analyzed whether oral interventions played a role of complement for or substitute
to actual interventions. The results are rather contradictory. Fratzscher (2004, 2006) showed that oral
interventions are efficient substitutes to actual interventions in the sense that they are able to influence
exchange rates independently from other policy measures. On the other hand, Beine et al. (2004a)
indicate that oral interventions may be regarded as good complements to actual ones given that they
allow to enhance the quality of the signal conveyed by the currency operation, by clarifying its purpose.
Finally, Jansen and de Haan (2007, 2005) did not find any significant effect for oral interventions.
The difficulty for researchers to obtain robust results when working with oral and actual interventions
data may result from two reasons. First, as already mentioned, data on oral interventions is not publicly
available. Then, substantial measurement errors may appear in the process of data collection. Second,
the exact timing at which interventions occur (whether they are oral or actual) is generally not available.
Therefore, it is not an easy task to determine what is the actual impact on the exchange rate dynamics.
The secrecy puzzle
An important prerequisite for an intervention to operate through the signaling channel is that it has
to be observed by market participants. However, in some circumstances, authorities try to conceal
that they are intervening (obviously, this does not concern oral interventions). That is, authorities may
intervene secretly (Beine and Lecourt, 2004). Secret interventions are interventions that are conducted by
authorities in a discreet way in order to avoid their detection by the market on the day it is conducted (i.e.
to avoid a contemporaneous detection). Importantly, the attempt of authorities to hide their operations
may not be sufficient since agents may detect their presence on the market. If authorities manage to
maintain the operation effectively secret, the secret intervention may be considered as a pure secret
intervention. While, if the market detects the operation in spite of the authorities’ efforts to conceal it,
we can refer to a detected secret intervention. That is, the expression “secret intervention” is related to
the desire of authorities to hide their interventions while the terms “pure” and “detected” concern the
perception of market participants of these measures. By contrast, a public or reported intervention is an
intervention authorities did not try to hide.
Identifying which interventions are secret and which are not requires an important work of data
collection through newswire services. Empirically, a public intervention is defined as an intervention for
which there is at least one news report, issued on the day it is conducted, related to it. Such news reports
should indicate, without any ambiguity, that the market was aware of the operation.
Determining which interventions were secret is slightly more complex (see Beine and Lecourt, 2004).
Pure secret interventions are operations for which no report at all could be found on the day it was
conducted. This means that the market was indeed completely unaware that authorities were acting in
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Table 5: News reports indicating that an intervention was perceived by the market
Intervention date Source Relevant text of the news report
19th September 1994 Reuters “BoJ buys dlrs persistently at around 98.60 yen”.
21st June 1999 Reuters “Dollar climbs amid BoJ seen continuing to buy dlrs
above Y122- bankers”.
9th January 2004 Reuters News The Bank of Japan was seen intervening heavily in the
currency market on Friday.
Note: This sample of news reports was extracted from the online database Factiva. The reports
clearly indicate that the market was aware of the presence of the BoJ for every day of official
intervention listed in the table. We conducted a full-text research using keywords such as “Bank
of Japan/BoJ”, “Ministry of Finance/MoF” and “intervention”.
the market.14 On the other hand, detected secret interventions are interventions for which news reports
related to the operation could be found, but, showing a high degree of uncertainty. That is, the market
knew that something was happening but was not completely sure. Since authorities can make their
interventions visible (e.g. by a confirming speech), this type of news report can be used to infer that the
intervention was conducted in a discreetly (i.e. to avoid detection). Table 5 contains a sample of news
reports that may be used to establish that an intervention is observed by the market. It is the absence
of such unambiguous news reports, on the day in which an intervention is implemented, that allows us
to establish that the intervention was a secret one.
By intervening secretly, authorities deliberately try to reduce the signaling impact of their operations.
In other words, the signaling channel fails to rationalize the use of secret interventions. This is referred in
the literature as the so-called “secrecy puzzle” (Sarno and Taylor, 2001). Several theoretical arguments
have been proposed to explain the existence of secret interventions. Some indicate that secrecy may
occur in cases in which there are conflicts between the different agents involved in the intervention
process (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993). Others argue that the use of secret interventions may be related
to the overall credibility obtained from past operations (Chiu, 2003). Some other arguments are related
to the microstructure approach and suppose that interventions may be secret if they go against usual
authorities’ objectives like when they aim at enhancing the misalignment (Vitale, 1999) or increasing the
volatility (Hung, 1997).
These theoretical arguments are naturally found outside the traditional signaling channel framework.
So far, however, no empirical attempt to assess them has been proposed. In the third chapter of the
thesis, we empirically investigate the main determinants to the use of secret interventions. For this,
we estimate a strategy function by using a logit specification.15 The model explains the use of secret
interventions by Japanese authorities. Two sets of determinants are identified on an ex ante basis. The
14Considering a window of five days following a pure secret intervention, we find that the market remains unaware of the
operation in more than 80% of the cases.
15Strategy functions should be distinguished from reaction functions. They describe authorities’ decisions conditionally
to the fact that they already decided to intervene. By contrast to reaction functions, strategy functions models are not
evaluated over all trading days but only on days in which interventions took place.
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first is related to the probability of detection of authorities’ orders by market participants. The second
is aimed at capturing the authorities’ internal decision to opt for secrecy. Our estimations indicate that
the ability of market participants to observe an intervention is determined by the characteristics of the
operation. Furthermore, results support the arguments of current microstructure theories rationalizing
the use of secret interventions.
This work, however, should be seen as a preliminary analysis of the secrecy issue. Indeed, we do
not identify pure secret and detected secret interventions. That is, we only consider public and secret
interventions as in Beine and Lecourt (2004). To get a better understanding of the secrecy issue, a unified
approach of the whole intervention process is necessary. As a result, more sophisticated techniques are
required, along with a more in-depth theoretical and empirical work.
A unified approach to interventions
Elements presented in the preceding lines clearly illustrate that intervening in the foreign exchange
market implies a complex decision process. Authorities have to decide whether to intervene or not and,
if so, when and how. The first step of the process concerns the decision to intervene and is treated by
the literature on reaction functions. Once the decision to intervene has been made, authorities have to
determine the type of intervention they are going to implement. In particular, they have to opt for a
disclosure strategy. This decision is described by simple strategy functions. Finally, the third step of
the process concerns the market itself. Indeed, when authorities decide to intervene secretly, it is still
necessary to examine whether market participants detect the operation or not in spite of authorities’
efforts to conceal it.
The literature on interventions has examined these different steps independently, failing to consider
them as highly interdependent. However, to achieve a good understanding of the intervention activity,
a single model for the whole process should be considered. This task is far from trivial. Theoretically,
it requires identifying the specific determinants of the different steps of the process (i.e. three sets of
determinants are necessary, one for the decision to intervene, another for the decision to opt for secrecy
and the last for the detection of interventions by the market). Empirically, one has to distinguish what is
related to authorities’ decisions and what the consequence of the behavior of the market is. For instance,
if an intervention is observed by market participants, one may wonder if it is because authorities did not
try to conceal it (i.e. the intervention is a public one) or because the market detected it in spite of the
efforts of authorities to conceal the operation (i.e. the intervention is a detected secret one).
In the fourth chapter of this thesis we propose a unified model for the whole intervention process.
For this, we estimate a nested logit model using Japanese interventions data. The approach is useful to
capture the relationships and the prominent features of the various steps of the intervention decision.
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The model is made up of three levels. The first level corresponds to the decision to intervene. The second
level describes the decision to intervene secretly. Finally, the third level is related to the perception of
market participants. The findings shed some light on the determinants of interventions, on the so-called
secrecy puzzle and on the identification of the variables influencing the ability of market traders to
detect official foreign exchange transactions. The estimation of such a complex model is also useful to
assess the previous literature (treating these steps separately). Furthermore, our results allow to put
into evidence the existence of new issues and trade-offs that were not apparent before. For instance,
secret interventions can only operate through the portfolio balance channel (according to Evans and
Lyons, 2001 secret interventions cannot be distinguished from private trades) which supposes that the
intervention amount has to be sufficiently large. However, if authorities use too large amounts, the size
and number of orders required to realize the operation may increase the ability of market participants
to detect the intervention. That is, a contradiction may emerge between the desire to intervene secretly
and the necessity to invest sufficiently large amounts to ensure the efficiency of the operation. The choice
of the type of intervention is then not a trivial one.
Organization of the thesis
This work is made of four chapters based on four empirical papers. All chapters pertain to the literature
examining the determinants of interventions by contrast to the works having studied their impact on
exchange rates. These works are linked by two important aspects. The first one is the new approach
to reaction functions. It allows extending our vision of how authorities decide the type of measure to
implement. These techniques are also appropriate to examine in detail the so-called secrecy puzzle. The
second important aspect is the use of financial information obtained through newswire services. Having
this information is useful to have a precise view of the actual perception of market participants concerning
general exchange rate developments. Such information is also essential to determine what are the precise
objectives pursued by authorities.
The first chapter distinguishes oral from actual interventions and proposes a new approach to reaction
functions. The model is useful to understand how authorities decide what type of intervention to conduct
(i.e. oral or actual interventions) depending on the circumstances. More precisely, the results allow
establishing the situations in which oral interventions will replace actual interventions or will accompany
them. In the second chapter we investigate in detail the institutional structure in which interventions
decisions are taken. We use a traditional loss minimization program to derive an optimal reaction
function. Our framework incorporates the interactions between a political authority in charge of the
foreign exchange policy and a central bank only implementing interventions orders. The model allows
observing the extent to which interventions are the outcome of a trade-off between the achievement of
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the political authority’s objectives and the central bank’s. In the third chapter, we analyze the secrecy
puzzle. We consider a simple strategy function that allows examining why central banks use secret
interventions. The model distinguishes secret interventions from reported ones. Variables for the decision
to intervene secretly and for the detection process are then incorporated. However, this analysis is only
preliminary since the interpretation of these variables relies on an ex ante assumption. A more complete
and sophisticated approach to this issue is developed in the last chapter in which a unified approach to
the study of the intervention activity is introduced. It incorporates a strategy function as well as the
perception of the market into a more general reaction function. This model allows to understand how
interventions decisions are taken as a result of a process made of various highly interdependent steps.
Not only this technique allows refining our analysis of the secrecy puzzle (by separating the decision to
intervene secretly and the detection process of market participants) but it also identifies new trade-offs
that were not apparent when considering partial models. Finally, the general conclusions of our analysis
are presented in the last section of the thesis.
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Chapter 1
Talks, financial operations or both?1
1.1 Introduction
“The Japanese authorities have so far limited themselves to verbal [oral] intervention, with
Vice-Finance Minister K. Tanami warning overnight that Japan will take appropriate mea-
sures in the event of drastic currency market fluctuations. But traders said the Bank of Japan
would have to spend money intervening to convince the market that Japan was resolute about
halting the yen’s rally” (Reuters, January 11, 1999).
Although monetary authorities intervene in the foreign exchange (FX) market to influence exchange rates,
different types of interventions can be distinguished. Actual interventions involve financial transactions
(i.e. currency sales or buys) whereas oral interventions do not (i.e. they are mere oral announcements).
While evidence on major economies (e.g. the United States, the Euro Zone and Japan) indicates a clear
shift toward lesser actual interventions, oral interventions continue to be frequently used. Understanding
why one type of intervention is used rather than another is then an important issue.
Researchers have concentrated on actual interventions largely focusing on their determinants and
effects for various countries and periods (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993; Almekinders and Eijffinger,
1996; Dominguez, 1998; Beine et al., 2002 and Ito and Yabu, 2007 among many others). It is just
recently that they have become interested in the authorities’ communication policy and particularly in
the role played by oral interventions as substitute for or as complement to actual interventions (see Beine
et al., 2004a and Fratzscher, 2004).
This chapter aims at providing useful elements to facilitate the understanding of the occurrence of
each type of intervention. We propose to analyze the FX intervention topography in the light of the
signaling theory (Mussa, 1981) which supposes that actual and oral interventions share the ability of
1This chapter is extracted from an article entitled “Talks, financial operations or both? Generalizing central banks’ FX
reaction functions” that has been written in collaboration with Jean-Yves Gnabo (FUNDP).
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influencing market agents’ expectations by conveying central banks’ private information. According to
Dominguez (1998) it is the nature of interventions (i.e. their signal “strength”) which determines their
effects on the exchange rate dynamics. We thus need to classify interventions following the strength of
the signal they convey.
As secret interventions (i.e. actual interventions not contemporaneously detected by the market)
do not carry an explicit or visible signal, they cannot be distinguished from private trades (Evans and
Lyons, 2001). Secret-interventions-days can thus hardly be differentiated from no-interventions-days.2
By contrast, interventions that are perceived by market participants naturally convey a stronger and
explicit signal that must be assessed. For this, as the total cost supported by authorities depends on the
type of operation carried out, we assume the cost associated to the different types of visible interventions
to be an indicator of their signal strength and we classify them accordingly. In other words, we infer
the authorities’ determination to correct a bad exchange rate dynamics to be given by the burden cost
related to the operation.
To understand the occurrence of the different types of interventions, we estimate an extended inter-
vention reaction function on traditional determinants (i.e. deviations of the exchange rate from some
target, the exchange rate volatility and the general situation of the economy). We use an ordered probit
specification which is convenient to model naturally ordered variables and to obtain thresholds estimates
determining unbalance levels leading to the use of increasingly stronger interventions. Moreover, these
thresholds also determine whether oral interventions play a role of substitute for or of complement to
actual ones.
The chapter is organized as follows. The theoretical discussion of the different types of interventions
and the way they have been studied in the literature is presented in section two. A discussion on the
transmission channels of sterilized interventions as well as the method used to classify interventions
according to the strength of the signal they convey is in section three. The econometric model and
the data are described in section four. Our empirical results are discussed in section five. Section six
concludes.
1.2 Interventions on foreign exchange markets
According to Dominguez and Frankel (1993), interventions can be broadly defined as “any transaction or
announcement by an official agent of a government that is intended to influence the value of an exchange
rate”. Countries intervene in the FX market when they perceive that the exchange rate dynamics is not
consistent with their objectives.3 That is, they intervene when the exchange rate level is not adequate or
2For more details about secret interventions, see chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis.
3In several countries specific political authorities (e.g. the Treasury in the United States and the Ministry of Finance
in Japan) are in charge of the FX policy. Central banks only implement transactions orders in the FX market. In this
chapter, for the sake of clarity, we neglect the interactions existing between the different actors involved in the intervention
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Figure 1.1: FX interventions topography
Note: Several types of interventions can be distinguished according to whether they
involve financial transactions or not. Oral interventions are speeches or communi-
cations by officials and do not involve any transaction. Actual interventions are
currency buys or sales. Confirmed interventions are actual interventions accompa-
nied by a confirming or clarifying announcement.
when the exchange rate volatility is excessive (for a recent review of central banks interventions practices
see Neely, 2006).
From Dominguez and Frankel (1993)’s definition, different types of interventions can be distinguished.
Actual interventions involve central bank’s transactions (i.e. currency buys or sales) designed to appro-
priately influence the exchange rate dynamics. They are generally leaning-against-the-wind operations.
That is, operations that try to reverse the exchange rate trend. Another type of intervention mentioned
by the definition are so-called oral interventions. They are pure announcements that do not involve
any currency transaction. Therefore, they are official speeches or communications that are intended to
influence the exchange rate by providing the market with explicit relevant (private) information. A third
type of intervention corresponds to confirmed interventions. They are actual interventions accompanied
by an announcement directly related to it (i.e. whether by confirming the occurrence of the actual in-
tervention or by clarifying its purpose). From this description, the topography of FX interventions can
be represented by three subsets respectively corresponding to the three kinds of interventions evoked. It
is illustrated in figure 1.1.
The literature on interventions has generally put the focus on the study of the determinants and
effects of actual interventions. Main results on actual interventions determinants suggest that large
deviations of the exchange rate from its past values and the fundamental equilibrium level cause corrective
measures. Furthermore, the leaning-against-the-wind strategy has been generally confirmed (Dominguez
and Frankel, 1993; Almekinders and Eijffinger, 1996; Baillie and Osterberg, 1997; Sarno and Taylor,
2001; Ito, 2003 and Ito and Yabu, 2007). The role of the exchange rate volatility as determinant to
actual interventions is less clear. Although, recent advances in the way it is measured may improve the
situation (Andersen et al., 2005; Beine et al., 2006 and Gnabo et al., 2006). In particular, Gnabo et al.
process (see chapter 2 of this thesis). We consider then a single agent as being responsible of it (i.e. the central bank).
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(2006) show that more interventions are expected by market participants when some components of the
realized volatility increase. Empirical works on the effects of actual interventions on the exchange rate
level most often indicate that they are effective over short periods (Dominguez, 2006 and Fatum and
Hutchinson, 2004, 2006). Furthermore, their impact on the volatility deeply depends on the market’s
overall situation (Bonser-Neal and Tanner, 1996; Dominguez, 1998, 2003; Beine and Laurent, 2003; Beine
et al., 2002, 2003a and Gnabo et al., 2006).
The interest in the authorities’ communication policy and more precisely in oral interventions is rather
recent. It takes its roots in the shift of major economies’ policy (i.e. the United States, the Euro Zone
and to a certain extent Japan) toward the use of this type of intervention and the abandon of actual
ones. As a matter of fact, after not having conducted any actual intervention since 1995, the United
States intervened once in 2000. It has not entered the market since. In Europe, authorities only actually
intervened on four occasions since the introduction of the euro in 1999. The case of Japan is particular
as it maintained a policy of frequent actual interventions until march 2004 where it ended an episode of
massive interventions.4 Nevertheless, it has not intervened since that time and seems to follow the path
of the United States and the Euro Zone (an updated analysis of the Japanese case is proposed by Ito,
2006).
The role of oral interventions of substitute for or complement to actual ones is a crucial question
that has been addressed. Particularly, Fratzscher (2004, 2006) finds that oral interventions are good
substitutes for actual operations. He shows that oral interventions may influence exchange rates with-
out raising the market’s uncertainty independently from the general stance of monetary policy and the
occurrence of actual interventions.5 However, in his analysis of the determinants to oral and actual
interventions, Fratzscher (2005) indicates that both types of interventions tend to be coordinated do-
mestically in practice. This suggests that they are used on the same periods and denotes the ability of
authorities to switch from one type of measure to another rapidly depending on the market conditions.
On the other hand, Beine et al. (2004a) find that oral interventions clarify the signal conveyed by actual
ones. They highlight the complementary relationship existing between these types of economic policy
measures. More generally, Gnabo and Teiletche (2006) analyze the impact on market expectations of
a large set of strategies of interventions. They confirm the virtuous effect of transparent measures (i.e.
oral, actual and confirmed interventions) against opaque ones (i.e. secret interventions). Besides, these
measures appear to be the most effective when the degree of authorities involvement is high. Therefore,
while it is clear that several corrective policies are at the disposal of responsible authorities, they could
hardly be considered as being perfectly substitutable.
4As we will see in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis, consistently with findings of Beine and Lecourt (2004), about 80%
of actual interventions conducted by Japan between 2003 and 2004 were secret. That is, these transactions were not
contemporaneously detected by market participants. This nuances the signaling role of that intervention episode.
5Jansen and de Haan (2005, 2007) have studied oral interventions taken alone and establishes that their effectiveness is
limited.
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Interestingly, to the best of our knowledge, no holistic study has been conducted to understand what
the elements inducing authorities to use one type of intervention rather than another are (Fratzscher,
2005 considers separate logit specifications, one for oral and one for actual interventions, to identify their
determinants). Furthermore, no rationale has been provided to the shift in the intervention strategy
observed in major economies. To address these questions appropriately, it is important to understand
how interventions work. We examine this point below with a particular focus on the signaling channel
theory.
1.3 Interventions transmission
In this section we first review the signaling approach to interventions. Then, we examine how the signal
strength of interventions can be assessed by their related cost.
1.3.1 The signaling approach to interventions
The way interventions influence exchange rates has been largely debated. Oral interventions solely
influence exchange rates through the signaling channel (Mussa, 1981). Besides, actual interventions may
also impact the market through the signaling channel (as long as they are not secret) but also through
the portfolio balance channel (see Edison, 1993; Dominguez and Frankel, 1993; Sarno and Taylor, 2001
and Neely, 2006 for surveys).6
The portfolio balance approach supposes that financial transactions operated by monetary authorities
affect the proportion of foreign and domestic assets in the market. If they are not perfect substitutes,
the exchange rate adapts to incite agents to purchase the assets whose proportion increased. On the
other hand, the signaling framework describes how the exchange rate can be regulated by the disclosure
of the central bank’s private information. Indeed, additionally to the information concerning their own
future monetary and exchange rate policy, central banks usually have a privileged access to information
on general macroeconomic developments.7 Pieces of this information can be “signaled” to the market
through interventions to induce traders to reshape their beliefs in accordance (e.g. a sale of domestic
currency may indicate that it is overvalued, then, if the signal is clear and credible, it might change
agents’ trading behavior that in turn will help to depreciate the currency).
Empirical evidence massively suggests that the signaling channel is the most important theory ex-
plaining how interventions work (see Edison, 1993; Dominguez and Frankel, 1993 and Sarno and Taylor,
2001 for surveys). This might be explained by the fact that the magnitude of interventions amounts is
6Other theories have been developed to explain how interventions affect exchange rates. The noise trading channel
(Hung, 1997) or, more recently, the coordination channel (Reitz and Taylor, 2006) can be mentioned. The portfolio balance
theory and the signaling channel remain however the principal approaches.
7Mussa (1981)’s signaling channel theory stricto sensu supposes that interventions “signal” future changes of mone-
tary policy. Nevertheless, most authors usually consider that interventions provide general information about economic
fundamentals.
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relatively small with respect to the market’s overall size. Recent findings of the microstructure approach
to exchange rates indicate however that there is room for an effect through the portfolio balance channel
(Evans and Lyons, 2001). Nevertheless, as the different types of interventions share the ability of pro-
viding the market with relevant official information, it is worth examining more in detail the signaling
framework.
As discussed by Dominguez (1998), the potential impact of a given intervention on the exchange rate
level or volatility is influenced by the degree of market efficiency and by the credibility and unambiguity
of the operation. For efficient markets, this is illustrated in table 1.1. It denotes an actual intervention
designed to appreciate the domestic currency or to calm disorderly markets. St is the exchange rate level
(domestic price of foreign currency). ∆St|It is the exchange rate level change due to the intervention.
var[∆St|It] captures the exchange rate volatility. We see that as long as the signal conveyed by the
intervention is credible and unambiguous it may move the exchange rate in the desired direction or reduce
the market’s volatility. On the other hand, if the signal is not sufficiently credible or is ambiguous, it
may have counterproductive effects.8
The concept of transparency developed in the monetary policy literature can help to understand
the mechanism described in the previous lines. Indeed, transparency synthesizes well the two notions
of unambiguity and credibility. It usually refers to the absence of information asymmetries between
monetary policy-makers and the private sector (Geraats, 2002). According to this, improving the degree
of transparency requires the disclosure of private information by authorities from time to time. However,
the amount of information transmitted to the market is not sufficient as this extra information will allow
agents to make better informed decisions only to the extent that they properly understand it. Winkler
(2000) argues that transparency should be seen as a multi-dimensional concept in which qualitative
aspects of the information like the degree of “clarity” and “honesty” of the policy also play an important
role. That is, authorities’ measures will be transparent only if they are clearly perceived and understood
by the market (they are unambiguous) and if they are honest in the sense that the declared objectives
are consistent with the ones actually pursued (which influences the credibility).
Dominguez (1998)’s approach may be extended to incorporate different types of interventions. Table
1.1 shows that, as market conditions are given, the degree of credibility and unambiguity are key factors
determining what we call the “strength of the signal” conveyed by an intervention. More generally, they
also influence the effectiveness of the regulation policies adopted by central banks.9 However, the degree
of credibility and unambiguity may not be the same for different types of interventions. Hence, they do
not all carry the same signal strength. Extending Dominguez (1998)’s framework requires then assessing
the strength of the signal conveyed by interventions.
8In the inefficient markets case, Dominguez (1998) shows that, even if the signal is credible and clear, an appropriate
impact on the exchange rate level cannot be guaranteed and the market’s volatility would always be stimulated.
9Since they are directly derived from a standard forward looking exchange rate model with very few assumptions, the
mechanisms presented in table 1.1 are robust and can be safely trusted (see Dominguez, 1998 for details).
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Table 1.1: Theoretical impact of interventions in an efficient market
Level Volatility
Credible and unambiguous signal [∆St|It] < 0 var[∆St|It] < 0
Not credible or ambiguous signal [∆St|It] ≥ 0 var[∆St|It] > 0
Note: On efficient markets, the impact of an intervention designed to appreciate the domestic
currency or to calm disorderly markets (It) on the exchange rate level (∆St|It, where St is the
domestic price of the foreign currency) or volatility (var[∆St|It]) depends on the credibility and
unambiguity of the signal conveyed by the intervention. The more credible or unambiguous the
signal, the more virtuous the impact on exchange rates.
This task is obvious for secret interventions. Indeed, according to the signaling approach, a dis-
tinction in terms of signal between days in which secret interventions were conducted or days in which
no interventions took place cannot be made. This is supported by the microstructure approach to FX
interventions. In particular, Lyons (2001) and Evans and Lyons (2001) show that the secrecy of order
flows allows an intervention to be indistinguishable from private trades. This directly arises because
authorities deliberately lose the signaling impact of their operations by concealing them. Therefore,
despite they involve financial trades, secret interventions are assumed to provide a non explicit signal.
In comparison to secret ones, oral, (non secret) actual and confirmed interventions provide stronger
and explicit signals. In this work, we consider that the strength of these explicit signals can be captured by
the authorities’ determination and credibility when attempting to correct a bad exchange rate dynamic.
As the burden cost is not the same for the different types of interventions, we use this criterion to assess
the strength of their signal.10 That is, the larger the burden cost authorities are decided to support,
the larger their determination and credibility and the stronger the signal of their visible interventions.
Below, we discuss how the auxiliary information on interventions total cost can be used to assess the
strength of the explicit signal conveyed by these interventions.
1.3.2 Interventions costs and signal strength
As discussed above, oral, actual and confirmed interventions provide the market with an explicit signal.
We assess it by referring to their related total cost. Several types of costs can be considered. Almekinders
(1995) evokes purely bureaucratic costs that refer to the loss of flexibility of the regulation policy due to
the time and bargaining required to decide and implement an intervention. This cost may be thought
to be larger for actual and confirmed interventions than for oral ones. Indeed, in countries in which
specific political authorities order central banks to implement interventions transactions (e.g. the United
States, the Euro Zone and Japan), several agents are involved (i.e. at least the political authority and
the central bank). A minimum level of costly coordination should then be achieved in order to ensure the
10As we will see, a measure of unambiguity is not necessary to our purpose.
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efficiency of interventions (see chapter 2 of this thesis).11 Speeches associated to confirmed interventions
clarify the authorities’ policy objectives. Then, they may also require a certain degree of coordination
between the different agents involved in the intervention process. On the other hand, oral interventions
are directly decided and conducted by responsible authorities and coordination is less necessary as long
as the announcement remains sufficiently vague. That is, it only provides general orientations and not
precise targets (see Stein, 1989’s cheap-talk approach).12 Financial costs should also be considered.
They occur when operations in the FX market do not move the exchange rate in the desired direction.
Indeed, the central bank would then hold an open position (i.e. if the currency purchase (resp. sell) is not
followed by an actual currency appreciation (resp. depreciation) the central bank may experience losses).
Obviously, these costs are only relevant for interventions involving currency transactions. A last type
of cost is related to the authorities overall reputation. When interventions are implemented, authorities
signal the market their will to correct an unsatisfactory exchange rate situation. Then, if the intervention
fails to correct the exchange rate dynamics, market participants and foreign counterparts become aware
of the authorities inability to correct things. The authorities’ reputation and more generally their ability
to implement efficient exchange rate policies would then be weakened by that failure. In practice, oral
interventions generally do not indicate precise targets. Actual interventions’ sign and magnitude provide
per se a more accurate information on the authorities objectives than vague announcements. Then,
they may be thought to carry a higher reputation cost than oral interventions.13 This view is reinforced
by the fact that statements can be made by isolated policy-makers. Whereas, actual interventions are
necessarily the outcome of a political process and may be considered of surely reflecting the official point
of view.14 Furthermore, as it does happen that some interventions are wrongly reported, a doubt on
whether or not a signal was actually sent to the market remains even if a news report, emanating from
the market itself, announces an intervention (see Gnabo et al., 2006). This underlying uncertainty can
be unambiguously removed by confirmation or clarifying speeches. The resulting confirmed intervention
then carries a higher reputation cost than actual interventions.
Table 1.2 summarizes the different costs level (i.e. BC for bureaucratic cost, FC for financial cost and
RC for reputation cost) associated to the different types of intervention (i.e. OI for oral interventions, AI
for actual interventions and CI for confirmed interventions). Total costs are assumed to provide auxiliary
information on the intervention signal strength. Accordingly, the weakest, intermediate and strongest
11As expressed by P. Fisher (Executive Vice-President of the New York Fed in 1998) concerning the United States (that
is institutionally highly similar to Japan): “The decision to intervene is not one that is made in 60 seconds. It is a
consensus process of getting the [...] Federal Reserve, [...] Treasury officials [and] our counterparts in a foreign country
in agreement” (Dow Jones, July 30, 1998). Note also that if many interventions are conducted several days in a row, the
bureaucratic cost associated to the subsequent interventions may be lower than for the first operation (Ito and Yabu, 2007).
This occurs because the official approbation has already been granted.
12Evidence obtained through the Factiva database clearly indicates that major central banks only reveal precise target
on very rare circumstances.
13If the oral intervention consisted in announcing a precise exchange rate target, the reputation cost may become larger
than for actual interventions. The central bank’s loss would then become explicit to all market participants.
14During the 1990s, the communication policy of Japan was sometimes discordant. While some officials claimed a
depreciation of the currency, others (especially the governor of the Bank of Japan) privileged a statu quo.
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Table 1.2: Interventions classified according to their associated cost
Bureaucratic cost (BC) Financial cost (FC) Reputation cost (RC)
Oral intervention (OI) BCOI > 0 - RCOI > 0
Actual intervention (AI) BCAI > BCOI FCAI > 0 RCAI > RCOI
Confirmed intervention (CI) BCCI ≥ BCAI FCCI = FCAI RCCI > RCAI
Note: Oral interventions (OI) are associated to the weakest burden cost, actual interventions (AI) carry an inter-
mediate cost while confirmed interventions (CI) carry the highest cost. The cost criterion is used to classify visible
interventions signal strength.
explicit signal can be respectively associated to oral, actual and confirmed interventions. It should be
noted that secret interventions also generate positive costs. However, they cannot be distinguished from
private trades. They are then considered to provide only a non explicit signal and consistently with the
signaling channel framework, days of secret interventions are associated to no interventions days. The
classification of the different types of interventions assumed in this work is illustrated in figure 1.2.
One may object that the burden cost is a rich but incomplete criterion. It clearly reflects the overall
credibility of the policy (i.e. it increases with the burden cost authorities are decided to sustain). How-
ever, the unambiguity of the signal is not explicitly captured. Nevertheless, the classification presented
in figure 1.2 would not be jeopardized if a measure of the unambiguity of interventions was incorpo-
rated. Both oral and actual interventions indicate the direction toward which authorities are pushing
the currency. In theory, oral interventions could be even more precise by providing an explicit target.
However, a systematic analysis of news reports shows that policy-makers are strongly reluctant to make
precise statements about their target as it might give some exchange rate level target for speculators to
challenge (Chiu, 2003).15 Therefore, market participants can learn from oral interventions whether the
domestic currency is overvalued or undervalued, but not much more.16 On the other hand, the sign and
magnitude of actual interventions provide a better estimate of the authorities objectives. They may then
be seen as providing a stronger signal than oral interventions. The confirmation speech accompanying a
confirmed intervention obviously provides a clearer signal than both oral and actual interventions (e.g.
the motivations of the actual intervention is further explained by officials themselves). Therefore, this
type of intervention carry the strongest signal. As we see, the respective location of oral, actual and
confirmed interventions in our classification can, then, be consistently attributed only using the burden
cost criterion. That is, an unambiguity measure would not change the way interventions are classified.
15For example a Japanese Ministry of Finance official, H. Kuroda, announced on November the 1st 1999: “Yen rise
excessive, doesn’t reflect fundamentals” (Dow Jones) without clarifying further what he considered as an ideal level.
16This phenomenon is well documented in the literature on monetary policy which talks about “monetary mystique”
(Goodfriend, 1986; Rosa and Verga, 2005).
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Figure 1.2: FX interventions signal strength
Note: Confirmed interventions are associated to the strongest explicit signal while oral interven-
tions carry the weakest one. Actual interventions provide an intermediate explicit signal strength.
Secret interventions only carry a non explicit signal and cannot be distinguished from days in
which no interventions were conducted.
1.4 Empirical part
This section presents the econometric model estimated in this chapter and, then, the data used for the
empirical analysis.
1.4.1 Econometric model for an extended reaction function
Traditional reaction functions are designed to explain when actual interventions occur. They are generally
derived from a standard loss minimization program (see Almekinders and Eijffinger, 1996; Ito and Yabu,
2007 and Kearns and Rigobon, 2005). In such a framework, interventions occur because of the losses
caused by an inadequate exchange rate level, an excessive volatility or a bad economic situation. Equation
(1.1) can be seen as a generic linear reaction function. I∗t denotes optimal interventions. Xt, Zt and Wt
are vectors of variables respectively capturing evolutions of the exchange rate level and volatility, and of
the economic situation. νt ∼ N (0,σ2) is a random error term.
I∗t = f(β1Xt,β2Zt,β3Wt) + νt (1.1)
Our work proposes an extended reaction function. It incorporates the different types of interventions
previously described and provides some elements valuable to understand their occurrence. From the
theoretical discussion of the previous sections, interventions can be classified in a discrete way according
to the strength of the signal they convey. Furthermore, equation (1.1) can be seen as a model for a
latent variable (i.e. the shadow intervention). The actual structure of the intervention process may then
be appropriately described by an ordered probit model (McKelvey and Zavoina, 1975). In such models,
the dependent variable’s different outcomes would correspond to the different types of interventions.
Equation (1.2) represents such a specification. Outcome 0 denotes secret interventions or no interventions
days (i.e. no explicit signal). Whereas, 1, 2 and 3 respectively correspond to oral, actual and confirmed
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interventions (i.e. explicit signals). Θ = (Θ1 Θ2 Θ2)′ is an unknown parameter jointly estimated with
β = (β1 β2 β3)′. It indicates thresholds causing It to take the different outcomes values (i.e. the
thresholds that should be attained by I∗t in order for It to equal 0, 1, 2 or 3). That is, Θ represents
unbalances in terms of Xt, Zt and Wt inducing sufficiently large losses to cause corrective measures.

It = 0 I∗t ≤ Θ1
It = 1 Θ1 < I∗t ≤ Θ2
It = 2 Θ2 < I∗t ≤ Θ3
It = 3 Θ3 < I∗t
(1.2)
The non-linear econometric model determined by equations (1.1) and (1.2) is estimated by maximum
likelihood techniques.17 The interpretation of β is not trivial. For instance, β1 > 0 indicates that Xt
positively (resp. negatively) influence the last (resp. first) outcome occurrence probability. The impact
of Xt on the intermediate outcomes cannot be presumed a priori. Specific marginal effects should then
be computed. They reflect the change in the occurrence probability of the different types of interventions
induced by a marginal change in the regressors. Following Wooldridge (2002), these marginal effects are
computed using equations (1.3). φ is the standard normal distribution density function.
∂P (It=0|Xt)
∂Xt
= −β1φ(Θ1 −Xtβ1 − Ztβ2 −Wtβ3)
∂P (It=1|Xt)
∂Xt
= β1[φ(Θ1 −Xtβ1 − Ztβ2 −Wtβ3)− φ(Θ2 −Xtβ1 − Ztβ2 −Wtβ3)]
∂P (It=2|Xt)
∂Xt
= β1[φ(Θ2 −Xtβ1 − Ztβ2 −Wtβ3)− φ(Θ3 −Xtβ1 − Ztβ2 −Wtβ3)]
∂P (It=3|Xt)
∂Xt
= β1φ(Θ3 −Xtβ1 − Ztβ2 −Wtβ3)
(1.3)
The value of Θ cannot be interpreted per se. It is however necessary that Θ1 < Θ2 < Θ3 for the
probabilities estimated from the model to be positive.18 Furthermore, in our case, as long as Θ1 < I∗t <
Θ2 oral interventions are likely to be used (i.e. the loss caused to the central bank by Xt, Zt and Wt is
not sufficient to justify stronger measures). Whereas, if Θ2 < I∗t < Θ3 actual interventions would be used
instead (i.e. the loss is large enough for the central bank to involve its own assets). Finally, if Θ3 < I∗t ,
confirmed interventions may be observed (i.e. the loss induced by the bad exchange rate dynamics is
so important that very strong corrective measures are required giving room for the simultaneous use
of actual interventions and announcements to enhance the efficiency of the intervention). To control
whether or not the classification imposed by Θ is meaningful, we test the hypothesis that adjacent
threshold are indistinguishable. We use the z− ratio test for a linear combination of coefficients written
in equation (1.4) where j = 1, 2, 3.
17For a technical discussion see Maddala (1983), Greene (2000) and Wooldridge (2002).
18There is a well-known identification problem with ordered probit models (see Verbeek, 2000 for an intuitive description).
To circumvent this it is usual to fix the value of one of the parameters (this do not affect the probabilities). In this work,
we fix the constant to zero. This allows to estimate an unconstrained Θ. An alternative would have been to fix Θ1 = 0. In
that case, condition Θ1 < Θ2 < Θ3 should have been rewritten to 0 < Θ2 < Θ3.
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Table 1.3: Sample of news reports used to identify oral interventions
Date Source Newswire
9th June 1997 Dow Jones Japan MoF Vice Minister Kato: “exces-
sive forex volatility undesirable”.
9th October 1998 Dow Jones Sakakibara: “Dlr-Yen excessive volatil-
ity undesirable”.
21st May 1999 Dow Jones Japan Sakakibara: “Forex volatility un-
desirable”.
21st June 1999 Dow Jones “An excessively strong yen is bad
for both the Japanese and overseas
economies”. Vice Finance Minister K.
Tanami said on Monday.
2nd September 2003 Dow Jones “No real reason for the yen to
strengthen at present”, a Japanese Min-
istry of Finance official said.
9th December 2003 Dow Jones “Yen’s latest surge against the dollar is
out of step with economic fundamen-
tals”, Japanese Finance Minister said.
Note: These news reports indicate that the Japanese authorities were not comfortable with the
exchange rate level or volatility. Therefore, they are used to build the variable indicating the
occurrence of oral interventions. We obtained them with a full-text research in Factiva with







Under the null hypothesis that two adjacent thresholds are equal, the zj,j−1 statistic follows a normal
distribution. The critical value at the 5% level is 1.96 (see Greene, 2000 for details).
1.4.2 The data
Data used to measure interventions is presented. Then, we describe explanatory variables.
Measure of interventions
The dependent variable of the ordered probit model (denoted It in equation (1.2)) is built using the
Japanese experience on the JPY/USD market from April 1991 to September 2004. Building the depen-
dent variable required obtaining data for the different types of interventions. Official data on Japanese
actual interventions is publicly available on the Japanese Ministry of Finance website.19 However, this
data is aggregated in the sense that it does not indicate which interventions were secret and which were
not. Data for oral and confirmed interventions is not available on a systematic basis. Relevant informa-
tion was then collected to build the series. We achieved this by using the Factiva online database.
19Precise dates of interventions, currencies involved and transactions amounts can be obtained on http://www.mof.go.
jp/english/e1c021.htm
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Table 1.4: Sample of news reports used to identify confirmed interventions
Date Source Newswire
28th September 2001 Dow Jones “We again intervened this morning single-
handedly. Since there have been many specu-
lative dollar/yen moves recently, we’ll continue
to intervene as necessary,” Shiokawa told a reg-
ular press conference. The finance minister [...]
said the yen should be a little weaker (against
the dollar) in light of the deteriorating Japanese
economy”.
15th March 2000 Dow Jones “Japan’s Ministry of Finance took action in the
foreign exchange market Wednesday and might
intervene again depending on the situation”, Fi-
nance Minister K. Miyazawa said Wednesday”.
15th August 1995 Dow Jones “US Treasury Secretary R. Rubin later confirmed
the coordinated intervention, and a BoJ official
said it was consistent with the April Group of
Seven (G-7) communique that called for an or-
derly reversal of the dollar’s decline”.
23rd May 2002 Dow Jones “Japan MoF confirms yen-selling intervention”.
Note: These news reports are official announcements that refer to an actual intervention conducted
during the same day. Therefore, they may be used to identify confirmed interventions. We obtained
them with a full-text research in Factiva with keywords such as “Bank of Japan/BoJ”, “Ministry
of Finance/MoF” and “intervention”.
For every day of the period of interest in which no actual intervention occurred (according to official
series), we searched for the existence of any official announcement indicating that authorities were not
comfortable with the exchange rate level or volatility. News reports obtained with that procedure per-
mitted to identify those days were so-called oral interventions took place. Table 1.3 contains a sample of
news reports of this kind. To identify confirmed interventions, the procedure consisted, for all the days in
which actual interventions were conducted, to search for official speeches confirming or commenting the
intervention of the day. Table 1.4 contains some news reports of that type. Finally, we used the method
proposed by Beine and Lecourt (2004) to identify secret interventions. For each official intervention day,
we looked for the existence of news reports indicating that the market was aware of the transaction. If
such news reports could not be found, the intervention was considered as secret (for examples of new re-
ports indicating that the market knew that an intervention was taking place see the appendix to chapter
3)
Having gathered the data, our dependent variable was built as a categorical variable with four out-
comes as illustrated in table 1.5.
Independent variables
We present three sets of independent variables respectively related to the exchange rate level, to the
exchange rate volatility and to the overall economic situation.
38
Table 1.5: Descriptive statistics on variable It (April 1991 - September 2004)
No (explicit) signal (It = 0) Explicit signal (It = 1, 2 and 3)
No Secret Oral Actual Confirmed
1991 - 2004 2475 131 523 163 49
Note: This table reports some descriptive statistics on variable It from April 1991 to Septem-
ber 2004. It = 0 holds for secret interventions or days of no intervention. From the signaling
framework, these outcomes cannot be distinguished. Oral, actual and confirmed interventions are
identified by It = 1, 2 or 3 respectively.
Exchange rate level
Authorities intervene when the exchange rate level moves away from their target. More generally, inter-
ventions are often designed as leaning-against-the-wind operations. These are operations elaborated to
fight an inappropriate exchange rate trend. The difficulty is to determine the time horizon over which
this trend should be defined. To cope with this issue, empirical papers (Almekinders and Eijffinger,
1996; Ito, 2003; Ito and Yabu, 2007 and Frenkel et al., 2004) have considered movements of the exchange
rate over the short, mid and long term as explanatory variables to the occurrence of interventions. In
this analysis, we adopt the same approach by considering the absolute deviation of the current exchange
rate from the previous trading day rate (X1t = 100 × |st − st−1|), the 21 trading days moving average
(X2t = 100×|st− 121
21∑
i=1




The absolute misalignment is also included (X4t = 100× |st − st|).
We use Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2006)’s quarterly estimates of the JPY/USD real misalignment (based
on a fundamental rate consistent with a global equilibrium between the G-20’s countries) as a measure of
st − st. Quarterly series are interpolated to obtain daily misalignments.21 In its current form, however,
variable X4t can suffer from non-stationarity. To circumvent this, we built a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 on days of high misalignment and 0 otherwise. The “high misalignment” days correspond to
the 10% of trading days with the highest positive misalignment and the 10% of days with the highest
negative misalignment. Note that the exchange rates measures are the domestic price of the foreign
currency (i.e. yen per dollar) and are taken in log.22
It should be mentioned that, ideally, reaction functions should be estimated with intra-daily data on
interventions. However, as mentioned in the General Introduction of this thesis, this data is not available
for most countries. Then, to avoid simultaneity issues, X1t, X2t, X3t and X4t are lagged. These variables
enter the reaction function to test whether or not authorities tend to intervene to avoid large fluctuations
20Note that variables X2t and X3t are prior moving averages in the sense that their value is the mean of the 21 or 260
previous days. This contrasts with central moving averages that use both “past” and “future data” (i.e. the value of the
moving average is at the center of the interval of interest). In this work, the use of prior moving averages is convenient
since they reflect the information available to authorities. It avoids the inclusion of any exchange rate forecast measure.
21Alternatively, we compute the misalignment from PPP yearly equilibrium rates provided by the OECD (http://www.
oecd.org/std/ppp).
22Daily exchange rate measures used are provided by Olsen and Associates. Quotation time is 9 p.m. GMT (i.e. New
York market’s close).
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of the exchange rate level over diverse horizons and to fight high misalignments. If this is the case, the
variables are expected to positively influence the probability of observing an intervention (of either type).
Exchange rate volatility
Authorities claim to intervene to “calm disorderly” markets. That is, when the exchange rate volatility
is excessive. Therefore, referring to Andersen et al. (2001), we introduce variable Z1t that corresponds
to the daily realized volatility (RV ). It is computed as the sum of the 288 5-minutes squared returns of
a day (Z1t ≡ RVt,h =
288∑
i=0
r2t,h−i). We choose h corresponding to 9 p.m. GMT (i.e. New York market’s
close). The realized volatility is a far less noisy measure than the daily volatility obtained from GARCH-
type models used in several studies (Baillie and Osterberg, 1997; Dominguez, 1998; Almekinders and
Eijffinger, 1996). It is also less subject to the issue of generated regressors (Pagan, 1984). To prevent
any simultaneity problem, variable Z1t is lagged. Given the volatility clustering usually observed for
exchange rates, this should be a good approximation.
It should be mentioned that, so far, most of studies have failed to find evidence that periods of excess
volatility are accompanied by corrective measures from central banks. Given the objectives announced
by the authorities themselves, this is paradoxical. Two reasons (at least), may explain this issue. The
first is the nature of volatility itself. As volatility is latent (i.e. it cannot be observed), any variable
capturing it is submitted to a measurement error risk. The second reason is that authorities can be more
concerned by variations of the overall volatility rather than by specific levels or regimes of volatility.
From these elements, it clearly appears that variable Z1t might not be sufficient to appropriately capture
the role of volatility as a determinant to interventions. Consistently with this, additional variables for
the exchange rate volatility should be tested.
To have a more precise measure of the exchange rate volatility, the realized volatility (Z1t) can be
split into an integrated volatility process (i.e. continuous and persistent) and a jump process (i.e. the
occurrence of which is random). Measures for these two components should then be found. As noticed
by Andersen et al. (2001), the realized volatility is a consistent estimator of the integrated volatility
only to the extent that there are no jumps in the underlying process. In the presence of jumps, the
identification of the jump and non-jump contributions can be achieved following Andersen et al. (2005).
Variables Z2t and Z3t respectively holding for the integrated volatility and jumps are then built.
Most empirical works show that interventions tend to increase the exchange rate volatility, at least
on the short term. Authorities may then be reluctant to intervene for “volatility purposes” except if
the increase in the market’s overall volatility is important. Therefore, two variables are introduced
to respectively indicate whether the volatility increased or decreased with respect to the previous day
volatility. They are denoted by Z4t = ι|RVt,h − RVt−1,h| and Z5t = ι′|RVt,h − RVt−1,h| where ι (resp.
ι′) is an indicator function taking the value 1 when RVt,h −RVt−1,h > 0 (resp. <0) and 0 otherwise. To
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ease the interpretation of these variables, we considered them in absolute value.
If authorities react to an excessive volatility, Z5t should reduce the probability of observing an inter-
vention while Z1t, Z2t, Z3t and Z4t should have a positive influence on the intervention activity.
Economic situation
During the period of interest, the Japanese economy behaved in a very specific way. Indeed, the economy
was in a liquidity trap and suffered from deflation (for a discussion see Svensson, forth.). Therefore,
when analyzing the exchange rate policy of the Japanese authorities, it is crucial to take account of
the overall economic situation. That is, variables related to the Japanese economy fundamentals should
be incorporated into the authorities reaction function. Surprisingly, this is not usual in the empirical
literature.
The output naturally appears as a good candidate. However, it is only available on a quarterly basis.
As the model is estimated at the daily frequency, this could be an issue. Therefore, given the export
orientation of the Japanese economy, the evolution of real exports appears as a good alternative. It
is available at the monthly frequency on the Bank of Japan’s website.23 The first variable considered
is then simply the absolute percentage deviation of real exports from their previous month level. It is
denoted by W1t = |EXt − EXt−1| where EX denotes the real export level in log. As variations of the
exchange rate potentially influence exports, to avoid simultaneity problems, we lagged the variable.
Similarly to the volatility, we considered two additional variables that respectively indicate whether or
not there was an improvement of real exports from their previous month level. The rationale underlying
the use of such variables is that authorities may not react symmetrically to an improvement or a deteri-
oration of exports. The variables are denoted by W2t = κ|EXt − EXt−1| and W3t = κ′|EXt − EXt−1|
where κ (resp. κ′) is an indicator function taking the value 1 when EXt −EXt−1 > 0 (resp. <0) and 0
otherwise.
To control for the monetary environment, we also included a variable denoted by W4t taking the
value 1 for years in which the inflation rate was negative and 0 otherwise. We opted for a dummy
variable because small variations of the inflation rate do not necessarily reflect relevant changes of the
macroeconomic environment of the economy (e.g. they may be due to measurement errors). Furthermore,
it is not easy to determine which is the inflation level causing authorities to take active measures.24
Therefore, W4t should only be seen as a variable of control indicating whether authorities’ exchange rate
policy decisions were affected by the inflation regime (as suggested by Svensson, forth.).
Variable W2t is expected to have a negative impact on the occurrence of interventions. On the other
hand, W1t, W3t and W4t should positively influence the intervention activity.
23http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/stat/dlong/etc/index.htm
24As we saw in table 2 of the General Introduction of this thesis, the Japanese inflation has a clear downward trend over
the period of interest. Our tests indicate that the variable is slightly non-stationary. This also constitutes an argument for
the use of a dummy.
41
1.5 Results
Table 1.6 indicates the main econometric results. The estimated coefficients should be interpreted in
terms of the last outcome of the dependent variable (i.e. confirmed interventions that corresponds to
the strongest signal). Several models were considered. Specification (1) is the basic model. It does not
include neither the volatility decomposition nor the evolution of real exports. Specifications (2) and (3)
respectively incorporate the volatility decomposition and the evolution of real exports over months. These
two alternative measures are simultaneously incorporated in specification (4). For all specifications, the
likelihood ratio, the log likelihood and the number of observations are reported. Thresholds estimates are
indicated. They are all significant at the 1% level. The zj,j−1 statistics are also significant and support
the hypothesis that adjacent thresholds are statistically different. This confirms the relevance of our
classification of the different types of interventions based upon the strength of the signal they convey.
Before examining the main results of our econometric analysis it should be stressed that Japanese
interventions show a high degree of variability across time. In particular, an apparent structural break
occurred during the so-called Sakakibara period (mid 1995 - 2002) as described by Ito (2006) and Ito and
Yabu (2007). A dummy was then considered to indicate the Sakakibara period. This variable does not
appear to be significant and our principal results remain stable when it is included. This suggests that
our estimates are robust across the different sub-periods. This may be explained by the break affecting
principally actual interventions which is only one of the four outcomes of our dependent variable.
Results for the exchange rate level variables (Xt) indicate, for all specifications, that large fluctuations
of the exchange rate level cause authorities to send strong and explicit corrective signals (i.e. all the
Xt coefficients are positive and significant). This confirms the leaning-against-the-wind strategy usually
adopted by the Japanese authorities and documented by Ito (2003) and Ito and Yabu (2007). However,
to get a more accurate view of these results, it is necessary to have a look at the marginal effects of
these variables on the intermediate outcomes (they reflect the change in the occurrence probability of
the different types of interventions induced by a marginal change in the regressors).25
The marginal effect of the short term deviation (X1t) shows a negative sign for the absence of explicit
signal and a positive sign for oral, actual and confirmed interventions in all specifications.26 Interestingly,
these marginal effects slightly decrease as the strength of the signal increases. Given the structure of our
econometric model, this could be interpreted as authorities adopting increasingly stronger and explicit
corrective measures as the magnitude of the exchange rate deviation from its past values raises. In other
words, authorities tend to use stronger measures as the market’s conditions deteriorate. This confirms
the intuition that the different types of interventions may be substitutes or complements depending on
the circumstances (Fratzscher, 2004, 2006; Beine et al., 2004a and Gnabo and Teiletche, 2006). For
25The marginal effects of specifications (1), (2), (3) and (4) are reported in the appendix to this chapter.
26By construction, the marginal probability effects change their sign only once when moving form the smallest to the
largest outcome in ordered probit models (Boes and Winkelmann, 2006).
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Table 1.6: Estimates of the ordered probit model for Japanese interventions during the 1991-2004 period
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
X1t (short term deviation) 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.15***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
X2t (mid term deviation) 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.16***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
X3t (long term deviation) 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
X4t (misalignment) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Z1t (realized volatility) -0.04 - -0.04 -
(0.07) (0.07)
Z2t (continuous volatility) - -0.05 - -0.05
(0.07) (0.07)
Z3t (jumps) - 0.56*** - 0.56***
(0.21) (0.21)
Z4t (positive volatility variation) 0.25** 0.20* 0.25** 0.20*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Z5t (negative volatility variation) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
W1t (real exports monthly variation) -0.24 -0.15 - -
(1.30) (1.30)
W2t (real exports positive variation) - - 0.70 0.77
(1.47) (1.47)
W3t (real exports negative variation) - - -1.54 -1.40
(1.62) (1.62)
W4t (deflation) 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.14***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Θ1 (threshold 1) 1.68*** 1.69*** 1.67*** 1.68***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Θ2 (threshold 2) 2.50*** 2.51*** 2.50*** 2.52***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Θ3 (threshold 3) 3.21*** 3.23*** 3.21*** 3.23***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
z2,1 (threshold 2 and 1) 27.33*** 27.33*** 27.67*** 28.00***
z3,2 (threshold 3 and 2) 17.75*** 18.00*** 17.75*** 17.75***
LR (likelihood ratio) 314.56*** 323.54*** 316.36*** 325.23***
LL (log likelihood) -2159.26 -2154.77 -2158.36 -2153.92
Number of observations 3341 3341 3341 3341
Note: Specification (1) corresponds to the basic model. It does not include neither the volatility
decomposition nor the evolution of real exports. Specifications (2) and (3) respectively incorporate
the volatility decomposition and the dynamics of real exports. These two alternative measures
are simultaneously incorporated in specification (4). The z − ratio statistics, zj,j−1, test whether
threshold j is statistically different from threshold j − 1 (the null hypothesis is that Θj = Θj−1
and the critical value is 1.96). Standard errors are reported between brackets. *, ** and ***
respectively denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
43
instance, in specification (1), the marginal effect of X1t on the occurrence of oral interventions is equal
to 0.03 meaning that a one-percent increase of the short term deviation raises the probability of sending
a weak explicit signal (an oral intervention) by 3%. This variation is slightly lower for stronger signals
(1% for actual interventions) suggesting that authorities can rapidly shift from simple talks to actual
interventions when the deviation is widening. This confirms the view of Fratzscher (2005) that both
types of interventions tend to be domestically coordinated (i.e. they are used on the same periods).
By contrast, Japanese authorities seem far more reluctant to do the following step since the marginal
effect on confirmed interventions is only of 0.004. In a sense, words and acts are used as complements
only in extreme cases. Results are quite similar for medium term deviations (X2t) while those on longer
horizons (i.e. the long term deviation (X3t) and the misalignment (X4t) variables) highlight lower
marginal effects.27 Note that the marginal effects of the different variables appear to be strongly robust
across the different specifications.
A possible interpretation of the results on marginal effects is that the central bank wants to preserve
its reputation by “putting its money where its mouth is” when the situation is worsening. In other words,
the communication policy mainly plays the role of a “first line of defense”. But when the exchange rate
crosses the so-called “line in the sand”, FX authorities rapidly back words with deeds. This scenario is
actually well summed up by Mr. K. Nakahira (a former Japanese Vice-Finance Minister for International
Affairs): “If verbal [oral] intervention proves to be effective I don’t think it is necessary for them [the
Japanese authorities] to get into the market [to intervene]. If it is inefficient, then they have to take
stronger means” (Reuters, August 17, 2001). On the market side, numerous news reports also reveal
that market participants need stronger signals to readjust their trading behavior when simple talks
are ineffective: “Ministry of Finance currency guru E. Sakakibara made his now-routine warning to the
market that MoF was determined to avoid premature yen strength, but mere verbal [oral] intervention
was having less and less effect unless backed with money” (Reuters, June 28, 1999).
Alternatively, the close dependence between words and acts can be viewed as a strategy in which
statements are used to test or to prepare market conditions. If these conditions become favorable, a
physical (financially risky) intervention is conducted, if not, the entry in the market is postponed. In
any case, these findings are particularly interesting since they shed some light on the reasons why market
participants usually expect new rounds of interventions (i.e. so-called unrequited interventions described
by Dominguez and Panthaki, 2005 that are found to have a significant empirical relation with official
statements by Gnabo et al., 2006) when officials express their discomfort with the exchange rate. Indeed,
several news reports confirm that market participants usually expect more interventions after statements
such as “Japanese Vice-Finance Minister for International Affairs H. Kuroda said earlier that the recent
rise in the yen was not appropriate given economic fundamentals, keeping markets wary about possible
27The use of a dummy as an alternative to the misalignment variable do not show different results. The same holds for
the PPP based misalignment.
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intervention to cap yen strength” (Reuters, August 27, 2001) or “For the time being, few expect actual
market intervention by the Bank of Japan. First they expect Japanese officials to start verbal [oral]
intervention in an effort to talk the dollar back down” (Dow Jones, August 6, 1997).
Estimations on the different volatility measures (Zt) are mitigated. From specifications (1) and (3),
the realized volatility (Z1t) is not significant. This is in line with the bulk of empirical works, but contrasts
with usual declarations from officials who claim to be concerned by volatility issues. To control whether
or not this is due to the way volatility is usually measured, we consider the volatility decomposition into
its continuous and jump components. Results are reported in specification (2) and (4). The continuous
volatility (Z2t) is still not significant. By contrast, jumps (Z3t) are strongly significant. Interestingly,
this justifies our decomposition since working at an aggregate level obviously hides some information.
From an economic point of view, this means that authorities pay attention to rapid shifts or jumps in
the volatility rather than to its overall level. This remark is reinforced by results on variables indicating
whether the volatility increased or decreased with respect to the previous day volatility level (Z4t and
Z5t). As partially expected, Z5t is not significant. So FX authorities do not react to a decreasing volatility.
They do however intervene when volatility increases (Z4t has a positive and significant coefficient). On
the whole, these results imply that authorities are more prompt to intervene when there are large and
rapid fluctuations of the exchange rate rather than when the overall volatility is high.
Again the examination of the marginal effects confirms that the central bank intervenes with in-
creasing strength as the volatility raises. This result is particularly interesting as it is consistent with
official declarations. Furthermore, marginal effects are on average larger than for the exchange rate level
variables. Indeed, we see that a one percent increase in the short term deviation of the volatility (Z4t)
raises the probability of having a visible signal of about 2.5%. The short term evolution of the exchange
rate level (X1t) only raises that probability of about 1.4%.28 This confirms that volatility is important
in the regulation policy.
Variables measuring the evolution of real exports (W1t, W2t andW3t) do not appear to be significant.
The exchange rate policy does not seem to have been influenced by the evolution of exports during the
period of interest. On the other hand, the variable capturing deflation (W4t) is significant and has a
positive coefficient. This indicates that authorities tended to be more active in foreign exchange markets
in periods of deflation. This may be interpreted as Japan adopting a weak yen policy to import inflation
in a period of liquidity trap in which pure monetary policy measures were not efficient (Svensson, forth.).
Interestingly, US officials regularly expressed their disagreement with any manipulation of the currency,
especially if it was aimed at boosting the economy. For instance, the Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence
Summers warned that “Japan’s manipulation of its currency would not help restore prosperity”, and that
“the focus in Japan has to be on strengthening the fundamentals”. (Dow Jones, July 8, 1999).
28For a given variable, the average marginal effects are computed using the marginal effect on the oral, actual and
confirmed interventions outcomes exclusively.
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1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we propose a new approach to central bank’s reaction functions. It does not only consider
official transactions on FX markets but also incorporates their general communication policy. This allows
us to consider different types of interventions according to whether they involve currency transactions
(i.e. actual and confirmed interventions) or not (i.e. oral interventions). There is a clear shift observed
in several important countries (i.e. the United States, the Euro Zone and more recently Japan) toward
less actual interventions. Determining which are the circumstances making authorities to use one type of
intervention or the other is then important. Furthermore, understanding to what extent oral interventions
may be used instead of or with actual ones is important for policy purposes.
The fact that, at a given moment, authorities decide to endorse a higher burden cost than in other
circumstances may be seen as a good indicator of their degree of determination. Then, we assume that
the strength of the signal conveyed by their visible interventions can be assessed by this criterion. Secret
interventions cannot be distinguished from private trades. They are then considered as carrying a non
explicit signal. According to this, it is possible to elaborate an econometric ordered probit model whose
dependent variable is a categorical one for the different types of interventions. They are classified with
respect to the strength of the signal they convey. The model is estimated over usual determinants to
interventions (i.e. exchange rate level and volatility variables and control variables for the economic
situation) using Japanese data for the 1991-2004 period.
Main econometric results indicate that authorities tend to adopt a leaning-against-the-wind strategy.
They fight against large deviations of the exchange rate from its past values and the fundamental equilib-
rium. Estimates related to the volatility variables reflect that only large fluctuations of the exchange rate
and especially jumps tend to prompt authorities to intervene and not the overall level of the volatility.
They appear then to be aware that interventions generally trigger volatility. While Japanese authorities
appear to have been more prompt to intervene in periods of deflation, they do not seem to have been
affected by the evolution of real exports.
Finally, the examination of the marginal effects on the different outcomes strongly suggests that
the strength of the measures decided by the Japanese authorities increases with the gravity of the
circumstances. That is, if the exchange rate level moves in an inappropriate direction or if the volatility
increases and these fluctuations are moderate, they will first use oral interventions. Actual or confirmed
interventions would only be used if the fluctuations magnitude increases. In other terms, words and acts




Marginal effects reflect the change in the occurrence probability of the different types of interventions (no
explicit signal, oral, actual and confirmed interventions) induced by a marginal change in the regressors.
Importantly, marginal effects sum to 0. They are computed at the mean of the different explanatory
variables. For technical details, see Wooldridge (2002).
Table 1.7: Marginal effects for specification (1)
Intervention
No/Secret Oral Actual Confirmed
X1t (short term deviation) -0.05 0.03 0.01 0.004
X2t (mid term deviation) -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.004
X3t (long term deviation) -0.01 0.009 0.004 0.001
X4t (misalignment) -0.004 0.002 0.001 0.0003
Z1t (realized volatility) - - - -
Z4t (positive volatility variation) -0.07 0.04 0.02 0.006
Z5t (negative volatility variation) - - - -
W1t (real exports variation) - - - -
W4t (deflation) -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.004
Table 1.8: Marginal effects for specification (2)
Intervention
No/Secret Oral Actual Confirmed
X1t (short term deviation) -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.004
X2t (mid term deviation) -0.05 0.03 0.01 0.004
X3t (long term deviation) -0.01 0.009 0.004 0.001
X4t (misalignment) -0.004 0.003 0.001 0.0003
Z2t (continuous volatility) - - - -
Z3t (jumps) -0.16 0.10 0.04 0.01
Z4t (positive volatility variation) -0.06 0.04 0.02 0.005
Z5t (negative volatility variation) - - - -
W1t (real exports variation) - - - -
W4t (deflation) -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.003
Table 1.9: Marginal effects for specification (3)
Intervention
No/Secret Oral Actual Confirmed
X1t (short term deviation) -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.004
X2t (mid term deviation) -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.003
X3t (long term deviation) -0.01 0.009 0.004 0.001
X4t (misalignment) -0.004 0.003 0.001 0.0003
Z1t (realized volatility) - - - -
Z4t (positive volatility variation) -0.07 0.04 0.02 0.006
Z5t (negative volatility variation) - - - -
W2t (real exports positive variation) - - - -
W3t (real exports negative variation) - - - -
W4t (deflation) -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.004
Table 1.10: Marginal effects for specification (4)
Intervention
No/Secret Oral Actual Confirmed
X1t (short term deviation) -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.004
X2t (mid term deviation) -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.004
X3t (long term deviation) -0.01 0.009 0.004 0.001
X4t (misalignment) -0.004 0.003 0.001 0.0003
Z2t (continuous volatility) - - - -
Z3t (jumps) -0.15 0.10 0.04 0.01
Z4t (positive volatility variation) -0.06 0.04 0.02 0.005
Z5t (negative volatility variation) - - - -
W2t (real exports positive variation) - - - -
W3t (real exports negative variation) - - - -
W4t (deflation) -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.004
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Chapter 2
The institutional organization of the
exchange rate policy1
2.1 Introduction
The literature on the determinants of foreign exchange (FX) interventions (see in particular Almekinders
and Eijffinger, 1996 and Ito and Yabu, 2007) and studies focusing on the specific impact of these opera-
tions on the exchange rate dynamics (see among others Dominguez, 1998, 2003; Beine et al., 2002, 2003a)
generally consider that the FX intervention activity is exclusively the responsibility of central banks. Nev-
ertheless, this is only “superficially correct” (Ito, 2006) since, in several countries (e.g. the United States
and Japan), FX interventions are rather decided on by specific political authorities, whereas, central
banks, solely play the role of agent by implementing transactions orders in the FX market.
An important characteristic of such institutional structure is that political authorities in charge of
FX interventions and central banks do not necessarily share the same exchange rate objectives. The
former, for political reasons, may be more concerned about encouraging economic growth on short- or
mid-term horizons, while, the latter, may have objectives more in line with the general stance of their
monetary policies (like the necessity to achieve the long term stability of prices). The fact that each
institution faces losses if the exchange rate is inconsistent with their respective objectives raises the
question of knowing, whether or not, political authorities, as decision-taking institutions, are affected by
central banks’ interests and, if so, how and to what extent.
The concern of political authorities to central banks’ losses potentially influences the occurrence and
characteristics of FX interventions. Then, knowing exactly “who is in charge” is important to the study
of reaction functions (Ito, 2006). Indeed, general features of political authorities’ optimal intervention
1This chapter is extracted from an article entitled “Do interactions between political authorities and central banks
influence FX interventions? Evidence from Japan”.
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strategy are presumably different depending on the compatibility of their respective exchange rate targets.
Should their objectives be compatible, large, frequent, internationally coordinated and highly visible
interventions are likely to be used. On the contrary, if these objectives are incompatible, political
authorities may be more reluctant to intervene. As indeed their actions may hurt central banks’ interests,
political authorities would rather opt for small, infrequent, unilateral and weakly visible interventions.
Consequences of the institutional organization underlying the FX activity are potentially deep. The
aim of this chapter is then to analyze how the intervention decision process is affected by interactions
between political authorities in charge of the FX policy and central banks. Our approach consists in
adapting the reaction function developed by Ito and Yabu (2007) to explain how the amount of currency
bought or sold is endogenously decided on by the Japanese Ministry of Finance as the outcome of a
trade-off between achieving its own objectives and the Bank of Japan’s. For this, we elaborate a basic
theoretical model of interactions that we assess econometrically with a friction model for the Japanese
interventions over the period 1993-2000.
The chapter is organized as follows: section two presents the theoretical model of interaction between
political authorities and central banks, the econometric approach is presented in section three, the fourth
section contains the results of the empirical procedure while section five concludes.
2.2 Institutional aspects
In this section, we first present the intervention process in Japan and, then, we discuss interactions
between the Japanese Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan.
2.2.1 Intervention process in Japan
In many countries, monetary policy is in the hands of central banks while FX interventions are controlled
by specific political authorities that order central banks to implement actual transactions on the FX
market.2 It is particularly the case in Japan where the Bank of Japan (BoJ) only executes the orders
of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) which controls FX interventions.3 In this country, the intervention
decision process is composed of three distinct steps.4 The first step corresponds to the monitoring of
market developments and the collection of relevant data (e.g. commodity prices or stock markets). This
task is under the responsibility of the BoJ Forex Division which relies on various sources of information
like market participants themselves, newswire services or overseas offices. This information is passed
every day to the Foreign Exchange and Money Market Division of the International Bureau of the
2For simplicity we will refer to the “Ministry of Finance”, the “Ministry” or just the “MoF” as being that political
authority.
3The BoJ’s website (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/about/basic/etc/faqkainy.htm) reports that: “In Japan, the Minister
of Finance is legally authorized to conduct intervention [...]. The Bank of Japan, as the agent of the Minister of Finance,
executes foreign exchange intervention operations [...]”.
4For further details, see http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/exp/faqkainy.htm
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Ministry of Finance (MoF Forex Division) which is in charge of foreign exchange interventions. When
foreign exchange movements become inappropriate (i.e. likely to have negative effects on the economy),
the MoF and BoJ Forex Divisions get in touch and discuss whether an intervention is necessary. This
corresponds to the second step of the process. The BoJ provides up-to-date information on market
movements and all relevant elements that may help the intervention decision making. If the Minister
of Finance decides to conduct intervention based on this information, the MoF Forex Division gives the
BoJ specific directions for the intervention. The details of the operation are determined to maximize the
efficiency of the intervention. Finally, the third step is related to the implementation to the operation
itself. BoJ’s dealers have to reach agreements concerning the terms of the required transactions with
counterparts in the market. Importantly, despite the intervention process ends at the third step, the BoJ
continues monitoring the market. There are cases in which subsequent interventions are decided or the
method of intervention is modified based on the BoJ’s report.
From the previous paragraph, we know that the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan closely
interact during the intervention process. However, despite they are both concerned with exchange rate
issues, they do not necessarily have the same exchange rate targets elaborated from their respective
objectives. For instance, the MoF, for pure political and electoral arguments, may encourage export-
oriented activities to boost economic growth. Objectives like these may be achieved by favoring the
depreciation of the domestic currency. The BoJ, on the other hand, consistently with the dynamics of
economic fundamentals, may pursue aims more in line with the general stance of its monetary policy and
the necessity of ensuring the long term stability of prices. Obviously, such a policy would be inconsistent
with an excessive depreciation of the domestic currency.
It turns out, then, that exchange rate targets of the Ministry of Finance and the BoJ may be different,
mainly because their objectives are elaborated over different time horizons. A deep understanding of
the intervention decision making process requires determining whether or not the Ministry of Finance,
as the decision-taking agent, takes the Bank of Japan’s objectives into account when elaborating its FX
interventions. We discuss this point below.
2.2.2 Interactions between MoF and BoJ
Several arguments justify that the Ministry of Finance is not indifferent to the central bank’s objectives
giving, then, room for an analysis of their interactions. A first obvious reason is the gain in credibility
that could be obtained by the Ministry if it could signal the market that its actions are backed by the
central bank. Indeed, credibility may enhance the signal conveyed by an intervention improving, then,
its effectiveness (Dominguez, 1998).5 Another justification is the eventuality for the Ministry to see the
5It is worth noting that during the 1990s, the communication policy of Japan was sometimes discordant. While officials
at the Ministry of Finance claimed a depreciation of the currency, others (especially the governor of the Bank of Japan)
privileged a statu quo.
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effects of its interventions weakened by the central bank if they adopt inconsistent measures leading to an
ineffective policy mix. This may occur, for instance, when the Ministry tries to depreciate the domestic
currency if, at the same time, the central bank adopts restrictive monetary measures. In this case,
the underlying argument is the necessity of achieving a minimal level of policy coordination between
the Ministry and the central bank. A last argument one may think of, while extreme, is the desire
of the Ministry to avoid interfering with the central bank’s monetary policy. Indeed, a too aggressive
undervaluation policy may trigger inflation, that, eventually, will affect the central bank’s policy if its
main objective is to maintain the stability of prices. From these elements, then, it seems reasonable to
assume that the Ministry of Finance takes care of the central bank’s objectives.6
Figure 2.1: Compatibility or incompatibility of exchange rate targets
(a) (b)
Note: st is the the current exchange rate, smof and scb are the Ministry’s and central bank’s
targets respectively. The rates design the domestic price of foreign currency. Black arrows (resp.
grey arrows) correspond to domestic currency operations designed to reduce the deviation of st
from smof (resp. scb ).
As long as the Ministry is actually concerned by the central bank’s interests, the degree of compati-
bility between their exchange rate targets is an important factor that ultimately may influence general
features of FX interventions. This makes the definition of the optimal level of intervention far from
trivial (see figure 2.1 for a graphical intuition of the question of targets compatibility). Targets are com-
patible if currencies purchases or sales reduce the deviation of the exchange rate from the Ministry’s and
the central bank’s target simultaneously. Therefore, as an effective intervention not only will improve
the Ministry’s situation but also the central bank’s, there is an additional incentive for the Ministry
to intervene. This may lead to the elaboration of strong measures in order to maximize interventions’
effectiveness. Strong measures may take the form of large, frequent, internationally coordinated and
highly visible interventions (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993; Dominguez, 1998; Beine et al., 2002, 2004b).
6Regarding the second and third argument presented to justify that the Ministry is not indifferent to the central bank’s
objectives, it is interesting to note that the Bank of Japan law states that “The Bank of Japan’s autonomy regarding
currency and monetary control shall be respected” (Article 3, Paragraph 1) and that “the Bank shall always maintain close
contact with the government and exchange views sufficiently” (Article 4) to ensure that the monetary policy is consistent
with the government’s basic economic policy framework.
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On the other hand, targets are incompatible if a purchase or sale of currency reduces the deviation of
the exchange rate from one of the targets and increases the deviation from the other. In this case, the
Ministry cannot improve its situation without damaging the central bank. In turn, it may be more re-
luctant to intervene by using small, infrequent and unilateral interventions to preserve the central bank.
The incompatibility of objectives of the Ministry and the central bank may also trigger the use of secret
interventions, as evoked by Dominguez and Frankel (1993) and Chiu (2003). The determinants to secret
interventions are examined in detail in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis.
In the following sections, we formally examine how the Ministry takes its intervention decisions and
in particular how the amount of interventions is decided on as the outcome of its interactions with the
central bank in a context in which their exchange rate targets may be different and incompatible.
2.3 Interventions in an interaction framework
In this section, we derive the optimal intervention reaction function of authorities. Then, we discuss
costs related to interventions and the way they may affect interventions rule.
2.3.1 Optimal intervention
We elaborate an interaction model for an economy in which interventions on the FX market are decided
on by the Ministry of Finance and just implemented by the central bank. This is consistent with the
organization in Japan described in the previous section. To formalize interactions between the Ministry
and the central bank in this institutional framework, we consider that both agencies face losses (Lmoft
and Lcbt respectively) if the exchange rate level (st) is deviated from their respective targets (denoted by
smoft and scbt ).7 Traditional quadratic loss functions are considered. They are respectively represented
by equations (2.1) and (2.2).8
Lmoft = (st − smoft )2 (2.1)
Lcbt = (st − scbt )2 (2.2)
As we have seen, the Ministry of Finance closely interacts with the central bank during the interven-
tion decision making process. We consider the discussions between the Ministry and the central bank as
an implicit negotiation in which information on market developments and views on the corrective mea-
7Note that all exchange rates are taken in log and indicate the domestic price of the foreign currency.
8The symmetry of the Ministry’s losses is justified by the fact that, by not controlling for the depreciation of its currency,
a country raises the risk of seeing the net benefits of the depreciation fully canceled by an increase of the price of imported
goods. This is fully in line with the so-called Marshall-Lerner condition (for details, see Sarno and Taylor, 2002). The
central bank’s loss function can also be symmetric because of the adoption of an inflation targeting strategy (on this point,
see Walsh, 2003).
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sures to adopt are exchanged. When it intervenes, the Ministry of Finance is then assumed to minimize
an expected joint loss function (Λt) represented by equation (2.3).
minIt Et−1[Λt|Ωt−1] = Et−1[(1− α)Lmoft + αLcbt |Ωt−1] (2.3)
The joint loss function not only depends on the Ministry’s losses but also on the central bank’s. The
weight given to central bank’s losses are represented by the parameter α (i.e. an interaction parameter,
see Brock and Durlauf, 2001). If α > 0, the joint loss can be positive even if st = smoft as long as
smoft &= scbt . As we will show below, this, eventually, will impact the Ministry’s interventions decisions.
Note that expectations in equation (2.3) reflect the fact that there is a lag between the moment at
which the decision to intervene is made and the moment it is implemented.9 Therefore, we consider
that an intervention decision made at the end of period t− 1 (based on information Ωt−1), will only be
implemented during period t. This, however, should be seen as a simplification. Indeed, as discussed
in chapter 1, ideally, the intervention process should be analyzed with intra-daily data on interventions
which is, unfortunately, not available for most countries.
As in Ito and Yabu (2007), we consider that authorities believe the exchange rate to follow a random
walk when there is no intervention. If an intervention occurs, it contemporaneously affects the exchange
rate process as described by equation (2.4). ϕ captures the impact of the intervention and *t is a white
noise. It > 0 (resp. It < 0) is a domestic currency purchasing (resp. selling) operation. An intervention
of either sign will be effective if ϕ < 0.
st = st−1 + ϕIt + *t (2.4)
Equation (2.4) supposes that the impact of an intervention on the exchange rate depends on the
amount of the intervention. As the focus of our analysis is on how the size of an intervention is decided
and not on the precise nature of the information transmitted to the market, equation (2.4) is conve-
nient.10 Solving the problem in equation (2.3) constrained by equation (2.4) yields equation (2.5) which





(st−1 − smoft )−
α
ϕ
(st−1 − scbt ) (2.5)
9This lag may be seen as the consequence of having several agents involved in the intervention process.
10Other approaches to the exchange rate dynamics may have been considered. In particular, Almekinders and Eijffinger
(1996) use a GARCH specification to take into account the fact that interventions have an influence on both the exchange
rate level and volatility. An alternative way of describing the exchange rate dynamics is proposed by Kearns and Rigobon
(2005) who base their approach on a generalized version of the uncovered interest parity relation which is a convenient way
to introduce expectations of market participants.
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Equation (2.5) describes how the Ministry of Finance reacts to combined deviations of the exchange
rate from its own and central bank’s target. It predicts that large deviations from targets induce large
interventions.11 Furthermore, this solution generalizes the reaction function proposed by Ito and Yabu
(2007) which can be recovered by fixing α = 0. This clearly appears by noticing that in our model,
interventions can occur even if the exchange rate is not different from the Ministry’s target (i.e. st−1 =
smoft ) as long as it is different from the central bank’s (i.e. st−1 &= scbt ).
Interpreting equation (2.5) appropriately requires discussing the cases in which the Ministry’s and
central bank’s target are compatible or not. If targets are compatible, a situation that may arise is
that the exchange rate is undervalued with respect to both targets (i.e. st−1 > smoft > scbt ). In that
case, as st−1 − smoft > 0 and st−1 − scbt > 0, equation (2.5) predicts unambiguously corrective currency
purchases. Moreover, as long as α > 0, these purchases are larger than in the case in which no interactions
are considered. The Ministry has indeed an additional incentive to intervene as its actions not only will
improve its situation but also the central bank’s. On the other hand, if targets are incompatible, we
may encounter a situation in which the exchange rate is overvalued with respect to the Ministry’s target
and undervalued with respect to the central bank’s target (i.e. smoft > st−1 > scbt ). In this case, while
st−1 − smoft < 0 requires currency sales, st−1 − scbt > 0 calls for currency purchases. Then, the sign and
magnitude of the intervention will depend on the trade-off faced by the Ministry of Finance between the
achievement of its own target and the central bank’s.
2.3.2 Cost of interventions
Linear models derived from equation (2.5) have been estimated in the literature by simple OLS techniques
(see Ito, 2003 among others). However, because of the usual large proportion of days of no intervention
with respect to days in which interventions were conducted, OLS techniques provide inconsistent and
biased estimates. Furthermore, an important feature of equation (2.5) is that it implicitly supposes
that there are no costs related to interventions. Indeed, I∗t should be seen as the shadow intervention
level, that is, the level of intervention that would be decided on by the Ministry of Finance if it was not
reluctant to intervene on a continuous basis.
This, however, is not the case. Reluctance of authorities to intervene is a stylized fact characterizing
the intervention activity on FX markets. Indeed, during the period 1985-1995, the US and Germany
respectively intervened on 7.5% and 9.1% of trading days on the DM/USD market. After 1995 and in
particular since the introduction of the euro in 1999, the US only intervened once on the EUR/USD
market in September 2000. Still on the EUR/USD market the ECB only intervened on 4 occasions
to support the euro. Finally, on the JPY/USD market, while the US was present only during the
11Note that intervention of day t depends upon st−1. This is the consequence of the lag existing between the moment
in which the intervention is decided and the moment it is implemented.
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period 1991-1998 on barely 1.2% of trading days, Japanese authorities stepped into the market on about
10% of trading days between 1991 and 2004 at which point they stopped their interventions. This last
observation should, however, be nuanced for the very end of the period, as, between 2003 and 2004, the
Japanese Ministry of Finance intervened on about 40% of trading days.
Actual interventions only occur if benefits are larger than related costs. While benefits associated
to an intervention are basically the opportunity of correcting an inappropriate exchange rate dynamics,
costs are of diverse types. They have been discussed by Almekinders (1995) who broadly distinguishes
pure bureaucratic costs (i.e. related to the decision process itself) and financial costs (i.e. related to
the loss that could occur if a currency purchase (resp. sale) was not followed by an actual currency
appreciation (resp. depreciation)). Reputation losses induced by an ineffective intervention may also
been taken into account (for a detailed discussion see chapter 1 of this thesis).
In this work, we consider a basic cost structure defined in equation (2.6) which is an adapted version
of the cost structure proposed by Ito and Yabu (2007). CB and CS respectively corresponds to the
cost of buying or selling the domestic currency. The cost of intervening at time t can be reduced if an
intervention of the same direction has been conducted at time t − 1. c measures this reduction and ι
(resp. ι′) is an indicator function taking the value 1 when It−1 > 0 (resp. < 0) and 0 otherwise. This
assumption allows explaining the clustering pattern of interventions usually observed.
Ct =
 C
B − c(ιIt−1) if It > 0
CS − c(ι′It−1) if It < 0
(2.6)
2.4 Econometric approach
We first derive the friction model and, then, we present the data used for the empirical work.
2.4.1 A friction model for interventions
Two main econometric techniques have been proposed to estimate the intervention process described in
the preceding section. Almekinders and Eijffinger (1996) use a friction model to analyze US interventions
on the DM/USD and JPY/USD markets and German interventions on the DM/USD market between
February 1987 and October 1989. Ito and Yabu (2007) make an ordered probit analysis of Japanese
interventions on the JPY/USD market from April 1991 to December 2002. Both techniques are well
suited to analyze the FX intervention activity as they allow the estimation of a no intervention band
that reflects implicit costs related to interventions.
The dependent variable in the ordered probit approach is an indicator function, therefore, we opted
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for a friction model that explains the magnitude of interventions. Friction models belong to the censored
regressions models family. They were first introduced by Rosett (1959) who presented them as a gen-
eralization of the two-limit tobit model. The particularity of these models is that they model a process
characterized by a dependent variable responding only to large variations of the exogenous variables. In
other words, there is a mass point at particular limiting values of the exogenous variables that determines
a no-effect band.12
To build the friction model, we combine the optimal intervention in equation (2.5) with the cost
structure in equation (2.6). Assuming that authorities will intervene only if the optimal intervention
exceeds the cost of intervening (i.e. intervention benefits must be larger than intervention costs), we
obtain the intervention rule represented by equation (2.7).
It =

I∗t if I∗t + ηt < Θ1 − β1(ιIt−1)
0 if Θ1 − β1(ιIt−1) ≤ I∗t + ηt ≤ Θ2 − β1(ι′It−1)
I∗t if I∗t + ηt > Θ2 − β1(ι′It−1)
(2.7)
From equation (2.5), we know that I∗t = β2Xt+β3Zt where β2 = − (1−α)ϕ , β3 = −αϕ , Xt = st−1−smoft
and Zt = st−1− scbt . Then, since all subsequent interventions are always of the same sign, equation (2.7)
can be rewritten as in equation (2.8) in which Int∗t = β1It−1 + β2Xt + β3Zt.
It =

Int∗t if Int∗t + ηt < Θ1
0 if Θ1 ≤ Int∗t + ηt ≤ Θ2
Int∗t if Int∗t + ηt > Θ2
(2.8)
Equation (2.8) constitutes the econometric model estimated in this chapter by the maximum like-
lihood method. Θ1 < 0 and Θ2 > 0 respectively correspond to the lower and upper limiting values
determining the no intervention band. ηt ∼ N (0,σ2) is a random error term. Figure 2.2 depicts the
process estimated by the model of friction.
2.4.2 Data
We begin by presenting data on interventions and on exchange rates. Variables measuring deviations
from the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan are then introduced. Finally, potential data issues
are discussed.
12For a discussion of the technical aspects of friction models see Maddala (1983), while, a presentation of the economic
relevance of these models to the study of FX interventions can be found in Neely (2005a,b).
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Figure 2.2: Process estimated by a friction model
Note: Actual interventions (It) only occur if the shadow intervention level (Int∗t ) reaches Θ1 or
Θ2.
Interventions and daily exchange rate
The dependent variable of the friction model (denoted It in equation (2.8)) is built using Japanese
intervention amounts on the JPY/USD market from 1993 to 2000. Positive values indicate yen purchases
while negative ones correspond to yen sales. The period is restricted in comparison to other chapters of
this thesis (i.e. 1991-2004) and only concerns 143 interventions. As we will see, this is due to the lack of
necessary data to build independent variables for the rest of the period.
Note, however, that Fatum and Hutchinson (2004) have shown that the BoJ adopted monetary policy
measures consisting of rapid money base growth to fight deflation and to help the economy in the early
2000’s. This explicit strategy was not influenced by MoF’s massive yen selling operations in 2003 and
2004. Furthermore, recent research suggest that only 60% of the funds supplied by yen sells during 2003
and 2004 were sterilized by the Bank of Japan (Watanabe and Yabu, 2007) while the ratio was of 100%
in the preceding years. This extreme practise is not consistent with our approach which relies on a clear
separation of monetary and foreign exchange policies. Therefore, not including the end of the period is
not necessarily an issue in our case.
Daily exchange rate measures used in this analysis are provided by Olsen and Associates. Quotation
time is 9 p.m. GMT (i.e. New York market’s close), which is convenient to ensure that an intervention
occurs after the record of the rate. The rate may, then, be safely used as a determinant of interventions
(for a discussion see Dominguez, 2006).
Ministry of Finance target
Ito (2003) documented that Japanese sales (resp. purchases) on the JPY/USD market were carried out
below (resp. above) a level close to 125 yen per dollar from 1991 to March 2001. By carefully examining
news reports obtained through the Factiva database, we found news emanating from both Japanese
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Table 2.1: 125 yen per dollar as the Ministry of Finance target
Date Source Relevant text of the news report
18th February 1992 Tokyo Financial Wire “A senior Ministry of Finance official
suggested that a foreign exchange rate
considered acceptable [...] was 124-125
yen/dollar”.
6th March 1992 Reuters News “Japan’s Finance Minister T. Hata [...]
said that the Group of Seven would prefer
a dollar rate of 124 to 125 yen”.
17th December 1997 Reuters News “[A senior banker] said the BoJ could
push the dollar further to about 125 yen
level”.
20th May 2002 Market News Int. “Traders appear ready to test the Bank of
Japan’s and Ministry of Finance’s inter-
vention line in the sand, seen somewhere
near 125 yen”.
Note: These news reports indicate the importance given by authorities and the market to the
exchange rate level of 125 yen per dollar. News reports were obtained using “Bank of Japan”,
“Ministry of Finance”, “Finance Minister”, “yen”, “dollar”, “target” and “objective” as keywords for
every trading day between April 1991 and March 2004 in Factiva.
officials and market participants indicating indeed that such rate is crucial to understand the Japanese
FX policy during the period of interest. This is illustrated in table 2.1.
In 1991 and 1992, the yen was particularly weak against the dollar (about 135 yen per dollar). This
was a major concern for the G-7 countries that urged Japan to take measures to correct the situation
and to push the yen at a level of about 125 yen per dollar. After that episode, interestingly, the market’s
perception of the Japanese FX policy did not change drastically. Market participants still perceive the
level of 125 yen per dollar as being the so-called “line in the sand” at which interventions occur. Assuming
the exchange rate target of the Japanese Ministry of Finance to be around 125 yen per dollar seems then
reasonable.
However, considering a constant target for the whole period under study may be an issue. Therefore,
we opted instead for Galati et al. (2005)’s “implicit target range” of Japanese authorities for the JPY/USD
spot rate. This implicit target range is based on press reports for the period from 1993 to 2000, which
“typically emphasize the role of the spot rate as trigger for central bank intervention”. The range is in
table 2.4 in the appendix to this chapter. Interestingly, for the most part of the period, the lower bound
of the range is 125 yen per dollar. The percentage deviation of the exchange rate from the Japanese
Ministry of Finance is built using the center of the implicit rage proposed by Galati et al. (2005) and is
denoted by XGt .
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Central bank target
Consistently to its long term objectives related to the fulfillment of an appropriate monetary policy and
in particular to the necessity of achieving price stability, we assume the Bank of Japan’s exchange rate
target to correspond to the fundamental equilibrium rate. This assumption is fully in line with the the
BoJ’s statutes and objectives.13 These are well described in “Functions and Operations of the Bank of
Japan” edited by the Japanese Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies in which it is stated that
“market participants’ expectations concerning the macroeconomic fundamentals and financial markets in
their own or another country can acquire a bias [...]. Foreign exchange intervention is intended to prevent
or contain excessive fluctuations in foreign exchange rates, and to stabilize them”.
Several measures of the misalignment are proposed in the literature. In this work, we considered two
of them. First, we used Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2006)’s quarterly estimates of the JPY/USD real misalign-
ment (based on a fundamental rate consistent with a global equilibrium between the G-20’s countries).
This measure is convenient because a real appreciation of the yen may generate inflation, which is not
consistent with BoJ’s objectives. Quarterly series are interpolated to obtain daily misalignments that
are represented by variable ZB−Qt . Second, as a robustness check, we compute the misalignment from
yearly PPP equilibrium rates.14 Yearly series are also interpolated to obtain daily misalignments. The
variable is denoted by ZPPPt .
Data issue
One important issue regarding the targets of the Ministry of Finance and the BoJ we consider is that they
do not vary much over time. Since the independent variables of our econometric models are exchange
rate deviations from these targets, this stickiness may be problematic. In particular, it may cause a high
correlation coefficient between explanatory variables conducting then to potential collinearity problems
(i.e. instability of coefficients or perverse signs). Dealing with this issue is not easy. Usual methods
concern removing the variables causing the collinearity or transforming them. In our case, given our
theoretical framework, we opted for the second solution.
Table 2.2: Correlation coefficient between explanatory variables
















14PPP rates are provided by the OECD.
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We transform independent variables by only retaining the 5, 10 and 15 % of trading days with the
highest positive (resp. negative) observations corresponding then to the 5, 10 and 15% of trading days
with the highest undervaluation (resp. overvaluation) from the targets. As can be seen from table
2.2, these transformations permit to dramatically reduce the correlation coefficient between explanatory




t where j = 5, 10 and 15.
2.5 Results
Maximum likelihood estimations are reported in table 2.3. Specifications (1) and (2) concern untrans-
formed variables while transformed variables are tested in specifications (3) and (4). Furthermore,
specifications (1) and (3) use the real misalignment estimated by Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2006) while spec-
ifications (2) and (4) consider the misalignment from PPP equilibrium rates. The estimated value of the
structural parameters of the model and the log likelihood are provided at the bottom of the table.
Table 2.3: Estimates of the friction model for Japanese interventions over the 1993-2000 period
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
It−1(lagged intervention) 0.41*** 0.36*** 0.53*** 0.49***
(0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14)
XGt (deviation from Ministry’s target) 25.10*** 24.39*** - -
(4.14) (3.63)
XG,15t (transformed deviation from Ministry’s target) - - 10.49*** 7.94***
(2.75) (2.56)
ZB−Qt (B-Q misalignment) 11.75*** - - -
(2.20)
ZB−Q,15t (transformed B-Q misalignment) - - 8.25*** -
(1.54)
ZPPPt (PPP misalignment) - 5.59*** - -
(1.88)
ZPPP,15t (transformed PPP misalignment) - - - 7.31***
(0.89)
Θ1 (negative threshold) -1166.62*** -1119.42*** -821.79*** -889.96***
(94.99) (104.61) (61.96) (64.75)
Θ2 (positive threshold) 1205.83*** 912.40*** 1215.68*** 1081.29***
(103.17) (98.19) (99.92) (82.47)
σ (standard deviation) 453.72*** 417.24*** 483.84*** 452.73***
(28.38) (23.78) (31.26) (26.81)
α (interaction parameter) 0.32 0.17 0.44 0.48
ϕ (intervention impact parameter) -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07
Log Likelihood -1322.70 -1366.20 -1384.64 -1348.99
Observations 1698 1698 1698 1698
Note: Specifications (1) and (2) concern untransformed variables and transformed variables are used in specifications
(3) and (4). Furthermore, specifications (1) and (3) use the real misalignment estimated by Bénassy-Quéré et al.
(2004) while specifications (2) and (4) consider the misalignment from PPP equilibrium rates. Standard errors are
reported between brackets and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Positive and negative thresholds (i.e. Θ1 and Θ2), are highly significant for all specifications. They
determine the no intervention band which reflects the authorities’ reluctance to intervene because of
intervention related costs (Almekinders, 1995). |Θ1| > |Θ2| suggests that authorities are more prompt to
intervene to sell yen. This may be interpreted as the Ministry of Finance being relatively more tolerant
to an undervalued rather than to an overvalued yen.
Consistently with Ito (2003) and Ito and Yabu (2007), our estimates indicate that interventions are
more likely to be decided on a given day if an intervention has already been conducted on the previous
day (i.e. It−1 has a significant positive coefficient). The positive coefficients (slightly) suggest that
authorities tend to invest larger amounts for their subsequent operations.
From specifications (1) and (2), we see that the Japanese Ministry of Finance indeed reacts to
combined deviations of the exchange rate from its own and BoJ’s target (i.e. XGt , Z
B−Q
t and ZPPPt have
significant and positive coefficients). More precisely, over the period under study and using estimates of
specification (1), a one percent depreciation of the yen from the Ministry’s target induces a 25.10 billion
yen purchase while a one percent increase of the misalignment induces a 11.75 billion yen purchase.
Interestingly, this result is robust to the measure of misalignment considered.
Furthermore, since α > 0, main intuitions of the model of interaction are supported. That is,
the Ministry seems to internalize central bank’s losses when intervening. Authorities have then an
additional incentive to adopt corrective measures if targets are compatible and they tend to be more
reluctant to intervene when they are not. These results suggests that despite Japan clearly had an
implicit target range, decisions were made in order to ensure consistency between monetary and foreign
exchange policies.
As previously discussed, independent variables of specifications (1) and (2) in table 2.3 are highly
correlated. Therefore, to cope with this issue, explanatory variables are transformed to only consider
the 5, 10 and 15% highest positive and negative observations. Specifications (3) and (4) correspond to
estimations with the 15%-variables.15 Interestingly, main results remain the same (i.e. XG,15t , Z
B−Q,15
t
and ZPPP,15t have significant and positive coefficients) and the intuition of the model of interaction is
still supported in the transformed model (i.e. α > 0).
2.6 Conclusion
In many countries, the FX intervention policy is in the hands of a particular political authority (i.e.
the Ministry of Finance). Whereas the central bank solely plays the role of agent by implementing
transactions orders in the FX market. In this chapter we describe a theoretical model of interaction
between the Ministry of Finance and the central bank whose exchange rate objectives are not necessarily
15For the sake of clarity, estimate with the 5- and 10%-variables are not reported. Results remain however the same. We
opted for the 15%-variables because they correspond to the best trade-off between information retained from untransformed
variables and an acceptable correlation coefficient between independent variables.
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the same. While the Ministry of Finance’s policy is supposed to be related to the short run objective of
stimulating the economy by artificially depreciating the domestic currency, the central bank’s objectives
are thought to be more in line with the long term necessity of achieving the stability of prices, according
to the general stance of its monetary policy. Our theoretical framework supposes that, as long as the
Ministry of Finance is not indifferent to the central bank’s objectives and when these objectives can be
reconciled with its own, it has an additional incentive to adopt corrective measures. On the other hand,
if these objectives cannot be reconciled, the Ministry will be more reluctant to intervene given that its
policy will be the outcome of a trade-off between the achievement of its own and the central bank’s
objectives.
To investigate the empirical relevance of the interaction framework, we define a friction model of
intervention using the Japanese experience on the JPY/USD market for the period between 1993 and
2000. The Japanese Ministry of Finance’s exchange rate target is built from the implicit target range
proposed by Galati et al. (2005). The Bank of Japan’s target is supposed to be the fundamental exchange
rate equilibrium and two measures of misalignment are considered (estimates of Bénassy-Quéré et al.,
2006 and deviations from PPP equilibrium rates). Results support the intuition of the Ministry of Finance
internalizing central bank’s losses and adapting its actions in accordance. More precisely, amounts
invested in interventions tend to be larger when MoF and BoJ’s objectives are compatible. On the other
hand, the Ministry of Finance is more reluctant to intervene if its objectives go against the BoJ’s.
The model of interaction analyzed in this work is limited to the case of domestic agencies (i.e. the
Japanese Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan). This approach could be extended to incorporate
interactions with foreign counterparts. While the exercise is theoretically obvious, empirically it is not.
Determining appropriate exchange rate targets for each involved institution may not be possible, at





Table 2.4 indicates the implicit target range of Japanese authorities for the JPY/USD spot market
proposed by Galati et al. (2005). The range is obtained from press reports over the period from 1993
to 2000. In this work, we use the center of the range as a proxy for the Japanese Ministry of Finance
exchange rate target .
Table 2.4: “Implicit target range” of Japanese authorities for the JPY/USD spot rate (1993-2000)
Upper bound Lower bound
13 July 1993 - 17 February 1994 104 125
18 February 1994 - 4 April 1994 105 125
5 May 1994 - 1 July 1994 102 125
2 July 1994 - 17 August 1994 98 125
18 August 1994 - 25 August 1994 100 125
26 August 1994 - 6 March 1995 99 125
7 March 1995 - 3 April 1995 92 125
4 April 1995 - 10 April 1995 88 125
11 April 1995 - 27 June 1995 83 125
28 June 1995 - 1 August 1995 86 125
2 August 1995 - 5 September 1995 100 125
6 September 1995 -19 September 1995 105 125
20 September 1995-19 February 1996 100 125
20 February 1996 - 29 February 1996 110 125
1 March 1996 - 10 April 1998 105 125
10 April 1998 - 9 June 1999 105 150
10 June 1999 - 21 June 1999 120 150
11 June 1999 - 31 April 2000 105 150
Note: Implicit target range obtained by Galati et al. (2005) from news reports over the period






Direct interventions in the foreign exchange (FX) market have been used as a policy instrument on a
regular basis by the major central banks. The sterilization process has often made these interventions
a tool that is independent of monetary policy. While the debate remains strong about the degree of
efficiency of sterilized interventions (see Humpage, 2003 among others), some major central banks, such
as the Bank of Japan (BoJ), have still relied extensively on such interventions over the recent period.
The motives for interventions as well as their nature have been closely scrutinized by academics and
policy makers. Understanding why monetary authorities intervene is important for policy evaluation.
Such an understanding is also valuable for capturing the exact nature of the endogeneity issue at stake
when the relationship between interventions and exchange rates is investigated (Kearns and Rigobon,
2005). Reaction functions have been estimated for the major central banks and suggest that monetary
authorities react to reverse undesirable trends and, to a lesser extent, to smooth exchange rate volatil-
ity (Almekinders and Eijffinger, 1996). Central bank practices have also been studied in much detail
(Dominguez and Frankel, 1993 and Neely, 2001), showing that monetary authorities make use of a large
variety of techniques to implement their intervention policy.
The literature contains many insights about the usual practice of central banks but has still not
been able to rationalize the use of secret interventions (Sarno and Taylor, 2001). Secret interventions
are usually defined as foreign exchange operations that are not disclosed to market participants (at
least not contemporaneously). Depending on the central bank’s communication policy and the way
the order is transmitted to commercial banks, these operations can be hidden from foreign exchange
traders and can be mistakenly viewed as purely private trades. While the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the
1An article extracted from this chapter is published in the Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and
Money under the name of “Why do central banks intervene secretly? Preliminary evidence from the BoJ”. This work is the
result of a collaboration with Michel Beine (ULB).
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Bundesbank, before being supplanted by the European Central Bank (ECB), have progressively adopted
more transparent policies, some central banks still rely on secret operations, as suggested by the recent
operations of the BoJ (Beine and Lecourt, 2004).
The signaling theory, which considers central bank interventions as a method of altering exchange
rate expectations through the release of private information, obviously is unable to rationalize the use
of secret operations. Theoretical arguments, based on alternative approaches such as the noise trading
(Hung, 1997) or the microstructure ones (Vitale, 1999), have, therefore, been put forth to explain this
practice. Purely informal arguments have also been proposed (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993 and Chiu,
2003). While interesting, these explanations have not been assessed empirically in the literature, to the
best of our knowledge. This chapter aims at correcting the situation.
To study the motives for using secret operations, we examine the intervention policy of the Bank of
Japan over the recent period (1991-2004). For a decade, the BoJ has been, by far, the most active central
bank in foreign exchange markets. Over the full period under study, the BoJ was present in the market
for more than 10 % of trading days. However, after 2002 up until April 2004, this increased to more than
40 % of trading days. The interventions of the BoJ vary greatly over time and thus form a useful basis for
testing competing theories of the secrecy conundrum. While the Bank of Japan used public (reported)
interventions most of the time during the pre-Sakakibara period (1991-1995) and the Sakakibara (1995-
2002), nearly 80 % of their operations in the post-Sakakibara period (2003-2004) remained undetected
by market participants on the day they were carried out. This points to a major shift in the intervention
policy.
This chapter builds on the recent approach proposed by Beine and Lecourt (2004) to separate the
official interventions of the BoJ into reported and secret operations. This was done using newswire
reports that capture the extent to which market participants are aware, contemporaneously, of the central
bank’s presence in the market. We then carried out a logit analysis aimed at explaining the percentage of
secret versus reported interventions. After controlling for the determinants of the intervention detection
process by market participants, we assessed the empirical validity of the traditional explanations of
secrecy developed in the theoretical literature. From our findings, we identified the major determinants
that favor a central bank’s operations being detected: the size of the operation, whether the operation
is carried out in concert with other monetary authorities, the success of the operation and the intensity
of the past intervention policy. More importantly, the results lend strong empirical support to those
explanations related to the microstructure approach. In particular, we show that the BoJ tended to
favor the use of secret operations when targeting an exchange rate value that was inconsistent with the
fundamental equilibrium level.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical literature that rationalizes the
use of secret interventions of the central banks. It also provides a short summary of the existing empirical
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analysis of the central bank practices, a summary that can be used as a useful starting point for our
econometric analysis. Section 3 details the empirical strategy and discusses some methodological issues.
Our results are reported in section 4 while section 5 concludes.
3.2 The literature
Theoretical works are first reviewed. Then, the focus is put on empirical studies.
3.2.1 Theoretical background
As clearly identified by Sarno and Taylor (2001), the use of secret interventions by central banks remains
puzzling. Indeed, along the signaling channel (Mussa, 1981), central bank interventions should lead to
successful results only to the extent that they alter the expectations of market participants. Theoret-
ical arguments to rationalize the choice of such operations have, therefore, been developed outside the
signaling theory.2
A traditional explanation of secret interventions is related to the unwillingness of the central bank
to conduct an intervention that has been decided upon by some external authority (Dominguez and
Frankel, 1993 and Chiu, 2003). As we have seen in chapter 2 of this thesis, this may occur in countries
where, like in Japan and in the United States, institutionally, interventions are not decided by the
central bank itself but by some political authority. Interestingly, Japanese interventions decisions are
not directly taken by the Bank of Japan but, rather, by the Ministry of Finance, as any intervention
needs its approval (internal departments of the Ministry manage the foreign reserves). Therefore, despite
the fact that the Bank of Japan has its own objectives, it just plays the role of agent of the Ministry of
Finance by implementing the intervention orders in the foreign exchange market. In such an institutional
framework, the adoption of a secret intervention strategy by a central bank might result from the existence
of a mismatch in the objectives pursued respectively by the central bank (e.g. objectives related to the
economic fundamentals or the conduct of monetary policy) and the external political authority (e.g.
exchange rate levels consistent with the stabilization policies such as favoring currency depreciation in
order to boost exports). In other words, the central bank will try to minimize the visibility of any
intervention decision taken by some external authority as long as it is considered inconsistent with its
own objectives or with the general stance of its policy.
The likelihood of a successful intervention is obviously one of the most direct determinants influencing
the choice of this type of operation. As emphasized by Dominguez and Frankel (1993) and Chiu (2003),
a low level of credibility, arising from a previous failure to move the market in the desired direction, may
2We do not develop the traditional arguments in terms of exchange rate regime (Chiu, 2003) as the Japanese yen evolved
into a flexible one over the full period of investigation. Secret operations are likely to occur in fixed exchange rate regimes,
either when there is a threat of speculative attacks (Enoch, 1998) or when the rate is not far from the edge of the fluctuation
band (see the European Monetary System experience in 1993).
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persuade the central bank to opt for secrecy. Using secret interventions would allow the central bank to
avoid a further deterioration in its perceived ability to achieve the desired goal or to avoid significant
increases of the exchange rate volatility. Alternatively, in the case of a previous reported success, and
when the current context appears less favorable, the central bank might also want to intervene secretly to
preserve its credibility. Credibility, as measured by previous interventions performance, therefore, exerts
some ambiguous theoretical influence on whether secret operations are conducted.
Theoretical contributions based on the noise trading approach also provide some rationale for secret
interventions. This is especially true when the central bank leans against the wind, that is, tries to reverse
an undesirable evolution of the currency. In this case, a secret intervention can mitigate bandwagon effects
by restoring a two-way risk (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993). This two-way risk is caused by central bank
order flows and the resulting increase in volatility. The secrecy of these order flows might, therefore, lead
market participants to consider exchange rate fluctuations as purely endogenous to the market (Hung,
1997). Then, secrecy ensures that the intervention works through a pure portfolio effect and that market
participants will not react to the mere fact that the central bank is leaning against the wind (perverse
signaling effect). In this context, a leaning-against-the-wind behavior can favor secret operations.
Other arguments have also been advanced by the microstructure approach to exchange rates (Lyons,
2001). These arguments rely on agents’ heterogeneity and on information asymmetry. The secrecy of
order flows allows central bank trades to be indistinguishable from private trades. This is important for
two main reasons. First, as developed by Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) or Vitale (1999), secrecy is
desirable when the central bank targets some exchange rate level that is inconsistent with the fundamental
equilibrium rate.3 To a certain extent, while the concept of inconsistent policies is quite different, this
fits with Stein (1989) stressing the importance of the ambiguous nature of the information delivered by
the central bank in such cases. Second, anonymous trades by the central bank restore the case for a
portfolio effect (as opposed to the signaling channel). As argued by Evans and Lyons (2001), in this
context the efficiency of central bank interventions is enhanced when the information flow in the market
is relatively important.
Finally, consistency with monetary policy could also be a determinant of intervention secrecy. As for
the Japanese situation, however, it is unclear whether interventions were also used during the investiga-
tion period to increase the monetary base, for instance, through a deliberate strategy of non sterilization.
Therefore, we leave this point to future research. Nevertheless, recent research suggest that about 40%
of funds provided by yen selling operations during 2003 and 2004 were not sterilized (Watanabe and
Yabu, 2007).
3Focusing on the interaction between the central bank and the speculators, Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) show, for
instance, that the higher the precision about the target, the higher is the chance to obtain the so-called perverse case (i.e.
bad response of the exchange rate to the central bank operation in the short run).
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3.2.2 Empirical studies
Identifying the determinants of central bank interventions has given rise to an extensive empirical liter-
ature. Almekinders and Eijffinger (1996) estimate central bank reaction functions for the Fed and the
Bundesbank. They find that central banks tend to adopt leaning-against-the-wind policies and, to a
lesser extent, respond to exchange rate volatility. They also emphasize the central banks’ reluctance to
intervene by estimating significant thresholds of intervention. These results are interesting to understand
the motivations of central bank in intervening and to tackle in an appropriate way the issue of reversed
causality that is at stake in the empirical analysis of the efficiency of these operations.4
Subsequent studies of major central banks practices have tended to confirm the importance of leaning-
against-the-wind behavior. In contrast, there has been much less empirical support for the goal of
smoothing exchange rate volatility. Ito and Yabu (2007) confirm the leaning-against-the-wind behavior
of the Japanese authorities and find support for a no intervention band that reflects the costs of inter-
vention. Baillie and Osterberg (1997) find that deviations of exchange rates from their target triggered
interventions by the Fed and Bundesbank. However, they do not find robust evidence that the excess
volatility prompted the banks to intervene. Using another estimate of the time-varying volatility, Beine
et al. (2002) confirm this last finding for the G-3 central banks. Galati and Melick (1999) find quite
similar results for the BoJ using expected moments drawn from implied distributions by currency option
prices. Using a count data model that captures the dynamics of the intensity of the Bank of Switzerland
interventions, Frenkel et al. (2004) also find support for leaning-against-the-wind behavior and a weak
response to excessive fluctuations of the exchange rate. As a whole, these results seem robust to alterna-
tive measures of exchange rates deviations and volatility as well as alternative econometric techniques.
While the existing literature focuses extensively on the potential determinants of FX interventions, to
the best of our knowledge, there has not been any attempt to analyze the choice of intervention mode.
This chapter aims at correcting this lack by analyzing the determinants of secret operations of the BoJ.
As for the impact of interventions, empirical studies have documented contrasting influences of secret
interventions and of reported. Dominguez (1998) finds that, while reported interventions can lead to
lower volatility, secret operations generally tend to increase the uncertainty in the market. Beine et al.
(2002) find that secret operations tend to be counterproductive in terms of exchange rate levels, while,
reported ones, have no systematic influence. While the results tend to be period- and country-specific, as
a whole they suggest that the type of intervention chosen might affect the efficiency of these operations.
4For a recent illustration, see Kearns and Rigobon (2005).
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3.3 The empirical strategy
Before presenting our econometric approach and the data used in the empirical work, we discuss how
secret interventions are identified in practice.
3.3.1 Measuring secret interventions
Our empirical investigation of the choice of secret operations uses the recent BoJ intervention policy.
The Japanese case was chosen for two main reasons. First, the Bank of Japan in recent times has been
by far the most active major central bank in the FX markets. Over the 1991-2004 period of interest
here, the BoJ has intervened 343 times against the dollar. This means the BoJ was in the market on
more than 10 % of business days. In the post-Sakakibara period beginning in 2003, the BoJ was active
more than 40 % of the time. This pattern is in sharp contrast with the recent experience in other
industrialized countries. While the Fed and the Bundesbank were quite active before 1995, they have
become increasingly reluctant to use this stabilization instrument. Since 1995, the Fed has intervened
only twice in a concerted way, while, the ECB, has conducted only four interventions to support the
euro.
Second, the BoJ was chosen because of the proportion and the time variability of secret interventions.
Based on their estimates of secret operations, Beine and Lecourt (2004) find that the Fed became
increasingly transparent over time. While most of their operations (90 %) against the DEM were secret
during the Plaza period (September 1985 - February 1987), this proportion fell dramatically afterward.
The share of unreported Fed operations was only 23 % against the DEM after 1987 and 12.5 % against
the yen after 1991. A similar trend was observed for the Bundesbank. These results are consistent with
the trend of increasing transparency in the FX intervention policies of these central banks. This is in
contrast to the BoJ policy. Beine and Lecourt (2004) document a major shift in the recent intervention
policy of the BoJ in favor of secret operations. Since 2002, while intervening massively, more than 60
% of the daily operations of the BoJ have remained undetected by market participants on the day of
the intervention. Updates of these estimates to April 2004 (at which time the BoJ stopped intervening)
indicate that about 80 % of these operations remain unreported. The intervention policy of the BoJ
suggests that secret operations remain an active instrument in the hands of central banks. Furthermore,
this policy displays much variation over time, which means that market evolution might explain the
central bank decision about the type of operation to conduct.
We define a secret intervention as an intervention that has not been clearly observed by market partic-
ipants on the day it was carried out because of a deliberate concealing strategy adopted by authorities.5
To distinguish secret interventions from reported ones, we use the identification procedure developed by
5As we will see in chapter 4, this definition encompasses the concepts of “pure secret interventions ” and “detected secret
interventions”.
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Beine and Lecourt (2004). Basically, the approach relies on searching appropriate keywords in newswire
reports that were sent on the days of official interventions.6 These newswire reports are extracted using
an online database (Factiva), which collects news of all types from all over the world. The intervention
is considered secret if there is no evidence of information provided to or by FX traders that the central
bank was active in the market.7 This search procedure provides numerous advantages over alternative
approaches (such as the use of publications of the financial press) that have been employed by several
authors (Bonser-Neal and Tanner, 1996 and Dominguez, 1998).8
Table 3.1 gives the number of official intervention days (defined as interventions actually conducted
by the central bank and confirmed in the data released on a quarterly basis by authorities themselves)
plus the percentage of secret operations. The data are separated into three distinct periods that match
definitions proposed by Ito (2003). The first period is called the pre-Sakakibara (1991-1995) during which
the BoJ conducted frequent interventions. These operations involved relatively low amounts and were
sometimes in concert with the Fed. The second period is the Sakakibara (1995-2002) with less frequent
but massive currency sales or purchases. During that period, the Bank of Japan obviously adopted a
policy of high transparency as reflected in the very low proportion of secret operations.9 Finally, the
post-Sakakibara period (2003-2004) displays a strong increase in both the number of interventions and
the share of secret operations. Note that, after 1995, the Bank of Japan conducted almost only unilateral
operations.10
At first glance, it might be surprising that the Bank of Japan succeeded in conducting such a high
proportion of secret interventions, often on several consecutive days. As documented by Dominguez and
Frankel (1993), there are several ways in which a central bank can hide its exchange rate operations. In
this regard, the BoJ exhibited a high degree of creativity in its various intervention strategies, especially
over the post-Sakakibara period. Exchange rate traders often mention these strategies without being
able to provide strong evidence supporting their existence. As a result, the Bank of Japan succeeded
in keeping the exchange rate operations undetected not only the day they were carried out but also on
the succeeding days. This was partly due to the reluctance of the Bank of Japan to confirm the recent
past operations. As a piece of evidence, we find very weak evidence that traders were aware of past
secret operations during the week after their occurrence: out of the 132 secret operations observed over
our sample period, only 6 were confirmed by the Bank of Japan during the 5 subsequent business days.
A systematic analysis of the reports extracted from the Factiva online database allows listing some of
the strategies used by the BoJ in order to keep the operations secret. First, a systematic medium-run
strategy used by the Bank of Japan is to decline any confirmation of recent past operations, whether
6We use the following keywords: “interventions”, “Bank of Japan”, “Federal Reserve”, and “Ministry of Finance”.
7Examples of news reports and further details on the search procedure are provided in the appendix to this chapter.
8See Beine and Lecourt (2004) for a development of the advantages of this approach over the use of financial newspapers.
9It should also be noted that Japan decided to release the official intervention data during that period.
10The last concerted operation with the Fed occurred on June 17, 1998. The Bank of Japan also joined the concerted
operation to support the Euro on September 22, 2000.
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Table 3.1: Features of BoJ intervention policy, JPY/USD, 04/01/1991-03/16/2004
Periods Official Concerted Secret (%)
pre-Sakakibara period (1991-1995) 166 21 16.9
Sakakibara period (1995-2002) 49 3 0
post-Sakakibara period (2003-2004) 128 0 80.5
Whole period (1991-2004) 343 24 38.2
Note: “Official” gives the number of interventions in the JPY/USD market as statistically reported
by the Bank of Japan. “Concerted” gives the number of concerted official interventions. “Secret”
reports the percentage of unreported interventions the day the operation was carried out.
they were detected or not.11 Second, during the first and the third sub-period, the BoJ placed FX orders
with a very limited number of commercial banks, with an explicit requirement of confidentiality.12 Third,
over the post-Sakakibara period, the BoJ has intervened not only in their own local markets but also in
the London, New York, and other Asian currency markets. This allows the BoJ to intervene over the full
course of the day and to pick up the optimal moment for surprising the market.13 A related strategy is
to intervene during Japanese bank holidays.14 Some other central banks such as the Fed and the ECB
were also reported to intervene on behalf of the BoJ.15 Finally, the BoJ was also reported to have placed
conditional orders at different exchange rate levels.16 This contrasted with the previous usual practice
of aggressive buys and sells when the exchange rate reached certain levels. This list of intervention
strategies is, of course, far from being exhaustive. They just reflect the high degree of innovation in the
way the Bank of Japan conducted its exchange rate operations.
3.3.2 The econometric model
In our analysis of the determinants of secret interventions, we use the standard approach of binary
response models. We adopt a logit specification, represented by equation (3.1) in which yi = 1 when
intervention i of the BoJ remains secret and yi = 0 when it has been reported.17 Importantly, in this
analysis, we do not distinguish interventions authorities wanted to be observed by the market from those
operations they failed to maintain effectively secret. This important dimension is examined in chapter 4
of this thesis.
Prob(yi = 1) =
exp(Xβ + Zγ)
1 + [exp(Xβ + Zγ)]
(3.1)
11A statement made by officials at the Foreign Exchange Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance about this general
strategy was issued on October 2, 2003.
12This strategy was mentioned by traders in June and August 1992. On August 12, 1992, the BoJ was even reported to
have placed orders with a single commercial bank.
13This point was reported in an analyst’s report in January 2003.
14Traders mentioned this strategy on January 18, 2003.
15It is nevertheless unclear to what extent this strategy favors the secrecy of an operation. On one hand, traders fail
to identify the BoJ as one of the central bank taking part in the operation. On the other hand, the BoJ often tended to
confirm the interventions when carried out by other central banks on its behalf.
16Traders reported this in March 2003.
17It should be clear that only observations associated to official intervention days are included in the sample. In this
respect, the model should be seen as a strategy function instead of a reaction function.
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Xβ = β0 + β1x1 + ...+ βKxK and Zγ = γ1z1 + ...+ γLzL. We disentangle the determinants of yi from
two sets of explanatory variables. We include, as regressors, variables thought to increase the probability
of detection (denoted as X in (3.1)) and variables believed to influence the central bank in its choice
of intervention type (denoted as Z in (3.1)). While our primary interest lies in the γ coefficients to
test theories of the endogenous choice for secrecy discussed in section 2.1, failing in controlling for the X
variables would obviously result in poor estimates of these γ. The model is estimated using the maximum
likelihood estimators. To improve estimator efficiency, we used Huber-White (QML) robust standard
errors.
Since logit models are non-linear, the parameter estimates cannot be interpreted directly and one has
to compute the marginal effects of the explanatory variables to assess their economic importance. In this
work, these marginal effects are estimated following the description of Wooldridge (2002), who makes a
careful distinction depending on whether the explanatory variable is continuous or not. The marginal
effect, mc(xK), associated with a given continuous variable xK is then computed as in equation (3.2).
mc(xK) =
exp(Xβ̂ + Zγ̂)
(1 + [exp(Xβ̂ + Zγ̂)])2
× β̂K (3.2)
X (resp. Z) denotes the vector of explanatory variables X (resp. Z) computed at their sample means
and β̂ (resp. γ̂) denotes the vector of estimates of β (resp. γ).18 In the discrete case, the marginal effect,
md(xk), of a dummy variable xK is computed following equation (3.3).
md(xK) = g(β̂0 + ...+ β̂K1 + γ̂1z1 + ...+ γ̂LzL)− g(β̂0 + ...+ β̂K0 + γ̂1z1 + ...+ γ̂LzL) (3.3)
g(.) denotes the logistic transformation.
3.3.3 The data
Consistently with the chosen specification, we have first to disentangle determinants of secret interven-
tions between variables impacting the detection process (X variables) and those leading the central bank
to opt for secrecy (Z variables). This decomposition relies on the previous empirical evidence of Beine
and Lecourt (2004) and on the basis of existing theories rationalizing the use of secret interventions.
While this might be discussed, this decomposition is nevertheless necessary in the present context. Our
analysis should thus be seen as a very first attempt to tackle the issue of secrecy in an empirical per-
spective. One way to overcome the limitation related to this decomposition might involve the separate
modeling of each step of the whole intervention process through a nested logit approach. This highly
technical extension is examined in chapter 4 of this thesis.
18Taking the sample mean values of the explanatory variables to compute the marginal effects is typical in this kind of




Beine and Lecourt (2004)’s preliminary analysis provides some clues to finding variables that influence
the probability of detecting the presence of the central bank in the market. These determinants pertain
primarily to some of the features of the central bank interventions but also touch on market conditions.
Beine and Lecourt (2004) document the relatively low proportion of unreported concerted interven-
tions in both the DEM/USD and the JPY/USD markets. The joint presence of the two involved central
banks increases the visibility of trades and is therefore expected to increase the probability of detection.19
We thus build a dummy variable denoted coord that takes the value 1 if the intervention was concerted
and 0 otherwise.
The size of the intervention is also expected to influence the extent to which traders might detect the
presence of the central bank. Daily size not only reflects the size of the orders given by the central bank
but also the number of these orders.20 Large daily amounts of intervention, such as the ones observed
during the Sakakibara period, usually result in successive trades by the central bank over the full course
of the trading day which, in turn, may increase the ability of market participants to detect the operation.
To account for this, a dummy variable is introduced (denoted by size) that takes the value 1 if the daily
size of the intervention is higher than the average amount of the year and 0 otherwise.
Reported interventions in the days before an intervention should also raise traders’ attention to the
presence of the central bank in the market. Empirical reaction functions (Almekinders and Eijffinger,
1996) suggest that the probability of intervention is higher when the central bank has intervened during
the previous days. This fits with the cluster behavior of central bank interventions that has been
documented in numerous studies. Given that official data are released only with a 3-month lag, we build
a variable (denoted clusters) that captures the number of successive reported interventions during the
five days immediately preceding an intervention.
The success of the intervention can also influence the extent to which this intervention is detected.
Dominguez (2006) provides a stunning example of this by looking at the effect of the Fed intervention
on May 31, 1995. The first order of the Fed resulted in DEM/USD jumping more than 2 %, drawing the
attention of traders and triggering newswire reports. Interestingly, subsequent trades of the Fed on that
day were also easily detected. Then, a given intervention is considered successful if it moves the exchange
rate in the desired direction. While restrictive, this definition is consistent with the main objective of
the BoJ over our investigation period. We compare the sign of the exchange rate return between day
t − 1 and t and the sign of intervention occurring at date t.21 The variable success takes the value 1
19It could also be argued that an agreement between several central banks to intervene at the same time may reflect
their willingness to send a strong signal to the market. In this case, the use of secret interventions is inconsistent with such
an international concertation.
20Unfortunately, while major central banks release information on both the days when they intervened as well as the
amounts involved, they do not provide data on the number of trades within the intervention days, nor the exact timing
of the operations. To the best of our knowledge, these data exist only for the (unilateral) interventions of the Bank of
Switzerland and the Bank of Canada.
21The choice of the quotation time of the JPY/USD exchange rate (noon rates on the New York market) ensures that the
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if a purchase (resp. a sale) of dollars led to an appreciation (resp. a depreciation) of the dollar and 0
otherwise.
Finally, we also include the degree of misalignment (denoted mis) of the exchange rate (i.e. the
size of the (absolute) deviation of the rate with respect to the equilibrium exchange rate). Note that,
usually, the misalignment is included as a determinant to interventions. Nevertheless, in this analysis,
the variable is introduced as a way to assess the ability of market participants to understand the strategy
of authorities. We use Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2004)’s yearly estimates of the JPY/USD real misalignment
(based on a fundamental rate consistent with a global equilibrium between the G-20’s countries). Yearly
series are interpolated to obtain daily misalignments.22 The implied equilibrium level of the JPY/USD
exchange rate is computed at an annual frequency.
Determinants of the choice for secrecy
We build variables to assess the theories rationalizing the use of secret intervention previously discussed.
Inconsistency of exchange rate policy
Our first variables aim at capturing the inconsistency of an intervention with the objective of reducing
the misalignment. Two measures of inconsistency are built, both based on the exchange rate degree of
misalignment estimated by Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2004). The first measure (inconsist) is in the form of
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the BoJ intervenes in a direction opposite to the direction
needed to reduce the degree of misalignment. This situation occurs when the BoJ bought yen when the
yen was overvalued or sold yen when the yen was undervalued.23 This first measure, however, does not
account for the magnitude of the misalignment as it gives equal weight to both large and small deviations
from the equilibrium rate. To overcome this limitation, we compute a second variable by multiplying
this first measure by the absolute value of the misalignment. This leads to a new variable denoted by
inconsist×mis. Using this measure, inconsistency is expected to rise with the degree of misalignment.24
Both measures of inconsistency may capture implicit conflicts between the central bank (i.e. the BoJ)
and the external authority (i.e. the Ministry of Finance), as noted in the first theoretical explanation of
secrecy and as formalized in chapter 2 of this thesis. As an illustration, over the post-Sakakibara period,
the Japanese government reportedly favored an export-led growth policy through a weak yen.25 More
intervention occurred before the record of the rate at time t, assuming that the BoJ intervened during Japanese business
hours. This assumption is in line with the evidence provided by Dominguez (2006).
22Comparing the degrees of the misalignment computed with these estimates with the ones induced by purchasing power
parity (PPP) measures reveals very similar measures.
23Incidentally, our definition of a consistent intervention policy fully matches the intervention strategy recently proposed
by Neely (2004). Neely (2004) argues that the adoption of such a policy rule should result in effective operations in the
medium run.
24This second measure also implicitly accounts for the non-observability of the equilibrium rate. Given that several
measures of the equilibrium might be used, small deviations lead to a difficult evaluation of the under- or overvaluation
of a currency. In contrast, large deviations should correspond to a broad consensus on whether the currency is under- or
overvalued.
25Both measures also capture another type of inconsistency. Intervention policy might be seen at odds with the inter-
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generally, these variables can be used to assess the empirical validity of the microstructure arguments
of Vitale (1999). That is, secrecy reveals a discrepancy between the exchange rate level targeted by
the intervention and the fundamental exchange rate. Nevertheless, both views clearly predict that our
inconsistency measure should be associated with a higher probability of secret intervention.
Previous success of interventions
We measure the extent to which past interventions have been efficient. With this aim, we build three
complementary measures of past intervention success. For the first, we measure whether the previous
intervention (regardless of whether it was secret or reported) has been a success, using the same concept
of success as previously used. This variable, denoted previous success, takes the value 1 if the previous
intervention succeeded in moving the exchange rate in the desired direction and 0 otherwise. Because
traders might be unaware of the previous intervention if it was secret, we compute a second measure
that restricts the success assessment to reported interventions. More precisely, the variable denoted last
reported success takes the value 1 if the last reported intervention succeeded in moving the exchange rate
in the desired direction and 0 otherwise. Our third and last measure captures previously known failures
through a dummy variable (previous reported failure) that takes the value 1 if the previous intervention
was not secret and was a failure and 0 if it was a success or was unknown to market participants. If
one believes that past inefficiency of interventions should lead the central bank to opt for secrecy, one
would expect the first two measures to be associated with negative coefficients in the logit specification
(equation (3.1)) and the last to be positively associated with secrecy.
From a more general perspective, central bank practice suggests that past performance of interven-
tions might influence a central bank’s decisions about the intervention policy. Results of the survey
conducted by Neely (2001) indicate that central bank trades depend on the response of exchange rates
to previous interventions. The current analysis should also be seen as a formal way to examine whether
past performance has an influence on the type of intervention conducted by central banks.
Declared policy targets
Official statements, extracted using Factiva, in the days preceding an intervention and indicating that
authorities are not comfortable with the evolution of the exchange rate level, generally, do not mention
explicit target levels. This suggests, then, the existence of some implicit target. To the extent that this
target differs from the fundamental level, along the lines of Vitale (1999), the central bank may opt for
secrecy. At first sight, it might be surprising that authorities intervene secretly after having indicated that
the exchange rate is behaving inappropriately. Nevertheless, such a strategy would be fully consistent
national monetary cooperation aimed at reducing economic imbalances. More precisely, the recent BoJ intervention policy
that was aimed at supporting the dollar was inconsistent with the G-7 statements in September 2003 and February 2004
in favor of fully flexible exchange rates.
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with the noise trading approach of Hung (1997). Indeed, in an heterogeneous agents framework, verbal
announcements might be aimed at influencing the behavior of fundamentalists (who will see them as
private information regarding macroeconomic fundamentals), while the subsequent secret intervention
would induce chartists to join the market (because of the exchange rate fluctuations generated by the
operation). We measure, then, the number of days on which verbal statements referring to the exchange
rate level were made by Japanese officials over the five days preceding an intervention. This variable is
denoted by target level. Interestingly, about 57 % of interventions were found to be preceded by at least
one statement of this type.
Central bankers also often denounce excess exchange rate volatility. We therefore create a similar
type of variable capturing the number of days, over the five days preceding an intervention, on which
officials made verbal statements referring to an excessive volatility. This variable is indicated by target
volatility. We found that, over the full period, about 34 % of interventions were preceded by at least one
statement of this type.26
Leaning-against-the-wind
As another indirect way to test for a noise trading strategy, we also create a variable indicating whether
the central bank adopted a leaning-against-the-wind behavior. To this end, we compare the sign of the
last five previous daily exchange rate returns with the sign of the intervention. The variable leaning takes
the value 1 when the intervention goes in the direction opposite to the previous trend and 0 otherwise.
We find that more than 76 % of the interventions were of a leaning-against-the-wind type.
Along the noise trading channel, leaning-against-the-wind intervention strategies favor secret inter-
ventions so as to create seemingly market-endogenous fluctuations of the exchange rate. More generally,
if associated with low credibility, a leaning-against-the-wind behavior should induce central banks to hide
their presence in the market (Enoch, 1998). Both arguments imply an expected positive relationship.
Exchange rate volatility
Finally, we also control for the exchange rate volatility. Market volatility is known to be highly correlated
with transaction volumes and the level of information flows. Microstructure approaches (Evans and
Lyons, 2001) argue that the efficiency of secret interventions should be greater with intense information
flows. Volatility is estimated here using the realized volatility, as suggested by Andersen et al. (2001).
Since interventions are known to increase the volatility most of the time (Dominguez, 1998) and, in order
to prevent any problem of simultaneity, we use the one-day lagged volatility. This should be a rather
good approximation, given the volatility clustering usually observed for exchange rates. Following Beine
et al. (2003b), daily volatility at day t measured at hour h (denoted by RVt,h) is calculated as the sum
26Examples of news reports used to build target level and target volatility variables are in the appendix to this chapter.
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Table 3.2: Empirical measures of explanatory variables (X and Z) of secret interventions.
Variables Definitions
size 1 if intervention size higher than annual average level.
coord 1 if intervention is concerted.
clusters Number of successive reported interventions over the
5 preceding trading days.
success 1 if the intervention moves the exchange rate in the
desired direction.
mis Absolute level of misalignment in percentage.
previous success 1 if the previous intervention was a success.
last reported success 1 if the last reported intervention was a success.
previous reported failure 1 if the previous intervention was a failure and was
reported.
inconsist 1 if the intervention direction inconsistent with the
reduction of the exchange rate misalignment.
target level Number of verbal statements signaling inconsistent
level of exchange rate.
target volatility Number of verbal statements signaling excess volatility
of exchange rate.
leaning 1 if the intervention tries to reverse recent exchange
rate trend.
RVt−1,h Realized exchange rate volatility of preceding day es-
timated at hour h.





We choose h corresponding to the opening of the Japanese market (i.e. 0.00 GMT+1). Table 3.2
summarizes the measures used to capture both the determinants of market detection and the motivation
of the central bank to opt for secrecy.
3.4 Results
In order to make things clear, we conduct a systematic estimation strategy. Results of table 3.3 are
organized as follows. Specification (1) includes all the explanatory variables. Specification (2) omits the
variable related to the success of the intervention (success) as a determinant of the detection of central
bank trades. The aim is to account for some potential endogeneity problems. Endogeneity might arise if
the type of intervention influences the efficiency of the operation. While the empirical literature is rather
inconclusive about such an effect (Dominguez, 1998 and Beine et al., 2002), we nevertheless look at the
stability of the parameters of the other determinants with and without this variable.
Specification (3) is parsimonious in the sense that it excludes insignificant variables such as the mis,
target level, target volatility and leaning variables. An alternative measure to the inconsistency variable
is used in specification (4) to account for the effect of the size of the misalignment (i.e. inconsist × mis
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Table 3.3: Determinants of secret interventions: BoJ, 1991-2004
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -0.325 -0.624 -0.733** -0.159 -0.490** -0.600**
(0.577) (0.545) (0.285) (0.230) (0.233) (0.252)
size -0.619** -0.691** -0.694** -0.632** -0.643** -0.633**
(0.291) (0.289) (0.289) (0.278) (0.271) (0.272)
coord -2.374** -2.589** -2.659** -2.636** -2.726** -2.708**
(0.957) (1.044) (1.062) (1.054) (1.106) (1.099)
clusters -0.387* -0.386** -0.354** -0.479*** -0.619*** -0.603***
(0.200) (0.192) (0.176) (0.171) (0.193) (0.192)
success -1.117*** - - - - -
(0.312)
mis -0.049 -0.152 - - - -
(2.314) (2.744)
previous reported failure -1.078*** -0.998*** -0.999*** -1.099*** - -
(0.390) (0.375) (0.377) (0.352)
previous success - - - - 0.061 -
(0.256)
last reported success - - - - - 0.243
(0.263)
target level 0.046 0.064 - - - -
(0.149) (0.136)
inconsist 1.972*** 1.734*** 1.794*** - - -
(0.377) (0.336) (0.304)
inconsist × mis - - - 7.635*** 9.176*** 8.907***
(1.970) (1.902) (1.918)
target volatility 0.216 0.200 - - - -
(0.169) (0.170)
leaning -0.246 -0.260 - - - -
(0.335) (0.312)
McFadden R2 0.313 0.281 0.276 0.233 0.211 0.212
Correct cases (secret) 0.720 0.758 0.773 0.682 0.652 0.667
Correct cases (all) 0.795 0.775 0.772 0.775 0.766 0.772
Total gain 0.181 0.161 0.158 0.161 0.152 0.158
Hosmer-Lemeshow test 0.260 0.049 0.204 0.113 0.069 0.069
Number of observations 342 342 342 342 342 342
Note: The estimates are obtained from a logit model with dependent variable equal to 1 when the intervention is secret,
0 if not (i.e. reported). Performance of past interventions is measured by previous reported failure (i.e. dummy
equal to 1 if the last intervention was perceived and a failure) in specifications (1) through (4) and by previous success
(i.e. dummy equal to 1 if the last intervention was a success) and last reported success (i.e. dummy equal to 1 if the
last perceived intervention was a success) respectively in specifications (5) and (6). Huber-White (QML) Standard
Errors are reported between brackets. ***, **, * denote significance level at 1, 5 and 10 % respectively. Correct cases
provide the proportion of correct predictions, using a threshold value of 0.5. Total gain gives the improvement of the
proportion of correct predictions compared to a constant probability model. The penultimate line provides p-values
related to the Hosmer-Lemeshow test of goodness-of-fit, distributed as a χ
2
with J − 2 degrees of freedom, J being
the number of quantiles used in the test (J = 10).
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is used instead of inconsist). The performance of past interventions in specifications (1) through (4) is
measured by the variable previous reported failure. In specifications (5) and (6), alternative measures
of past performance are used (previous success and last reported success variables).
It should also be mentioned that the inclusion of the realized volatility (RVt−1,h) points to a high
level of insignificance of this variable. Furthermore, the unavailability of intra-daily exchange rates over
the full period restricts the size of the sample used to estimate the probability of secret interventions.
The variable is then systematically excluded.
Along with the estimated coefficients, table 3.3 reports the test statistics that can be used to assess the
empirical relevance of our specifications. These measures (the McFadden R2, the percentage of correct
predictions for the secret intervention and for both alternatives as well as the Hosmer-Lemeshow test
statistics for the null of a correct specification) are commonly used for logit specifications as discussed
by Greene (2000) and Wooldridge (2002). In general, all estimated models provide a good fit with often
more than 75 % of interventions being correctly identified as secret or reported. They also pass rather
well the Hosmer-Lemeshow misspecification test.27
3.4.1 Detection of interventions
Our estimations succeed, on the whole, in capturing the determinants of the detection of interventions
carried out by the BoJ. Market participants’ identification of central bank interventions tends to increase
because of the amounts (measured by the size variable) of transactions orders. Thus, other things being
equal, central banks will tend to favor small operations to keep their operations secret. Operations in
concert with the Fed, captured by the coord variable, also result in higher detection by market partic-
ipants. This fits with the previous evidence, provided by Beine and Lecourt (2004), that coordinated
operations are less successful in remaining undetected than unilateral ones. To a certain extent, this
means that the decision to coordinate prevents the use of secret operations.
Successive reported interventions occurring over the previous days also result in better detection of
central bank operations as shown by the clusters variable. This might occur in two ways. First, given
the fact that central banks tend to intervene in a clustered way, identification of previous operations
might raise traders’ attention to order flows conducting to a higher detection rate of central bank trades,
regardless on whether they were initially intended to be secret or public. Second, central banks tend to
keep the same intervention policy for a period of time. In other words, transparent policies that aim at
informing market participants will tend to be applied to a number of successive operations.
The results relative to the success variable also suggest that successful operations will tend to be
27Given the differences in the conduct of the BoJ’s intervention policy documented in table 3.1, it might be interesting
to look for the existence of structural breaks in our data. Greene (2000) describes a way to implement a Chow-type test for
limited dependent variable models based upon the likelihood ratio statistic. The procedure requires the estimation of the
model for each of the three sub-periods (i.e. pre-Sakakibara, Sakakibara and the post-Sakakibara period). Unfortunately,
given the weak variability of the dependent variable within each sub-period, the restricted models cannot be estimated and
the test statistic cannot be computed. Therefore, the existence of structural breaks cannot be formally rejected.
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more easily detected by market participants. Nevertheless, given the potential problem of endogeneity
with this variable, this result should be taken with caution. Importantly, while the variable is highly
significant, its exclusion does not lead to any important parameter changes for the other variables, nor
does it strongly reduce the goodness-of-fit performances of the model. Our estimates, therefore, tend to be
robust to the inclusion of this variable. Finally, the misalignment captured by the mis variable, was not
found to affect the probability of intervention detection. This result tends to reject the idea that market
participants will devote more attention to the presence of the central bank in the market when there
is a reason for authorities to use FX operations to reduce the degree of exchange rate misalignment.28
This result may also be explained by the fact that the misalignment is generally considered to be a
determinant to interventions.
3.4.2 Endogenous choice for secrecy
The interpretation of table 3.3 shows that there is no evidence whatsoever that poor performance of
previous interventions induces the Bank of Japan to use secret interventions. This result holds regard-
less of the way we capture past performance. From specifications (1) through (4) the coefficient of the
previous reported failure variable suggests that when the Bank of Japan had been reported to have
intervened without success, it tended to rely less on secret operations. The fact that the previous inter-
vention was unsuccessful in moving the exchange rate in the desired direction and that this intervention
was known by the market lowers the probability of using a subsequent secret intervention by about 19
% (using specification (3) to compute the marginal effect). While less robust, findings obtained using
specifications (5) and (6) are not inconsistent with this result. They do not support any significant
relationship between the variables measuring the success of past interventions (i.e. previous success and
last reported success) and the proportion of secret operations. While the explanation of such a result
deserves further investigation, it seems to go against the view that poorly performing central banks favor
secret interventions (Chiu, 2003).
The leaning variable is clearly insignificant in all specifications, suggesting that a leaning-against-
the-wind behavior did not induce the BoJ to use secret operations. Leaning-against-the-wind behavior is
one particular circumstance in which the central bank may choose to follow a noise trading strategy. It
is not, however, the only case that favors such strategies. An insignificant leaning variable therefore does
not reject per se the adoption of a noise trading strategy. Nevertheless, we did not find any evidence
that statements by officials indicating that the exchange rate level or volatility was not consistent with
28This result might be due to the fact that traders internalized the fact that the Bank of Japan often intervened in
the direction opposite to the reduction of the misalignment. The release of historical official intervention data after 2000
could have made it easier for traders to notice such a practice. We found that the share of inconsistent policies (i.e.
interventions that went in a direction opposite to reducing the misalignment of the exchange rate) represents more than
51 % of the operations. This means that more than one of two interventions does not aim at reducing the misalignment
of the JPY/USD exchange rate. Once more, this tends to fit with the central bank behavior proposed by Vitale (1999) in
which authorities target an exchange rate level not consistent with fundamentals.
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their implicit target (target level and volatility variables) tended to raise or decrease the probability of
conducting subsequent secret operations. This tends to reject the idea that the central bank intended to
alter the behavior of both fundamental and noise traders.
The existence of conflicts, between the central bank and the political authority actually in charge
of the foreign exchange policy, regarding the exchange rate level to defend might favor the occurrence
of secret interventions. This would be consistent with the work of Vitale (1999) showing that secret
interventions should be used when the operation targets an exchange rate level inconsistent with the
fundamental equilibrium. The findings related to the effect of inconsistent intervention policies provide
a striking support for such a rationale. Both inconsistency measures (inconsist and inconsit × mis
variables) indicate that when the BoJ acted in a direction opposite to the reduction of the misalignment
of the yen, it favored the use of a secret operation. Depending on the specification, the marginal effect
associated with this inconsistency is around 0.35. In other words, the Bank of Japan tended to use a
secret operation 35 % more often when the intervention was aimed at increasing rather than reducing
the degree of the misalignment. The impact of the interaction variable (inconsist×mis) shows that this
tendency increases with the size of the misalignment. On the whole, our findings strongly suggest that
the effect formalized by Vitale (1999) is much more than a theoretical curiosity.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter provides the first attempt of an empirical evaluation of the reasons underlying the use
of secret interventions by central banks in the foreign exchange market. The assessment examines the
actions of the Bank of Japan over the recent period (1991-2004). Not only has the Bank of Japan been
the sole major central bank using foreign exchange interventions as an instrument but it has also relied
extensively on secret operations, especially in recent times.
Using newswire reports, we distinguish between reported and secret interventions. Our empirical
analysis includes two sets of explanatory variables, one for the process of market participants’ detecting
the central bank, the other for the incentives for the central bank to opt for secrecy. The size of the
amounts used in the interventions, coordination with another central bank as well as the presence of
recent past operations are found to improve the detection of central bank operations.
Our findings provide strong support for the theoretical explanations of foreign exchange market
operations that have recently been developed within the microstructure approach. Our findings show
that the Bank of Japan tended to favor secret operations when it was acting in the opposite direction
to reducing the exchange rate misalignment. In contrast, we did not find evidence in favor of a noise




Identification method of secret and reported interventions
The Bank of Japan usually releases the data on its official interventions (i.e. days of intervention,
currencies and amounts involved) on a quarterly basis without specifying whether any given intervention
was reported or secret. It is therefore necessary to separate out officially reported interventions from
secret ones.
In the current analysis, we achieve this by employing the same technique that was used in Beine and
Lecourt (2004). Their dataset, available up to October 2003, was extended until March 2004 at which
time the BoJ stopped its interventions. As secret interventions, by definition, cannot be observed, the
method consists in searching, for each official intervention day, for any news report clearly stating that
the bank was in the market. An intervention is considered reported if the news was issued on the day of
the intervention. Otherwise, the intervention is considered as secret.
We searched for news reports using the online database Factiva that gives access to reports from
numerous sources such as Reuters and Dow Jones, among others. Factiva has powerful search tools
(e.g. keywords, choice of sources, choice of date ranges, ability to search titles, headlines, or full text of
the news reports).29 This facilitates the extraction of relevant information within a news report. More
importantly, the Factiva database is available for the whole period analyzed in this chapter. This makes
possible the use of the same technique for the whole sample, thereby ensuring the consistency of the
findings.
Using news reports to identify reported interventions presents some advantages compared with the
usual method described in the literature-examining the financial press (Bonser-Neal and Tanner, 1996
and Dominguez, 1998). As there is no guarantee that any information on interventions will be transmit-
ted from the market to the press, using newspapers may cause an overestimation of the proportion of
secret interventions. Using news reports allows a more accurate estimation of the proportion of secret
interventions.30
A sample of four news reports, obtained using the technique described above, is in table 3.4. As can
be seen from this table, the news reports clearly indicate that the market was aware of the intervention
the day the operation occurred. The interventions on these days should therefore be considered reported.
29For every official intervention day, we did a full-text search for the following keywords in the news reports: “interven-
tions”, “Federal Reserve”, “Bank of Japan”, and “Ministry of Finance”. The sources were restricted to Reuters and Dow
Jones.
30For further details, see Beine and Lecourt (2004).
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Table 3.4: Sample of news reports indicating the occurrence of an intervention
Intervention date Source Relevant text of the news report
10th December 2003 Reuters News We saw some dollar buying against the yen due to
Bank of Japan intervention today.
6th January 2004 Reuters News The dollar [...] managed to hold above the previous
day’s three-year low on the yen as traders detected
Bank of Japan intervention to lend it support.
9th January 2004 Reuters News The Bank of Japan was seen intervening heavily in the
currency market on Friday.
16th January 2004 Reuters News The dollar slumped to a three-year low against the
yen on Friday and traders said Japanese authorities
intervened to try to contain the yen’s export-crimping
rise.
Note: This sample of four news reports was extracted from the online database Factiva. The
reports clearly indicate that the market was aware of the presence of the BoJ for every day of
official intervention listed in the table.
Building the target level and target volatility variables
We searched for this information in the Factiva database in a window of five days preceding any official
intervention.31 Our findings indicate that precise and numerical targets were very scarce. However,
monetary authorities did make many announcements clearly indicating that the exchange rate level was
not satisfactory. We therefore built the target level variable to indicate the number of announcements
stating the authorities are not comfortable with the exchange rate level.
Central banks may also target exchange rate volatility level. To capture that information, we built
the target volatility variable the same way as the target level variable but using announcements on the
market volatility. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 contain examples of announcements on the exchange rate level and
volatility, respectively. It can be seen that the news reports clearly indicate that the exchange rate level
or volatility are not satisfactory to authorities.
31We carried out a full-text search of the news reports for the following keywords: “Bank of Japan”, “Ministry of Finance”,
“Finance Minister”, “yen”, “dollar”, “target”, and “objective”. Sources were not restricted as we wanted to be able to capture
local newswires.
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Table 3.5: Sample of news reports used to build the target level variable
Date Source Relevant text of the news report
11th December 1997 New York Times E. Sakakibara, Japan’s Vice Finance Minister for In-
ternational Affairs, said the excessive yen weakness
was undesirable. Mr. Sakakibara added that Japan
would take the appropriate steps in the currency mar-
kets.
2nd April 1998 Financial Times Japan’s finance minister, said: “The yen’s fall is un-
favourable. We will continue to monitor market de-
velopments and respond in a timely and appropriate
manner”.
2nd September 2003 Dow Jones Int. News There is no real reason for the yen to strengthen in
foreign exchange markets at present, a top Japanese
Ministry of Finance official said Tuesday, likely reflect-
ing MoF concern over recent rise of the yen against the
dollar.
9th December 2003 Dow Jones Int. News The yen’s latest surge against the dollar is out of
step with economic fundamentals, Japanese Finance
Minister S. Tanigaki said Tuesday, a clear signal to
traders that Tokyo remains poised to curb the yen’s
rise through market intervention.
Note: The news reports in this table clearly indicate that the authorities are uncomfortable with
the current exchange rate level.
Table 3.6: Sample of news reports used to build the target volatility variable
Date Source Relevant text of the news report
2nd April 1993 Agence France-Presse “It is not desirable for the yen to fluctuate wildly in
a short period of time” Ozaki [Japanese Vice-Finance
Minister] added. “Currently, the yen is swinging too
much”.
8th October 2003 Kyodo News Finance Minister S. Tanigaki said Wednesday that
swings in the dollar-yen exchange rate are too rapid
and that Japan remains committed to its policy of in-
tervening to stem volatility in the currency market.
14th November 2003 AFX Int.Focus On Friday, Japanese finance minister S. Tanigakai was
quoted [...] as saying that fluctuations in the forex
market were too rapid and that Japan was ready to
stem the volatility.
5th January 2004 Kyodo News The Finance Ministry’s top bureaucrat said Monday
that Japanese monetary authorities [...] will continue
acting against excessive volatility in the foreign ex-
change market. “We believe that recent movements
have been rather rapid”.
Note: The news reports in this table clearly indicate that the authorities are uncomfortable with
the current exchange rate volatility.
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Chapter 4
A unified approach to the intervention
process1
4.1 Introduction
Direct central bank interventions remain an important policy instrument used by major central banks
to influence the dynamics of the foreign exchange (FX) market. In the 1980s and the 1990s, the US
Federal Reserve (Fed) and the Bundesbank relied extensively on unilateral and concerted operations to
counteract what they considered to be undesirable developments in major exchange rates. While the
US and European monetary authorities have become more reluctant to intervene over time, the Bank
of Japan (BoJ) has remained very active. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the BoJ has been present
in the foreign exchange market more than 300 times and has played a major role by conducting very
large-scaled operations (such as those undertaken in June 1998 when the Bank of Japan purchased more
than 20 billion USD on a single day).
Intervening in the FX market is a complex process that displays several dimensions which are not
always easy for researchers to understand. A first important dimension concerns the determinants of
interventions. This has been extensively explored in the empirical literature (Almekinders and Eijffinger,
1996; Baillie and Osterberg, 1997; Ito, 2003; Ito and Yabu, 2007 and Kearns and Rigobon, 2005).
The main results suggest that interventions tend to be conducted to counteract large deviations of the
exchange rate from past levels. These studies have also highlighted the existence of no intervention
bands, suggesting that monetary authorities incur significant costs when intervening on foreign exchange
markets.
Another, less-studied, dimension involves the type of intervention conducted. Basically, when inter-
1This chapter is extracted from an article entitled “Intervention policy of the BoJ: A unified approach” that has been
written in collaboration with Michel Beine (ULB), Jean-Yves Gnabo (FUNDP) and Christelle Lecourt (FUNDP).
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vening, monetary authorities might or might not wish to conceal their operations. As emphasized by
Sarno and Taylor (2001) and Vitale (2006), central bank interventions usually aim to provide market
participants with some private information, and so, according to the signaling theory (Mussa, 1981), the
use of secret operations is puzzling. The BoJ has used secret interventions intensively in recent years
(see Beine and Lecourt, 2004 and chapter 3 of this thesis), which suggests that this issue is of much more
than purely academic interest. While a couple of theoretical rationales have been provided to the use of
secret interventions (Bhattacharya and Weller, 1997; Vitale, 1999 and Chiu, 2003), only a few empirical
studies have attempted to identify the determinants of this choice. In particular, in chapter 3 of this
thesis, we have explored this topic by studying the share of interventions by the BoJ which were hidden
from the market in recent years.
A final dimension is the detection of foreign exchange operations by market participants. While central
banks can ensure that the market detects their interventions by confirming their operations, when they
opt for secrecy, they cannot be certain that their actions will remain undetected. The circumstances in
which the market remains unaware of interventions have been investigated in chapter 3 of this thesis.
We suggested that FX market traders can detect the presence of the central bank more or less easily
depending on the features of the operation (such as the size or the timing). A failure in the strategy
of maintaining secrecy about an intervention the central bank wanted to hide would obviously erode its
credibility and reputation. Therefore, a good understanding of the features involved in the process of
detecting those operations might be important for central banks for policy purposes.
Most studies have dealt with these three dimensions separately. One of the primary aims of the present
chapter is, then, to consider them as interdependent processes, and to identify the main determinants
of the various outcomes peculiar to the intervention process. Using data on the intervention policy of
the BoJ over the period 1991-2004, we estimate a discrete choice model describing each of the above
dimensions. More precisely, we use a nested logit model that allows to simultaneously identify the
determinants of the intervention activity, the incentives for the central bank to opt for secrecy, and the
variables at stake in the detection of FX operations by market participants.
This approach offers two main advantages that allow some new light to be shed on key elements
of the intervention policy. First, the various dimensions related to the intervention activity are likely
to be highly interdependent. That is, an element related to one dimension of the intervention process
might well influence the outcome of another dimension. For instance, the fact that the central bank
can intervene with a fairly good probability of not being detected by the market may increase the scope
for intervention. Another implication of the interdependence of these dimensions is that they might be
influenced by the same set of determinants. An example of this is provided by communication policy.
Official statements about the exchange rate policy or the general stance of the FX market can increase
or decrease the use of interventions (depending on whether statements are considered as substitutes
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for or complements to actual FX operations). Furthermore, since authorities’ communication strategies
generally aim to increase the transparency of their policy, official statements might be expected to lower
the propensity to use secret interventions. The estimation of a nested logit describing the various steps
of the intervention process, then, allows their interdependence to be taken into account, and leads to a
better understanding of the exchange rate policy.
A second advantage concerns the way we specifically address the secret intervention puzzle. Two
conditions must be fulfilled for an intervention to remain effectively secret: (i) the central bank must
decide to conceal the operation and (ii) market participants must not detect it. In order to assess the
statistical significance of the determinants influencing the choice of secrecy by the central bank and the
detection process by market participants, it is necessary to make a clear distinction between interventions
the BoJ wanted to make public and those it wanted to keep secret. This is achieved by using auxiliary
information about rumors, as in Gnabo and Lecourt (2005)’s recent work. This procedure overcomes one
limitation of the analysis conducted in chapter 3 of this thesis, in which we did not distinguish public
interventions from those authorities had failed to keep secret, and had to make an ex ante distinction
between the two sets of explanatory variables. Our approach allows to consider the choice of secrecy
made by central banks and the detection of official trades by market participants as different steps in
the intervention process. Furthermore, it allows the secrecy puzzle to be considered within the whole set
of decisions made by central banks when intervening on the FX market.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 clarifies a set of useful concepts, while section 3 reviews
the existing literature. Section 4 presents the nested logit model which allows the intervention policy
to be analyzed as a sequential process. It also discusses specification issues. Section 5 gives details of
the data used in the econometric analysis, while section 6 reports and discusses the econometric results.
Section 7 presents our conclusions.
4.2 Some useful definitions
Before discussing the empirical literature and describing our analysis, it might be useful to clarify the
concepts surrounding interventions on the FX markets. To this end, we present below several useful
definitions that should help the reader to have a clear overview of the concepts used in this chapter.
1. An (actual) FX intervention carried out by a central bank is a direct sale or purchase of foreign
currency on the spot market that is intended to influence the value of the exchange rate. This
intervention is unilateral if there is a single central bank present in the market. If two or more
central banks undertake the same intervention (same market, same direction and on the same day)
with their own funds, the intervention is considered coordinated.2
2Interventions conducted on behalf of other central banks are not considered coordinated. Coordination requires each
central bank to intervene with its own funds.
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2. An official intervention is an intervention which is confirmed by official data released after
some time lag (usually three to six months) by the central banks themselves. The data allows
interventions that have actually taken place to be identified. This contrasts with interventions
inferred from news papers reports (i.e. non official sources).
3. A secret intervention is an intervention that the central bank wants to carry out in a discreet
way. By contrast, a public intervention is an operation that the central bank wants to disclose to
market participants, either through the way the orders are given to FX traders or through official
statements aimed at drawing the attention of market participants.
4. A detected intervention is a central bank intervention (secret or public) which is detected
by market participants (usually FX dealers) the day it is carried out.3 On the other hand, an
undetected intervention is an operation of which agents are unaware on the day it is conducted.
5. The combination of the secret/public distinction and the detection process leads to a further
distinction: detected secret interventions and undetected secret interventions (also called pure
secret interventions). By definition, public interventions are always detected.
Importantly, the distinction between “public” and “secret” interventions relies on the willingness of the
central bank to make the operation known to market participants. This contrasts with the notion
of “detected” or “undetected” interventions which relies on an ex post assessment of the perception of
these operations by market participants (for instance by newswire reports). This means that a secret
intervention can be detected, in spite of the efforts of the central bank to conceal it, if FX dealers have
an efficient detection system in place. In other words, the fact that the central bank tries to keep an
intervention secret is not sufficient to ensure that it remains undetected.
4.3 The previous literature
The empirical literature devoted to decisions on interventions can be divided into (i) studies focusing on
the intervention decision itself, (ii) studies rationalizing the use of secret interventions and (iii) analysis
of the processes by which market traders detect central bank operations. Most of these studies have dealt
with these issues separately, without taking into account their interdependence. One of the primary aims
of this chapter is to fill this gap and to identify the main determinants of the various outcomes of the
intervention process. To highlight the contribution of this chapter, we first briefly review the existing
literature.
3Another definition of a detected intervention is that it is an intervention which is confirmed by official data. Our
definition refers to a short-run notion of detection and secrecy, and is consistent with most studies of secret operations (see,
for instance, Dominguez, 1998).
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4.3.1 Intervention decisions
Most papers dealing with central banks reaction function (Almekinders and Eijffinger, 1996; Ito, 2003;
Ito and Yabu, 2007 and Kearns and Rigobon, 2005) derive it from a loss-function minimization program
by assuming specific processes for the exchange rate dynamics (e.g. random walk or auto-regressive
processes). Losses increase with deviations of the exchange rate from the central bank’s target (several
definitions have been used, such as the fundamental equilibrium rate or a weighted target derived from
past exchange rate levels). The central bank is also assumed to incur a loss if it faces excessive exchange
rate volatility. The results of these studies indicate, quite robustly, that intervention policies are designed
to counter large deviations of the exchange rate from the central bank’s target. More generally, there is
considerable consensus that central banks tend to adopt a leaning-against-the-wind strategy to counter
inappropriate exchange rate dynamics. Research on the volatility issue provides less robust results. It
indicates, however, that central banks tend sometime to intervene to calm disorderly markets (Baillie
and Osterberg, 1997). Note that an important result of chapter 1 of this thesis is that central banks
seem to be more concerned by increases in the daily volatility rather than by overall volatility levels or
regimes. The weaker evidence on volatility may come from the fact that interventions themselves can
stimulate volatility. Another explanation may be that the volatility measures generally used in empirical
studies are generated regressors (Pagan, 1984).
Empirical results also indicate that current interventions depend strongly on past intervention activity.
This is reflected by the clustering pattern of foreign exchange operations that can be explained by their
related cost (which is reduced if interventions are conducted several days in a row, according to Ito
and Yabu, 2007). There is also considerable debate about whether actual and oral interventions are
substitutes or complements. Fratzscher (2004) has shown that oral interventions can be a good alternative
to actual FX purchases and sales, suggesting that these instruments are substitutes. However, Beine et al.
(2004a) have shown that some of these statements can be used as efficient complementary tools. More
generally, in chapter 1 of this thesis, we have seen that the substitute/complement role of oral and actual
interventions depends on the overall market conditions.
4.3.2 Secret intervention strategy
Central banks can adopt different intervention strategies. In particular, they have to decide whether to
intervene secretly or publicly.4 However the use of secret interventions remains a puzzle, given that the
main theory used to explain how interventions work (the signaling channel framework) fails to explain
their use (Sarno and Taylor, 2001 and Vitale, 1999). Indeed, this theory suggests that an intervention
has to be detected by market participants in order to be effective, as it works by influencing their
4Using evidence from recent BoJ practices, Beine and Lecourt (2004) conclude that secret interventions constitute an
important stabilization tool.
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expectations concerning the future value of exchange rates. Nevertheless, theoretical arguments have
been developed to rationalize the use of secret interventions (see, inter alia Vitale, 1999 and Chiu, 2003).
The main reasons suggested involve the inconsistency of an intervention with the objective of reducing
the misalignment, the bad past performance of the intervention activity, and, generally, the low likelihood
of conducting a successful intervention.
A first step in testing the relevance of these variables was provided in chapter 3 of this thesis using
a single logit approach.5 We analyzed the probability of an intervention being conducted secretly by
assuming we were able to disentangle the determinants of the detection process from the determinants
of the decision to use secret operations. In contrast with Chiu (2003)’s conjecture, our results indicate
that authorities tend to avoid the use of secret interventions when their past interventions have failed to
deliver the intended outcome. On the other hand, the results also support Vitale (1999)’s view, in that
secret interventions tend to be used when the operation runs counter to that which would be needed to
reduce the misalignment.
4.3.3 Detected and undetected secret interventions
A central bank’s adoption of a covert or public intervention strategy has an impact on other characteristics
of its interventions, such as their size, frequency, and the degree of international coordination. In turn,
these elements define the exact nature of interventions and determine whether or not the market can
easily detect the operations. This arises directly from the fact that, by choosing a specific disclosure
strategy, the central bank explicitly chooses to maximize or minimize the signal sent to the market.6
This has been discussed by Beine and Lecourt (2004) and in chapter 3 of this thesis: large, frequent, and
internationally coordinated interventions have a higher probability of being detected by the market than
small, sporadic and unilateral interventions. According to Neely (2006), these findings are strikingly in
accord with central bankers’ opinions about the key variables influencing the detection process. These
findings, thus, provide evidence about how central banks should intervene if they want the signal sent
to the market to be clear, strong and efficient with respect to their general policy. These results also
emphasize the existence of conflicting interests when FX authorities decide to conceal their operations.
In this case most of the effect occurs through the portfolio and microstructure channels, so that there is
a trade-off between the authorities’ desire to increase the portfolio effects and their wish to keep their
intervention secret.
5Another interesting approach is provided by Neely (2006)’s updated survey of authorities’ beliefs about interventions.
He asked 27 central banks why they opted for secrecy. Most of the responses appear to be consistent with the variables
tested in chapter 3 of this thesis and in this chapter.
6According to the microstructure approach to FX interventions (see Lyons, 2001 and Evans and Lyons, 2001), the
secrecy of orders flows allows an intervention to be indistinguishable from private trades.
91
4.4 Econometric approach: a nested logit model
As discussed in the previous section, the intervention process involves three distinct steps (i.e. the
intervention decision, the choice of intervention strategy, and the market’s perception) that should all
be incorporated into a single model. Nested logit specifications (Ben-Akiva, 1973) are well suited for
this. They extend the well-known multinomial logit model by relaxing the independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) hypothesis. The IIA hypothesis is a central assumption of multinomial logit models
which states that the ratio of the probabilities of choosing any two alternatives should be independent of
the choice set. Nested logit models relax this restrictive assumption by allowing the different alternatives
to be organized in groups and by letting within-group cross-elasticities be larger than those between
groups (for a comprehensive discussion, see McFadden, 1984).7
We consider a three-levels nested logit in which, generally, the set of choices faced by an individual
is partitioned in nests (i = 1, ..., N) and sub-nests (j = 1, ..., Ni) of alternatives (k = 1, ..., Nij). This
structure is well adapted to our case (see figure 4.1). Indeed, authorities have first to decide whether
to intervene or not. This decision is represented by the two nests “No intervention” and “Intervention”.
Then, if the central bank decides to intervene, it has to opt for a disclosure strategy. That is, the
“Intervention” nest is partitioned into two sub-nests denoted by “Public” and “Secret”. While sub-nest
“Public” only contains one alternative corresponding to the occurrence of a public intervention, the sub-
nest “Secret” is composed of alternatives “Detected secret” and “Pure secret” respectively corresponding
to the detection or not by market participants of an operation authorities tried to conceal.8
Formally, the probability problem supposed by a three-levels nested logit model is given by equation
(4.1). Pijk is the probability of choosing alternative k in sub-nest j of nest i. Pk|i,j , Pj|i and Pi denote
the conditional probability of choosing alternative k, sub-nest j and nest i respectively. Adapted to
our framework, the underlying intuition of equation (4.1) is that the probability of having a detected
secret intervention on a given day depends on the probability of market participants detecting a secret
interventions weighted by the probability of authorities opting for secrecy which in turn is weighted by
the probability of authorities deciding to intervene.
Pijk = Pk|i,j × Pj|i × Pi (4.1)
Econometrically, estimating the nested logit model requires determining analytical forms for the
different terms of equation (4.1). For this, as nested logits were originally introduced as choice models,
a random utility function for alternatives k should be specified.9 It corresponds to equation (4.2). This
7Hausman and McFadden (1984) propose a test of the validity of the IIA hypothesis. However this test suffers from
several drawbacks, and so, we used the Small-Hsiao test instead (Hsiao and Small, 1985).
8Note that, for technical reasons, the nest “No intervention” is composed of a single sub-nest also called “No intervention”
that contains a single alternative corresponding to the decisions of authorities of not intervening.
9It should be stressed that our model is not strictly speaking a choice model since it is not the central bank that decides
whether a secret intervention is going to be detected by market participants or not. In this respect, our model should
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random utility function is composed of a term specific to the alternative (V˜ijk), a term specific to the
sub-nest (V˜ij) and a term specific to the nest in which it is located (V˜i). *ijk, *ij and *i are independent
extreme value distributed error terms with σij , σi and σ as their respective scale parameters.
Uijk = V˜ijk + *ijk + V˜ij + *ij + V˜i + *i (4.2)
Similarly, a pseudo-utility function is associated to each nest and sub-nest of the model. They
correspond to equations (4.3) and (4.4). Iij and Ii are inclusive values that permit the lower level utility
to be incorporated into the upper level.10






















Following Maddala (1983), we set V˜ijk = αXijk, V˜ij = βZij and V˜i = γWi in equations (4.2), (4.3)
and (4.4). Xijk, Zij and Wi are respectively the vectors of specific attributes of alternative k, sub-nest
j and nest i. α, β and γ are parameters to be estimated. Then, given the assumed distribution of *ijk,















































Equations (4.5), (4.6) and (4.7) determine a general three-levels nested logit model. In our framework,
equation (4.7) would describe the decision of authorities of intervening or not. Vector W then designs
variables usually used in the literature on central bank reaction functions (i.e. the deviation with respect
to the central bank’s target, the volatility, the recent intervention activity and the communication policy
of the central bank). Equation (4.6) corresponds to the choice of a disclosure strategy by the central
bank. Z is a set of determinants explaining the use of secret or public interventions (i.e. inconsistency
be seen as a mixed choice-model in which both authorities decisions and market participants actions determine the final
outcome.
10The software used to estimate our model (Alogit) uses a different definition of the pseudo-utility functions, principally
















Figure 4.1: Problem faced by the central bank
with respect to the objective of reducing the deviation from the central bank’s target, the performance of
past interventions, and the likelihood of success). Finally, equation (4.5) is related to the perception of
interventions by market participants. The variables indicated by X (i.e. the size of the intervention, the
clustering of interventions, the extent of international coordination, and the success of an intervention)
influence the ability of market participants to detect interventions that the central bank wanted to
conceal.
Estimates of α, β and γ are obtained by maximum likelihood techniques.11 These parameters can
only be estimated up to the scale parameters. Since only their ratio is actually meaningful it is then
usual to arbitrarily fix (i.e. normalize) the value of the scale parameters. Alogit performs a normalization
“from the bottom” (Ben-Akiva, 1973 and Ben-Akiva and Bierlaire, 1999).12 That is, it constrains one
of the scale parameters at the bottom level of the model. This dramatically simplifies the estimation
process (Daly, 1987).
4.5 The data
Data constraints play an important role in assessing the determinants of secret and detected interventions
empirically, since this information is not directly observable. In this section, we detail the building of
the dataset used to estimate the model made up of equations (4.5), (4.6) and (4.7). We start by focusing
on the intervention data, and the way we disentangle, first, secret and public interventions and, then,
pure secret and detected secret operations. Then we turn to the description of the data corresponding
to variables X, Z and W .
11Note that, for estimation purposes, only γ contains a constant.





We start with the official data on interventions released by the Japanese authorities. Daily data is
available from 1 April 1991 onwards. Our investigation period ends in September 2004 and encompasses
343 official intervention days. Note that starting with official data (i.e. data on interventions that
have actually taken place) allows us to circumvent the issue of spuriously reported interventions (when
market participants erroneously believe that an intervention has occurred). This contrasts with studies
identifying interventions with unofficial data sources such as news reports (see Dominguez and Frankel,
1993 for a discussion of this practice).
Using newswire reports to identify public and secret interventions
The identification of public and secret interventions can be achieved by comparing actual and market-
reported interventions (see, inter alia, Dominguez, 1998; Beine et al., 2002 and Beine and Lecourt,
2004). While actual interventions can be correctly assessed using official intervention data, different
techniques have to be used to determine whether or not market participants were informed that the
central bank was in the market. Some previous studies have used reports from financial newspapers
(Bonser-Neal and Tanner, 1996 and Dominguez, 1998). This method does not, however, appear to be
particularly accurate. Subsequent studies (Galati and Melick, 1999 and Beine and Lecourt, 2004) have
shown that news reports from wire sources such as Reuters, Bloomberg and Dow Jones capture many
more intervention episodes. This is consistent with Oberlechner and Hocking (2004)’s view that newswire
services are the most important sources of information available to traders and often reflect both market
participants’ perceptions and their interpretations.
In this study, we distinguished between public and secret official interventions by using information
provided by newswire reports. To this end we used the online database Factiva (including Dow Jones and
Reuters reports) from which news reports can be extracted in real time. To find reports related to central
bank intervention activity, we used the method pioneered by Beine and Lecourt (2004) and Gnabo and
Lecourt (2005) that consists of searching for a set of relevant keywords within the main core of the text of
the news. Then, these reports are classified according to the degree of certainty of the information about
the occurrence of the intervention. In turn, this criterion is used first to decompose official interventions
into public and secret interventions and, subsequently, to decompose secret interventions into pure secret
and detected secret interventions. We discuss this in detail below.
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Table 4.1: Examples of news reports used to identify public interventions
Date Sources Relevant text of the news report
19th September 1994 Reuters “BoJ buys dlrs persistently at around 98.60 yen”.
6th September 1995 Dow Jones “Early Tokyo: dollar surges after BoJ buying”.
10th April 1998 Reuters “Dollar down sharply vs. yen on BoJ
intervention”.
21st June 1999 Reuters “Dollar climbs amid BoJ seen continuing to buy
dlrs above Y122- bankers”.
21st June 1999 Dow Jones “N.Y. Early: Dollar up vs. Yen After BoJ
intervenes”.
17th September 2001 Dow Jones “Dollar rises near to Y118 on BoJ FX
intervention”.
14th October 1999 Dow Jones “BoJ conducts Yen-selling intervention”.
Note: Reports in this table indicate that the market clearly knew that an intervention was taking
place in the market.
Identifying public interventions
According to the signaling channel theory (Mussa, 1981), central bank intervention operations convey a
signal about the future value of fundamentals. The process of disseminating the signal may be divided
into three steps. First, depending on whether the central bank wants its intervention to be perceived or
not, some agents detect the presence of the central bank in the market. At this stage, the signal is only
seen by a small audience, and may not be considered as publicly known (some privileged agents such
as major commercial banks may be explicitly informed of the intervention by the central bank itself).
Afterwards, the news of the intervention is reported by newswire journalists through their personal
network of traders, bankers and brokers in the market. Finally, the news is relayed to the whole market
through newswires such as “BoJ seen buying dollars at around 104.00 yen in Tokyo - Reuters, August
11, 1993”, so definitely making it public.13
Public interventions are then identified as those that were firmly or clearly reported in newswires
(whether through direct detections by market participants or by official speeches announcing the opera-
tion).14 Here “clear” means that the report removes any remaining ambiguity concerning the occurrence
of the operation and reflects the willingness of the central bank to be seen by the market to be intervening.
Examples of this type of news report are given in table 4.1.
Identifying secret interventions
A central bank can also decide to step into the market without drawing traders’ attention to its action.
Several strategies are available in order to keep an intervention secret (as presented in chapter 3 of this
thesis). For instance, the central bank can intervene in a discreet way by using unilateral operations
13Dominguez (2003) suggests that this process may take approximately 15 minutes.
14Keywords such as “BoJ”, “Bank of Japan” and “interventions” were used to identify clear reports of interventions (i.e.
reports with a high degree of certainty).
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and low amounts. It can also choose to operate with unusual partners (for example through major
foreign banks or brokers). Nevertheless, the central bank may be detected by traders or bankers who
suspect that authorities have placed orders. In turn, these traders might report the news to the market.
That is, the central bank’s intention to keep its operations secret is not sufficient to ensure that market
participants do not detect them. Therefore, secret interventions have to be further split into “pure secret
interventions” (i.e. interventions that the central bank managed to keep secret) and “detected secret
interventions” (i.e. interventions that were detected by market participants despite the central bank’s
efforts to conceal them).
Secret interventions are defined as those for which there was either no report at all or a report with
a high degree of uncertainty.15 More precisely, “pure secret interventions” are secret interventions which
were not detected by the market (i.e. for which there were no news reports of the intervention at all).
Conversely, “detected secret interventions” are secret interventions which were detected by the market
but with a high degree of uncertainty (i.e. for which there was a highly uncertain news report about the
intervention). Table 4.2 provides examples of this type of news report. Given their degree of uncertainty,
these news reports can also be called rumors of intervention (Gnabo et al., 2006).16 That is, the market
suspects that the central bank has intervened, but is not absolutely certain. Importantly, while we do
not explicitly analyze the process through which rumors of intervention spread among FX dealers, we use
this type of information to make a distinction between interventions which are clearly perceived by the
market and those which are only guessed at by FX traders. This distinction between two types of secret
intervention (pure secret interventions and detected secret interventions) is an important contribution of
this work, and contrasts with previous empirical studies.
Summing up
Table 4.3 shows the number of official interventions (as indicated by the Japanese Ministry of Finance
itself) that were conducted over the period of interest. The methodology described in the previous
section allows us to determine that 212 of the 343 official interventions were public (i.e. clear reports
were found suggesting that market participants knew an intervention had been conducted) while 131
were secret (i.e. either no report indicating that an intervention had been conducted could be found or
the existing report did not exhibit a sufficient degree of clarity). Among these secret operations, the
Japanese authorities actually managed to conceal its operations on 75 occasions and failed 56 times.17
15News reports with a high degree of uncertainty can be easily recognized as they generally contain words such as “likely”,
“believed”, “may have/think”, “rumor”, “unconfirmed”, “suspected/speculation” and “covert”.
16We exclude reports of interventions occurring on days in which no official interventions were in fact carried out (i.e.
when the market mistakenly believed that the central bank had intervened). Such reports are called false reports.
17Galati and Melick (1999) also extract perceived interventions of the BoJ over the 1993-1996 period. They use reports
extracted from the Nexis-Lexis database. A cross-check between our findings and the ones of Galati and Melick (1999) shows
that both databases were quite effective in capturing the reported interventions. Over this period, only one intervention
(on the 3rd of November 2004) classified as secret in our data was reported by the Lexis-Nexis database. Conversely,
3 operations that were considered unreported in the Lexis-Nexis database were classified as public interventions in our
dataset. We are grateful to G. Galati for sharing his database with us.
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Table 4.2: Examples of news reports used to identify detected secret interventions
Date Sources Relevant text of the news report (classified as rumors)
3rd March 1995 Dow Jones “Though traders couldn’t confirm the BoJ intervention,
several said they were positive the central bank stepped
in the market stealthily at regular intervals Friday be-
tween 95.40-.50 yen”.
22nd February 1996 Reuters “US currency traders remain watchful of central bank
intervention to support the US dollar. After the Bank
of Japan was believed to have been in the market buy-
ing US dollars Thursday”.
21st May 2003 Reuters “Asia Forex -2: Dlr underpinned by rumored covert
MoF bids”.
29th October 2003 Dow Jones “In early New York trading. the dollar was trading at
108.04 yen. slightly above its latest three-year low be-
low 107.90 yen. with traders suspecting the Bank of
Japan might be quietly preventing further losses. Mar-
ket sources said the central bank may have been selling
yen for dollars in Asian trade but this could not be
confirmed”.
29th October 2003 Dow Jones “Dollar climbs amid suspicion of BoJ Intervention. The
dollar edged higher against its major rivals consoli-
dating gains as suspicions intensified that the Bank of
Japan had intervened covertly to weaken the yen”.
18th November 2003 Dow Jones “Several traders suspected the Bank of Japan acting on
behalf of Japan’s Ministry of Finance was intervening
covertly by selling yen around 108 yen to keep the dollar
from breaking into a free fall”.
20th February 2004 Reuters “It also broke above Y109 Friday for the first time since
early December, helped by what traders have cited as
covert dollar-buying by the Bank of Japan through
agent banks”.
Note: Reports in this table clearly indicate that the market does not know clearly whether an
intervention was taking place in the market, whereas official data ex post shows that it was the
case.
Table 4.3: Type of BoJ intervention 1991-2004
Trading days Official Reported Secret
Public Pure Detected
3498 343 212 75 56
Note: The table reports the number of trading days, the number of official interventions, those
the BoJ wanted to make public and those it wanted to conceal. The latter are further split into
those which were detected by the market and those which remained undetected.
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4.5.2 Explanatory variables
We turn now to the choice and measurement of the explanatory variables. These are summarized in
table 4.4 and discussed in more detail in the following sections.
Table 4.4: Empirical measures of the explanatory variables (W , Z and X) for central bank interventions
Variables Definition
W (intervention decision)
dev short Absolute level of short-term deviation in percentage.
dev medium Absolute level of medium-term deviation in percentage.
dev long Absolute level of long-term deviation in percentage.
mis Absolute level of misalignment in percentage.
misdum 1 if there is a large deviation between the current exchange
rate and its fundamental value.
statement 1 if authorities made a statement expressing some discom-
fort regarding the exchange rate level or volatility on the
day of the operation.
interventiont−1 1 if there was an official intervention the day before.
RVt−1 Exchange rate realized volatility of preceding day, esti-
mated at the end of the day.
Z (choice of secrecy)
leaning 1 if the intervention tries to reverse recent exchange rate
trend.
last reported success 1 if the last detected intervention was a success.
inconsist 1 if the intervention direction is inconsistent with the re-
duction of the exchange rate misalignment.
sum statement Number of statements from authorities signaling a discom-
fort regarding the exchange rate level or volatility in the 5
days preceding the intervention.
X (detection process)
amount Amount invested in the daily intervention.
coord 1 if intervention is concerted.
clusters 1 if there is at least one detected intervention over the last
5 preceding days.
success 1 if the intervention moves the exchange rate in the desired
direction.
Empirical counterparts of the intervention decision, W
The extensive literature on why central banks use FX interventions has been reviewed in several recent
surveys (e.g. Sarno and Taylor, 2001). Specific studies involving the BoJ include Ito (2003) and Ito and
Yabu (2007), among many others.
Exchange rate variation
Like other central banks, the Bank of Japan is reported to lean against the wind (i.e. to try to reverse
previous undesirable exchange rate changes). Ito (2003) observed that the BoJ intervened to stabilize the
spot exchange rate changes with respect to short-, medium- and long-term deviations. To capture this
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behavior, we use past exchange rate variations observed at one-day, one-month and one-year frequencies.
Three variables, denoted dev short, dev medium and dev long, were then built to reflect the size of
the (absolute) deviation of the current exchange rate from the previous day, the past one-month moving
average, and the past one-year moving average. The variables capture the dynamics of the exchange rate
around some implicit short-, medium- and long-term target respectively (see Almekinders and Eijffinger,
1996; Ito, 2003 and Ito and Yabu, 2007). Since interventions are supposed to influence the exchange rate
level, these variables may suffer from simultaneity problems if the contemporaneous exchange rate level,
st, is used. Therefore, our measure is corrected by using the one-day lagged JPY/USD rate (st−1) instead
of the current rate. From an economic point of view, this shift is meaningful, since the central bank should
presumably face administrative or political costs before implementing an intervention (Almekinders and
Eijffinger, 1996 and Ito and Yabu, 2007), so that a small delay, between the decision to intervene (based
on the exchange rate deviation, for example) and its implementation, may be expected. dev short is
computed as 100× |st−1 − st−2|. dev medium and dev long are computed as in equation (4.8).





st denotes the log of the JPY/USD rate at the close of the New York market (9 p.m. GMT +1), and i is
the time horizon in trading days (i=21 and 260). As in chapter 1, variables dev medium and dev long
are prior moving averages instead of usual central moving averages (in which the value of the moving
average is at the center of the interval of interest) to reflect the information available to authorities when
they decided to intervene.
Exchange rate misalignment
FX interventions are also supposed to reduce deviations of the exchange rate with respect to some
fundamental value (i.e. to minimize the degree of currency misalignment). The BoJ is charged with this
specific goal.18 We used a specific measure of the misalignment to test whether the intervention activity
responded to deviations of the exchange rate from its fundamental value.
The degree of misalignment (denotedmis) of the exchange rate level is measured by computing the size
of the (absolute) deviation of the current rate (more precisely st−1 to control for simultaneity issues) from
the equilibrium exchange rate. For the equilibrium rate we used that estimated by Bénassy-Quéré et al.
(2004) to reflect the level needed for a global equilibrium between the G-20 economies.19 The equilibrium
level of the JPY/USD exchange rate is estimated annually, so, to obtain daily values we interpolated
between the two end-of -year values. However, this variable can suffer from non-stationarity.20 To
18The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/exp/faqkainy.htm) stipulates that
the “Minister of Finance shall endeavor to stabilize the external value of the yen through foreign exchange trading and
other measures” (Article 7, section 3).
19Alternatively, we compute the misalignment from PPP yearly equilibrium rates provided by the OECD.
20The mis variable is obviously non-stationary if there is no tendency for the exchange rate to revert to the equilibrium
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cope with this, as an alternative used in a robustness check analysis, we constructed another measure
of misalignment (denoted misdum) which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 on days of high
misalignment and 0 otherwise. We consider the 10% of days with the highest positive misalignment and
the 10% of days with the highest negative misalignment as high misalignment.
Volatility
Although there is no explicit volatility target, the goal of “calming disorderly markets” is frequently used
by officials to justify interventions. We included a measure of exchange rate volatility to test to what
extent this actually influences the authorities’ behavior.
As suggested by Andersen et al. (2002), we use the realized volatility (denoted by RVt). This is
a consistent estimate of the integrated (latent) volatility and is less subject to the issue of generated
regressors (Pagan, 1984) than parametric estimates of the volatility (such as GARCH estimates). In
practice the realized volatility for day t is computed by sampling the intra-daily data at a high frequency
and cumulating the square products of the relevant returns over a specific horizon (here a day). If m
is the fixed sampling frequency (m=288 for 5-minute intervals over 24 hours), the daily measure of the





Since interventions are also known to raise volatility, we used the one-day lagged realized volatility.
This should be a good approximation, given the volatility clustering usually observed for exchange rates
(Andersen et al., 2001).
Statements
Statements (i.e. oral interventions) made by Japanese officials are also included in our model as they can
interact with actual interventions (as explored in chapter of 1 this thesis). The role of oral interventions
has been studied by several authors including Fatum and Hutchinson (2002) and Jansen and de Haan
(2005). Basically, these official statements can be regarded as a complementary or substitute tool for FX
operations. Fratzscher (2004) argues that oral interventions can be an alternative to physical sales or
purchases of foreign currency. Policymakers can try to regulate their currency by expressing their views
regarding the exchange rate value or the usefulness of interventions. Beine et al. (2004a), nevertheless,
also found support for a complementary role for contemporaneous statements. By clarifying the goal
of interventions and the context in which those operations were conducted, authorities can magnify the
value. It should also be stressed that, to the best of our knowledge, the consequences of non-stationarity in limited-
dependent variable models (such as the nested logit model) has received very little attention. Therefore, the alternative
measure of the exchange rate misalignment is only included in the robustness analysis.
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signal conveyed by actual operations. More generally, however, the first chapter of this thesis estab-
lished that only in extreme cases are financial operations likely to be accompanied by contemporaneous
statements.
Consistently with the definition of oral interventions adopted in chapter 1 of this thesis, two types of
statements are included in this analysis: (i) those giving pieces of information about the future exchange
rate policy (i.e. statements informing the market of the authorities’ view of exchange rates level or their
volatility) and (ii) those clearly indicating the possibility of a future intervention which may be seen
as threats to intervene (see Fatum and Hutchinson, 2002). A dummy variable (statement) is used to
indicate whether such statements occurred on a given trading day. We also built another variable (called
sum statement) to capture the number of official statements issued during the five days preceding an
intervention operation. This variable may be seen as an indicator of the state of the recent transparency
policy. Examples of this statements are in the appendix to chapter 3 of this thesis.
Lagged intervention
Finally, to capture the time dependency generally observed for central bank interventions, the first lag
of an intervention is included (interventiont−1). This captures the clustering nature of central bank
interventions over time. The literature usually explains this feature by the existence of “political costs”
associated with the intervention decision process (Almekinders and Eijffinger, 1996 and Ito and Yabu,
2007). As documented by Ito (2003) and Gnabo and Lecourt (2005), this approach has been widely used
by Japanese authorities during the last decade. As a matter of fact, the likelihood of an intervention by
the BoJ when there had been an intervention on the previous day was over 60% between 1991 and 2004.
Empirical counterparts of the choice of secrecy, Z
The decision to intervene secretly rather than publicly has been rationalized by a few authors. A review
of the various arguments in favor of secrecy has been proposed in chapter 3 of this thesis. Here, we
basically use the same variables. Note that in his updated survey, Neely (2006) investigates the same
underlying reasons for opting for secrecy.
Inconsistent interventions
An inconsistent intervention is an operation that attempts to move the exchange rate in the “wrong”
direction. The concept of wrong direction is of course not a natural one. For instance, inconsistency might
occur when the intervention targets a different value from the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate
(Vitale, 1999). These arguments have been developed within the microstructure approach to exchange
rates that relies on the twin assumptions of agents’ heterogeneity and information asymmetry. In that
framework, the secrecy of order flows allows trading by the central bank to be indistinguishable from
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private trades, and the central bank may then target an exchange rate that differs from the fundamental
one (Lyons, 2001 and Evans and Lyons, 2001).
The inconsist variable was introduced to capture the inconsistency of an intervention. It is a dummy
built by comparing the sign of the misalignment of the exchange rate with the sign of the official in-
tervention (sale or purchase), and takes the value 1 when the BoJ intervenes in the opposite direction
to that needed to reduce the misalignment (e.g. when the BoJ buys JPY when it is overvalued or sells
JPY when it is undervalued) and 0 otherwise. As an alternative, we consider the interaction between
the degree of misalignment and the inconsistency dummy. This variable (denoted inconsist×mis) aims
to give more weight to inconsistent policies occurring during periods of large over- or undervaluation of
the exchange rate.
Previous success of interventions
The previous success of FX operations can be seen as a measure of the credibility of a central bank. As
emphasized by Dominguez and Frankel (1993) and Chiu (2003), a low level of credibility, due to previous
failures in moving the market in the desired direction, might persuade the central bank to opt for secrecy.
Indeed, using secret interventions would allow the central bank to avoid a further deterioration of its
perceived ability to achieve a specific goal or to avoid significant increases of the exchange rate volatility.
Interestingly, central bankers themselves seem to think that the failure of previous interventions tends to
favor the use of secret operations (Neely, 2006). Alternatively, in the case of a previous reported success,
and when the current context appears less favorable, the central bank might also want to intervene
secretly to preserve its credibility. Therefore, credibility, as measured by the performance of previous
interventions, exerts an ambiguous theoretical influence on the use of secret operations.21
To assess the impact of the effectiveness of past interventions, we built a variable denoted last reported
success that takes the value 1 if the last detected intervention succeeded in moving the exchange rate in
the desired direction. It is worth noting that we restricted our analysis to detected interventions. Traders
might well be unaware of (undetected) interventions conducted during the past few days. Obviously, the
failure of these operations would not jeopardize the central bank’s credibility and, so, would not influence
the strategy for future interventions.
Leaning-against-the-wind
In the noise-trading channel theory, a secret intervention can mitigate bandwagon effects (Dominguez
and Frankel, 1993). Indeed, the secrecy of these order flows and the resulting increase in volatility might
restore a two-way risk and lead market participants to consider exchange rate fluctuations as purely
21More generally, central bank practices suggest that the performance of past interventions might influence a central
bank’s decision about its intervention policy. Results of the survey conducted by Neely (2001) indicate that a central
bank’s trading is influenced by the response of exchange rates to its previous interventions.
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endogenous to the market (Hung, 1997). Secrecy ensures then that the intervention works through a
pure portfolio effect, and that market participants will not react to the mere fact that the central bank is
leaning against the wind (perverse signaling effect). In this context, a leaning-against-the-wind behavior
can encourage secret operations.
These noise-trading arguments (Hung, 1997) were considered in our analysis by taking account of
whether the central bank has adopted a leaning-against-the-wind strategy. A variable (denoted leaning)
was built by comparing the sign of the intervention with the average sign of the last five daily exchange
rate returns. It takes the value 1 when the intervention goes in the opposite direction to the recent
exchange rate trend and 0 otherwise. We find that about two thirds of Japanese interventions were of a
leaning-against-the wind type.
Empirical counterparts of the detection process, X
Several variables have already been identified, in chapter 3 of this thesis, as major determinants of
the ways in which FX traders detect central bank operations. Nevertheless, as already discussed, this
analysis relies on the validity of an ex ante decomposition between Z and X. One of the purposes of the
nested logit approach adopted here is to assess the robustness of the previous findings by decomposing
the observed outcomes by decision levels. Beine and Lecourt (2004)’s preliminary analysis also provides
some clues as to which variables influence the probability of detecting the presence of the central bank
in the market. The relevance of these variables has been confirmed by Neely (2006)’s recent survey of
central bankers beliefs (see in particular table 3 of his analysis). These determinants mainly concern
features of central bank interventions. However, they also deal with market conditions.
Coordinated interventions
Coordination between two or more central banks is expected to increase the visibility of any operation.
As documented by Beine and Lecourt (2004) the proportion of unreported concerted interventions is low.
This is consistent with the fact that coordination is expected to increase the probability of detection by
most central banks (Neely, 2006).22
A dummy variable (denoted coord), taking the value 1 if the intervention is coordinated and 0
otherwise, was introduced. An intervention is considered coordinated if two or more central banks
intervened on the same day in the same market and in the same direction. In this analysis, as our focus
is on the JPY/USD market, we only consider coordination between the BoJ and the Fed. We use the
official data of the Fed to identify these days.
22It could also be argued that an agreement between several central banks to intervene at the same time reflects their
willingness to send a strong signal to the market. The use of secret interventions would be, then, inconsistent with such
an international agreement.
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Amount invested in daily interventions
The size of an intervention is expected to influence the extent to which traders can detect the presence
of the central bank. Indeed, central bankers consider the size of their interventions to be one of the
most prominent features influencing the detection process (Neely, 2006). The daily amount is therefore
expected to influence the rate of detection of interventions by the market positively. In theory, the daily
size of interventions not only reflects the size of the order flows given by the central bank but also their
number. However, this information is unavailable for most central bank operations, including those of the
BoJ. Therefore, in this study, the variable amount only reflects the total daily amount of an intervention
in billions of JPY.
Clusters of interventions
Detected interventions in the days preceding an intervention should raise traders’ awareness of the pres-
ence of the central bank in the market. Empirical reaction functions (Almekinders and Eijffinger, 1996;
Ito, 2003 and Ito and Yabu, 2007) suggest that the probability of intervening is higher when the central
bank has intervened in the previous days. This fits with the cluster behavior of central bank interventions
that has been documented in numerous studies. The existence of recent previous interventions is also
mentioned by central bankers as a key variable for the detection of FX operations (Neely, 2006). We
built a variable (clusters) that takes the value 1 if there was at least one perceived intervention during
the five days preceding an intervention operation.
Success
Finally, the success of an intervention can also influence the extent to which this intervention is detected.
Dominguez (2003) provides a stunning example of this by looking at the effect of the Fed’s intervention
on May 31, 1995. The first order by the Fed resulted in the DEM/USD rate jumping by more than 2%,
drawing the attention of traders and triggering newswire reports. Subsequent trades by the Fed on that
day were therefore easily detected.
In this study a given intervention is considered successful if it moved the exchange rate in the desired
direction. Although restrictive, this definition is consistent with the main objective of the BoJ over our
period of investigation. We compared the sign of the exchange rate return between day t− 1 and day t
with the sign of the intervention occurring on date t. Variable success takes the value 1 if a purchase
(sale) of yen led to an appreciation (depreciation) of the yen.23
23This variable uses a contemporaneous version of the success of a FX operation. This contrasts with the
last reported success variable used to explain the choice of secrecy.
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4.6 Econometric results
In order to assess the relevance of the nested logit framework described in the previous sections, we
estimated a multinomial logit model along with the nested logit itself. The significance of inclusive
values of the nested logit model as well as the likelihood ratio tests between the two models can be used
as a useful check of the relevance of the nested logit structure. The estimates of both models are shown
in table 4.5. Column (1) reports the estimates of the multinomial logit while Columns (2), (3) and (4)
give estimates of the full, semi-parsimonious and parsimonious nested logit models. Some robustness
checks were also conducted and are reported in table 4.6. First, we used a dummy variable (misdum) to
capture large degrees of misalignment as a way of accounting for the non-stationarity of mis (Column
(1)). Second, an alternative measure of the inconsistency of the exchange rate policy (inconsist×mis)
was introduced as a determinant of the use of secret interventions so as to give more weight to large
deviations of the exchange rate from the equilibrium level (Column (2)). Finally, the contemporaneous
and past official statements were introduced into the second level instead of the first one, to capture the
role of the communication policy (Columns (3) and (4)).
The results definitely support the nested structure of the model. All the Small-Hsiao tests reject
the validity of the IIA assumption, indicating some similarities among the alternatives.24 Moreover, the
nested logit model outperforms the multinomial logit, as suggested by the significance of the inclusive
values (Θ1 and Θ2) as well as by the large increase in the log-likelihood.25 The idea of interdependent
sequential steps in the intervention procedure rather than independent processes is thus supported.
Importantly, the nested logit framework implies that some of the estimates of the multinomial logit
might be subject to specification bias. This is important since for a (small) subset of variables, opposite
signs between the two models are obtained, stressing the importance of our new approach for policy
evaluation.
First level : intervention reaction function
For the sake of interpretation, it is important to mention that the underlying utility of the first level is
related to the no intervention outcome. In other words, positive (or negative) coefficients imply that an
increase in the explanatory variable tends to decrease (increase) the probability of intervention.
Our results indicate that an increase in the misalignment of the exchange rate tends to induce the BoJ
to be more active on the FX market (mis has a significant negative coefficient in tables 4.5 and 4.6). This
24These tests were conducted on several estimated models. We first tested the IIA assumption on the full model involving
all three levels. Then, we considered sub-models with either the first or the last two levels. In most cases, the p-values led
to a clear rejection of the IIA hypothesis.
25It is noteworthy that both Θ1 and Θ2 are greater than 1. According to McFadden (1984) they should be less than 1
for the nested logit to be consistent with the random utility maximization program which usually underlies such models.
However, the model presented in this chapter is not entirely a random utility maximization one. While the upper levels
clearly describe the behavior of an optimizing central bank, this is not true for the sub-nest containing “detected secret”
and “pure secret” interventions , which are exclusively related to the perception of the market. Therefore, the fact that Θ1
and Θ2 are both greater than 1 should not be of major concern.
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result does not seem to be driven by the non-stationarity of mis as we obtain similar results by using a
dummy variable (misdum) capturing large currency misalignments (see the upper panel of table 4.6).26
In contrast, our estimates do not support the idea that the BoJ reacts systematically either to variations
of the exchange rate from past values (dev short, dev medium and dev long are not significant) nor to
exchange rate volatility (RVt−1 is significant in the multinomial logit but not when a nested structure
is imposed). This result is consistent with Ito (2006)’s claim that, on average, central banks in general
and the BoJ in particular do not worry about volatility general levels. This is also consistent with Galati
et al. (2006)’s results.
Interestingly, official statements (statement) by the central bank are found to be positively related to
the probability of intervention. This supports the view that this instrument can be used as a complement
to central bank operations (Beine et al., 2004a). That is, statements accompanying interventions help to
clarify the message embodied in these operations. By informing the market about the authorities’ view
of exchange rate levels or volatility, or by indicating the possibility of a future intervention, statements
permit the BoJ to amplify potentially the results of its operations.
Not surprisingly, past interventions (interventiont−1) are found to be one of the main determinants
of the BoJ reaction function. This finding is fully in line with most other studies and is consistent with
previous research describing the administrative and political costs of interventions (Ito and Yabu, 2007)
and indicating that once the monetary authorities reach agreement on what threshold to defend, they
may conduct several interventions in a row. As subsequent interventions do not require any further
political bargaining, they are easier (and less costly) to implement.
Second level: secrecy puzzle
As for the first level, it is important to notice that the underlying utility of the second level depends upon
the decision to intervene publicly. That is, positive (or negative) coefficients imply that an increase in
the explanatory variable tends to increase (decrease) the probability of using a public intervention (i.e.
an intervention which the central bank wants market participants to know about) and so to decrease
(increase) the probability of using a secret intervention (i.e. an intervention the central bank wants to
hide from market participants). The estimates of the parameters in the second nest are directly linked
to the secrecy puzzle in the sense that they give some information about the determinants of the choice
of secrecy.
Interestingly, the three variables considered as determinants of the choice of secrecy all turn out to
be significant. Little evidence is revealed about the noise-trading channel as a way of explaining the use
of secret interventions by the BoJ. Indeed, while that argument would suggest that a leaning-against-
the-wind context would favor the use of secret interventions, we find the opposite effect (leaning has
26The use of the PPP-based misalignment provide similar results.
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Table 4.5: Multinomial logit and Nested logit estimation
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Top variables : intervention decision (Probability of non intervention)
Constant 5.225*** 1.556*** 1.543*** 1.546 ***
(0.236) (0.089) (0.086) (0.086)
dev short -0.128 -0.009 - -
(0.188) (0.034)
dev medium -0.106 0.005 - -
(0.074) (0.015)
dev long -0.019 -0.005 - -
(0.025) (0.005)
mis -0.016 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
statement -0.735*** -0.097** -0.100** -0.097**
(0.186) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
interventiont−1 -2.827*** -0.349*** -0.349*** -0.345***
(0.186) (0.050) (0.049) (0.048)
RVt−1 0.478*** 0.016 0.009 -
(0.181) (0.028) (0.022)
Mid variables : secrecy strategy (Probability of public intervention)
leaning 3.642*** 1.397*** 1.404*** 1.403***
(0.272) (0.082) (0.081) (0.081)
last reported success 3.532*** 1.421*** 1.411*** 1.406***
(0.363) (0.108) (0.107) (0.106)
inconsist -0.882*** 0.454*** 0.433*** 0.439***
(0.345) (0.163) (0.155) (0.156)
Bottom variables : detection process (Probability of detection)
amount 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
coord 5.964*** 2.369*** 2.363*** 2.362***
(1.650) (0.856) (0.854) (0.854)
success 2.359*** 1.515*** 1.509*** 1.511***
(0.409) (0.217) (0.215) (0.215)
clusters -0.364 0.443*** 0.444*** 0.442***
(0.402) (0.162) (0.160) (0.161)
Inclusive values
Θ1 - 3.507*** 3.466*** 3.472***
(0.443) (0.422) (0.425)
Θ2 - 2.125*** 2.137*** 2.136***
(.246 ) (0.245) (0.245)
Log Likelihood -705.232 -505.196 -505.769 -505.871
Note: Column (1) gives the estimates of the multinomial logit specification, while columns (2) to
(4) report the estimates of the full, semi-parsimonious and parsimonious nested logit models. The
10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively.
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Table 4.6: Nested logit estimation: Robustness analysis
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Top variables : intervention decision (Probability of non intervention)
Constant 1.467*** 1.525*** 1.460*** 1.403***
(0.074) (0.082) (0.078) (0.074)
misdum -0.087** - - -
(0.039)
mis - -0.005** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
statement -0.094** -0.092** - -
(0.039) (0.039)
interventiont−1 -0.354*** -0.356*** -0.320*** -0.265***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.043) (0.040)
Mid Variables: secrecy strategy (Probability of public intervention)
leaning 1.423*** 1.471*** 1.203*** 1.142***
(0.082) (0.085) (0.071) (0.068)
last reported success 1.441*** 1.413*** 1.295*** 1.231***
(0.108) (0.107) (0.098) (0.093)
inconsist 0.396*** - 0.480*** 0.453***
(0.153) (0.145) (0.116)
inconsist × mis - 0.018* - -
(0.010)
statement - - 0.418*** -
(0.062)
sum statement - - - 0.131***
(0.015)
Bottom variables: detection process (Probability of detection)
amount 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
coord 2.380*** 2.344*** 2.102*** 2.103***
(0.856) (0.852) (0.804) (0.775)
success 1.497*** 1.450*** 1.517*** 1.528***
(0.216) (0.199) (0.220) (0.218)
clusters 0.461** 0.491*** 0.448*** 0.464***
(0.159 ) (0.153) (0.150 ) (0.139)
Inclusive values
Θ1 3.457*** 3.203*** 3.564*** 3.688***
(0.420) (0.347) (0.443) (0.432)
Θ2 2.138*** 2.223*** 2.397*** 2.536***
(0.244) (0.244) (0.271) (0.283)
Log Likelihood -507.968 -511.452 -488.515 -485.675
Note: Estimates in this table correspond to robustness tests of the parsimonious nested logit
model. Column (1) considers a dummy version (misdum) of the misalignment variable. Column
(2) incorporates a continuous version of the variable measuring the inconsistency of an intervention
with respect to the objective of reducing the misalignment (inconsist ×mis). Columns (3) and
(4) include the variables statement and sum statement respectively at the second level. The 10%,
5% and 1% levels of significance are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively.
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a significant positive coefficient). This means that, when the BoJ conducts interventions to reverse a
recent trend, it tends to use public rather than secret interventions. Note that in chapter 3 of this thesis,
we also had not found any significant relation between the use of secret interventions and a noise trading
strategy. Of course, the way the noise-trading approach is tested in this model is quite unusual. Since
central banks do not often release information about their intervention strategies, indirect evidence has
to be used to assess the presence of such a channel. Further research is clearly needed before drawing
more conclusions. Nevertheless, our rejection of a noise-trading strategy is consistent with Neely (2006)’s
findings: on average, central bankers do not seem to believe that leaning-against-the-wind favors the use
of secret interventions.
Our results on the inconsistency of the exchange rate policy and the fundamental equilibrium exchange
rate differ from those obtained in chapter 3 of this thesis in which we had found that when the direction
of an intervention is inconsistent with a reduction in the degree of misalignment, the BoJ tended to
favor the use of secret interventions. The nested logit approach gives the opposite result (inconsist has
a significant positive coefficient). The findings of the multinomial logit (column (1) of table 4.5), suggest
that the previous result might be due to a failure to decompose the decision process into sequential
interdependent steps. Moreover, these results rely on the validity of an ex ante identification between
the determinants of secrecy and those favoring the detection of interventions. The present study, by
achieving a clear distinction between the different decision levels, allows the identification of the relevant
determinants to come directly from the theory. Furthermore, when large deviations of the exchange
rate from the equilibrium value are taken into account, the impact of inconsistent policies is much less
significant (see variable inconsist×mis in table 4.6). This result emphasizes the importance of the nested
logit structure that allows establishing a clear distinction between the decision to use secret interventions
and the detection process conducted by FX traders. This distinction is impossible in a multinomial logit
framework or in a simple logit model for detected and undetected operations. Furthermore, the fact
that inconsistency of intervention policy leads to the use of public interventions may be explained by
the hypothesis of multiple equilibria and by the view that interventions can be used in an attempt to
coordinate market participants’ expectations on an exchange rate level different from the prevailing one
(Reitz and Taylor, 2006). In this context, highly visible operations can be used as a device to alter
market expectations.
Estimates also show that a previous success tends to favor the use of public interventions (last
reported success has a significant positive coefficient). This result may be interpreted as authorities
taking advantage of their increased credibility (arising from their proven ability to influence the market
in the desired direction) for their subsequent interventions.
When statements are introduced at the second level (Columns (3) and (4) in table 4.6), a significant
positive correlation between statements and open interventions is established. This result holds both
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for contemporaneous statements and for statements issued in the days preceding the intervention and
indicates that, when the BoJ communicate frequently, it tends to use more public interventions.27
Third level: detection of interventions
The third level results concern the detection of secret interventions. A positive (or negative) coefficient
indicates that an increase in the independent variable increases (decreases) the probability of detecting
a secret intervention. Our estimates lead to a clear identification of the factors favoring the detection of
interventions by FX traders. Not surprisingly, large, concerted and frequent interventions are much more
easily detected than small, unilateral and sporadic ones (amount, coord and clusters have positive sig-
nificant coefficients). The relevance of these three determinants is strongly supported by central bankers
(see Neely, 2006). Successful interventions are also found to be more often spotted by FX traders than
unsuccessful ones, which supports Dominguez (2006)’s conjecture (success also has a positive signifi-
cant coefficient). Note that the estimates of the parameters in this nest are very robust to alternative
specifications.
Implications
By modeling the whole process relative to FX intervention activity, our analysis has delivered insights
that cannot be provided by separate investigations. The value added in terms of implications of our
work can be illustrated by two different examples.
First, our results suggest that the central bank (the BoJ) faces difficult problems when its previous
interventions have failed to deliver the desired objective. To see this, suppose that, during the previous
weeks, the interventions conducted by the bank have not succeeded in moving the exchange rate in the
desired direction. In this sense, the bank has a low degree of credibility. Assume also that the exchange
rate is misaligned so that interventions are required. Our results indicate that (i) the bank will tend to
intervene and (ii) it will favor the use of secret rather than public interventions. In this situation, only
portfolio balance effects can be expected to work, which in turn suggests that large currency purchasing
or selling amounts will be involved. However, large amounts increase the probability of interventions
being detected, which would undermine the secrecy strategy. As a result, the central bank faces a trade-
off over the size of its interventions. This may also explain why it might be difficult to produce efficient
interventions after a row of unsuccessful operations.
As a second example of the implications of this work, consider how communication policy interacts
with exchange rate policy. When a central bank tends to communicate quite often, according to our
results, it will favor public interventions. In this case, since there is no real detection process being
27Recent changes in communication regimes at the BoJ are fully consistent with these findings. Under Sakakibara’s
management (1995-2000), very few secret operations were used (see Beine and Lecourt, 2004). After this period, the BoJ
used much less oral communication and the proportion of secret operations increased strongly.
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undertaken by traders, the central bank can buy or sell large amounts of foreign currency. This is exactly
what was observed for the BoJ during the Sakakibara period (1995-2002), when oral communication was
often used alongside large and public interventions against the USD (Ito, 2003).28
These two examples suggest that the various determinants of the intervention process interact strongly.
They show that the central bank’s decision making involves a set of decisions rather than a simple choice
(to intervene or not to intervene). A full understanding of a given exchange rate policy requires a large
set of considerations, directly and indirectly related to interventions, to be taken into account.
Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the various steps undertaken by the BoJ when intervening on the JPY/USD
market. We have studied the determinants of three outcomes: (i) the decision to intervene, (ii) the use
of secret versus public interventions and (iii) the detection of secret interventions by FX traders. The
estimation procedure is based on a nested logit specification with three different levels. The specificity of
this model allows us to consider the various outcomes in an integrated framework with a clear distinction
between the levels.
Our results allow us to put previous empirical findings on the behavior of central banks in the FX
markets into perspective. On the whole, FX authorities are found to intervene to reduce misalignments
and to use their communication policy to further clarify their objectives. Once the decision to inter-
vene has been taken, the characteristics of the intervention depends on market conditions and the central
bank’s overall credibility. That is, visible operations are used when trying to reverse the prevailing trend,
while the failure of previous interventions encourages the central bank to opt for secrecy. Importantly, a
secret intervention has to remain undetected to ensure its consistency with the secrecy strategy. The way
interventions are conducted is then of overwhelming importance in influencing market participants’ de-
tection process. In this respect, our estimates suggest that a central bank trying to keep its interventions
undetected should choose to intervene unilaterally, with low amounts and in a sporadic way.
Our results also show that a full understanding of any intervention policy has to integrate a large set
of variables influencing the three levels discussed above. For instance, investing low amounts to reduce
the probability of detection of an intervention means that the portfolio and microstructure effects are
deliberately weakened. In other words, the central bank worsens its chances of moving the FX trend
28The so-called Sakakibara period includes the period during which E. Sakakibara was Director General of the Inter-
national Bureau of the Ministry of Finance and therefore in charge of the FX intervention of the BoJ. This period also
includes the period of office of his successor (i.e. H. Kuroda who basically followed the same type of intervention policy
(see Ito and Yabu, 2007 on this)). If we compare the Sakakibara period with the period between 1991 and 1995 on the one
hand, and the period after 2002 on the other hand, we observe striking differences. About two thirds of the official state-
ments were made during the Sakakibara period, which leads many observers to consider it as a period of high transparency
and communication. Almost all interventions during that period are found to be public, while for the other periods, the
proportions amount to 83% and 19% respectively. Finally, the average size of daily interventions amounts to 519 billions
of JPY during this period, compared to 46.8 and 273.4 billions of JPY during the first and the last period respectively.
The largest FX operation carried out by the BoJ also occurred during this period, more precisely on the 10th of April 1998
when the BoJ sold more than 20 billions of US dollars.
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successfully (which is the primary objective of the intervention). This puts the focus on a potential
trade-off for FX authorities between the necessity of influencing the exchange rate adequately and the
consistency with its general intervention strategy. Importantly, this dilemma only emerges when secrecy
is required. This might partially explain the well-known reduction in the effectiveness of opaque policy.
This reasoning illustrates the necessity of adopting a global approach to analyzing central banks’
behavior. More generally, it might open the door to further research. In particular, it would be interesting
to investigate in more detail the influence of constraints such as the objectives of exchange rate and
strategy on the critical amount invested in each intervention.
Finally, while our results are specifically related to the BoJ’s intervention policy, we believe that
they shed some interesting light on key variables influencing the exchange rate policy decisions of central
banks in general. Most of the results we obtained are consistent with the opinions of a large number of
central bankers about the appropriate way to intervene in the FX markets.
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General conclusion
This thesis is composed of four empirical chapters addressing specific questions related to interventions on
foreign exchange markets. This, unsurprisingly, appealed for appropriate econometric strategies whose
results should be examined with respect to the particular purpose of each chapter. Furthermore, it is
essential to keep in mind that the different parts of the thesis, on the whole, intent to provide elements
helping to understand the way authorities make their decisions concerning the different aspects of the
intervention activity. Therefore, principal results should also be reviewed with respect to this more
general objective.
Specific results for specific questions
Principal results of each chapter are reviewed under the light of their own objective.
Different types of interventions
In chapter 1, we propose a new approach to reaction functions. By contrast to previous works that
have considered oral and actual interventions separately, our method allows their inclusion into a single
model. For this, we classify theoretically the different types of interventions according to the “strength”
of the signal they convey. This task is achieved relying on an evaluation of the overall cost related to
interventions by assuming that the determination of authorities to correct an unwanted exchange rate
dynamics increases with the total burden cost they are ready to support. In other words, the cost of
interventions is used as a proxy to their strength. Importantly, since secret interventions cannot be
distinguished from private trades, they do not play any signaling role. Therefore, secret intervention
days cannot be distinguished from no intervention days. Our approach allows then examining precisely
the elements causing authorities to use one type of visible intervention rather than another.
The model is estimated using an econometric ordered probit specification. The estimations are con-
ducted on traditional interventions determinants (i.e. variables capturing the exchange rate level and
volatility dynamics and variables for the general economic situation) and using the Japanese experience
between 1991 and 2004 on the JPY/USD market. The main econometric results confirm that authorities
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tend to adopt a leaning-against-the-wind strategy. That means that they intervene to fight excessive
currency fluctuations. Volatility jumps are also found to induce authorities to intervene. This result is
important since it contrasts with other studies in the literature in which, generally, no effect is found
for the volatility. An interpretation of this is that authorities are less concerned by high volatility levels
than by sudden increases of the volatility. Finally, results on the general economic situation variables
indicate that authorities do not react to variations of real exports, presumably because they want to
avoid international pressures when manipulating exchange rates to defend their international position.
Furthermore, authorities seem to have used foreign exchange policy measures as a reaction to the de-
creasing inflation rate over the period under study. On the whole, our estimates also confirm the intuition
that if the exchange rate level moves in an inappropriate direction or if the volatility increases and these
fluctuations are moderate, authorities first use oral interventions (i.e. weak measures). Actual or con-
firmed interventions (i.e. stronger measures) are only used if the magnitude of fluctuations increases. In
a sense, authorities first try to correct things using cheap measures. More costly interventions are used
only if the former were not sufficient.
Institutional organization and intervention activity
The actual institutional organization underlying the intervention activity is examined in chapter 2 of
the thesis. Indeed, in many countries, the foreign exchange policy is in the hands of a specific political
authority (i.e. the Ministry of Finance), while the central bank only plays the role of agent by implement-
ing interventions orders. The theoretical model developed in this chapter considers that the objectives
pursued by these two agents are not necessarily the same. Indeed, political authorities may be more
concerned by short run evolutions of exchange rates while central banks may elaborate their exchange
rate objectives consistently with the general stance of their monetary policy, which requires a long run
perspective. Then, relying upon an interaction model for the political authority and the central bank, an
extended reaction function is derived that depends on exchange rate deviations from both authorities’
targets. That is, our extended reaction function establishes that the intervention policy is the result of a
trade-off between the achievement of the political authority’s or the central bank’s exchange rate target.
We estimate our model using a friction model with Japanese interventions on the JPY/USD market
between 1993 and 2000. Our results indicate that the Japanese Ministry of Finance internalized Bank
of Japan’s losses (due to an unwanted exchange rate level) and adapted its actions in accordance, con-
sistently with the intuitions of the theoretical interaction model. More precisely, it became reluctant
to intervene when the targets were incompatible (because it could not reduce its losses without hurting
central bank’s interests) and had an additional incentive to do so when targets were compatible (because
its actions were able to improve simultaneously both its and the central bank’s situation).
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The use of secret interventions
A first empirical analysis of the secrecy puzzle is proposed in chapter 3 of the thesis. The analysis takes
its roots in the observation that the signaling channel theory (i.e. the traditional framework explaining
how interventions work) fails to rationalize the existence of secret interventions. Several arguments for
the use of secret interventions have then been developed outside the signaling approach.
We assess these theoretical arguments using a logit model. The analysis relies on Japanese interven-
tions on the JPY/USD market over the period from 1991 to 2004. Basically, two sets of explanatory
variables are included into the model. The first is related to the process of detection of interventions by
the market. The second set concerns the incentives for authorities to opt for secrecy. Results indicate, for
the first set of determinants, that the amount invested in the intervention, the coordination with other
countries and the existence of recent past operations increase the probability of detection of interventions
by the market. From the second set of variables, we find that authorities tend to favor the use of secret
interventions when they act in the opposite direction to the one required to reduce the misalignment,
consistently with theoretical works of the microstructure approach to interventions.
A unified framework for the intervention process
To have a more precise view of the reasons underlying the choice of secrecy and the perception of market
participants, it is necessary to analyze the whole intervention process in detail. We examine these issues
in chapter 4 of the thesis in which we propose a unified approach to the intervention process. Indeed,
this process is made up of three steps that are respectively related to the decision to intervene, to the
use of secret interventions and to the market perception of secret interventions.
Since these steps are likely to be highly interdependent, we incorporate them into a single three-levels
nested logit estimated using Japanese data over the period from 1991 to 2004. Authorities are found to
intervene consistently to what is described in the literature. They lean-against-the-wind and fight large
deviations of the exchange rate from their target. Furthermore, once the decision to intervene is made,
the choice to intervene secretly is found to depend essentially upon the authorities’ overall credibility.
That is, the use of secret interventions is favored when previous operations failed in moving the exchange
rate in the desired direction. Moreover, authorities tend to avoid the use of secret interventions when they
try to reverse the general market’s trend. Importantly, when authorities decide to intervene secretly, it is
necessary to assess whether they managed to keep their operation effectively secret or if it was detected
by the market, in spite of their efforts. We find that the characteristics of the operation are essential
for this detection process. Unilateral, small sized and sporadic interventions are found to be the ones
that are less likely to be detected. Overall, our results confirm previous studies having considered these
different steps independently. By considering a unified approach to these steps, interestingly, new issues
became apparent. For instance, authorities face a trade-off when opting for secrecy. They have to choose
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between the necessity of maintaining the intervention undetected by the market (i.e. by investing small
amounts) and the necessity of ensuring the efficiency of the operation (i.e. by investing sufficiently large
amounts). Therefore, the choice of the type of intervention to conduct is not a trivial one. These issues
cannot be examined without a global approach to the intervention process. It arises, then, that a clear
understanding of the intervention policy has to integrate a large number of variables that are related to
the different steps of the intervention process.
Specific results for general questions
In the previous paragraphs, we reviewed results with respect to the specific goals pursued by the different
chapters composing this work. We now try to put these results in perspective by reviewing them under the
light of the more general objective of the thesis. For this, it is interesting to note that most explanatory
variables introduced in the empirical works can be classified in different general sets of variables. They
are described in table 1.
These sets of variables provide useful information concerning different aspects of the intervention
activity. Naturally, most of them are used in several chapters. Therefore, it is crucial to adopt a broader
perspective to determine which general conclusions can be drawn. Table 2 should help the reader to have
an overview of principal results of the thesis. Before examining them in detail, it is interesting to note
that these sets of variables suggest that authorities intervene on foreign exchange markets because they
believe that exchange rates do not behave in an appropriate way. They also indicate that authorities do
not hesitate to adapt the manner these corrective measures are implemented by adopting, for instance,
a specific disclosure strategy. While the work in this thesis does not directly addresses the issue of
market efficiency, it is interesting to briefly examine how our findings can be related to this question. At
first sight, results suggest that authorities do not believe in the efficiency of foreign exchange markets.
They seem to consider that, because of some sort of inefficiency, exchange rates can move away from
fundamentals or from some equilibrium level. However, this does not necessarily mean that foreign
exchange markets are inefficient. It just supposes that they do not behave consistently to what is
considered as “desirable” by authorities. For instance, abrupt but necessary adjustments of the exchange
rate following a period of destabilising speculation may generate substantial macroeconomic costs that
authorities may want to reduce with interventions. Overall, given the difficulty, even for authorities, to
determine if exchange rate movements are “good” or “bad” (for instance because it is difficult to determine
if exchange rate fluctuations are just temporary or not), our results reflect, at most, that authorities base
their interventions decisions on their own perception of what is appropriate or not concerning the foreign
exchange market and not necessarily on a certain vision of market efficiency.
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Table 1: Set of variables used in the thesis
Set of variables Description
Set 1 Past intervention activity (i.e. lagged interventions)
Set 2 Exchange rate level dynamics and misalignment (i.e.
exchange rate deviation from its past values/ a specific
target, measure of misalignment)
Set 3 Exchange rate volatility (i.e. evolution of realized
volatility, jumps)
Set 4 General economic situation (i.e. evolution of real ex-
ports, inflation)
Set 5 Secret interventions (i.e. inconsistency, performance of
past interventions)
Set 6 Detection by market participants (i.e. size, coordina-
tion, clustering)
Past intervention activity
The role of the past intervention activity (Set 1) is explicitly tested in chapters 2 and 4 of this thesis.
The objective of introducing this determinant is to take account of the inertia usually observed in the
intervention activity. It should be stressed that incorporating a measure of the past intervention activity
into the model presented in chapter 3 would not be relevant. Indeed, the model in question is estimated
on interventions days only. This supposes that the decision to intervene has already been made. The past
intervention activity is not included in chapter 1 neither, mainly for technical reasons. Indeed, because
of its structure (i.e. ordered outcomes), the lagged dependent variable would not be an appropriate
regressor (i.e. it would not allow the identification of the impact of a particular type of intervention
conducted in the past).
Our findings for this set of variables robustly indicate that the past intervention activity influences
the decision to intervene. More precisely, authorities tend to be more active in foreign exchange markets
when other interventions have been conducted in the previous days. This result is consistent with the
clustering pattern usually observed in the intervention activity. Furthermore, from the discussion in
chapter 2, this pattern can be explained by the presence of costs related to interventions. Inertia in
intervention decisions seems then to be related to the fact that the cost of intervening is lower for
subsequent interventions. Therefore, authorities will be less reluctant to keep intervening if they think
it is necessary.
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Exchange rate level dynamics and misalignment
The role of exchange rate level movements and the misalignment (Set 2) is tested in chapters 1, 2 and
4. These variables are used to examine whether authorities intervene to maintain exchange rates around
a given level. Since this level is difficult to measure, exchange rate movements from its past values are
used as a proxy of the target actually defended by authorities. Note that in chapter 2, we propose a
measure of this target (which is not very common in the literature). On the other hand, misalignment
measures are used to test whether authorities adopt mean-reverting strategies or not. These variables
are not included in chapter 3 since the approach in this chapter considers that the decision to intervene
has already been made.
Our results indicate that an increasing misalignment is a strong element causing interventions. Au-
thorities seem then to be concerned by maintaining the exchange rate at a level corresponding to fun-
damentals. This may be seen as the long run component of the intervention strategy. Furthermore,
by contrast to chapter 4 (in which the decision to intervene is treated in a very basic way), findings of
chapters 1 and 2 indicate that excessive movements of exchange rates from their past values (or a specific
target of authorities) are important determinants of interventions. This reflects that authorities’ actions
are intended to smooth exchange rate fluctuations in the short or medium run.
Exchange rate volatility
Volatility (Set 3) is tested in chapters 1, and 4. It is also introduced in chapter 3 but as an element
influencing the ability of market participants to detect official operations and not as a determinant of
interventions. These variables (based on the realized volatility) are useful to see how authorities respond
to rapid movements of exchange rates. Note that, since there are no elements pleading for the existence
of differences in terms of volatility objectives between the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan,
volatility measures are not included in chapter 2.
The role of volatility as a determinant to interventions does not seem to be definite. Chapter 1
supports a significant role for volatility, but only in extreme cases (e.g. volatility jumps). On the other
hand, results of chapter 4 are consistent with the bulk of the literature (i.e. volatility does not seem
to influence intervention decisions). On the whole, our findings concerning this variable are weak. This
may be explained by the fact that interventions tend to generate volatility. Authorities may then be
reluctant to risk destabilising the market any further by intervening.
General economic situation
The overall economic situation (Set 4) is only introduced in chapter 1. We test how authorities react
to changes of the macroeconomic environment. For this, we control for the evolution of real exports
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but also from the inflation rate. This set of variables is not usual in the literature. The analysis of
chapter 1 should then be seen as a first attempt to examine formally whether the general macroeconomic
environment influences foreign exchange interventions decisions. While results on real exports are not
conclusive, controlling for inflation indicates that authorities adapted their intervention policy to fight
deflation. This result is certainly specific to the Japanese case, especially given that pure monetary
policy measures are inoperative in a context of liquidity trap.
Secret interventions and detection by market participants
Empirical measures for the arguments rationalizing the adoption of a non disclosure strategy (Set 5)
mainly concern the inconsistency of official operations with respect to the aim of reducing the misalign-
ment and the performance of past interventions. On the other hand, elements favoring the ability of
market participants to perceive official operations (Set 6) principally capture the characteristics of inter-
ventions like their size, whether they are coordinated or not or whether they belong to a cluster. These
sets of determinants are peculiar to the study of the secrecy puzzle which is only addressed in chapters 3
and 4. Despite secret interventions are also discussed in chapter 1, they are not differentiated from days
of no interventions (i.e. the analysis relies on the signaling channel). Therefore, they are not analyzed
specifically.
Main results concerning the determinants of secret interventions indicate that authorities decide to
operate secretly when the performance of their past operations is bad. This robust result is confirmed
in chapters 3 and 4 suggesting, then, that secret interventions are decided by authorities to preserve
their credibility. Finally, the ability of market participants to detect interventions is found in chapters 3
and 4 to be strongly determined by the characteristics of interventions. Small, unilateral and sporadic
interventions are the ones that have the best probability of remaining undetected by the market. This
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